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How and why do leaders renege on their alliance commitments, despite institutional
incentives to cooperate? According to the research on alliance reliability, three types
of costs discourage reneging: material costs, reputational costs, and domestic audience
costs. These costs are theorized to be especially high for leaders of democracies, ju-
nior alliance members, and members of highly institutionalized alliances. Yet, despite
these characteristics, Canada’s foreign policy related to its nuclear sharing commit-
ments to NATO and NORAD between 1957 to 1984 was uneven. It included several
instances of reneging or attempted reneging. Through an in-depth analysis of archival
material related to Canada’s nuclear alliance commitments, I propose a new theory
of reneging. I show that a leader’s decision to renege, choice of bargaining strategy in
intra-alliance negotiations, and likelihood of success are related to the type of domes-
tic coalition that supports reneging. Leaders with the support of nationalist domestic
coalitions face fewer audience costs for reneging and have more leverage when bargain-
ing with allies than those with the support of single-issue or anti-nuclear coalitions.
Nationalist coalitions provide negotiators with three key sources of bargaining power
in intra-alliance negotiations: a credible threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act
unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to being swayed by foreign allies. On the other
hand, single-issue coalitions do not wish to leave the alliance, are more willing to act
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On May 26th 1969, the Canadian Minister of Defence Leo Cadieux met with the
American Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird. Cadieux was presenting Canada’s plan
for reducing its NATO forces, which, he stressed, was “non-negotiable.”1 The plan
had been approved by Cabinet and Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and their
intention to reduce their contribution to NATO had been announced to the pub-
lic. Among other cuts, Canada would completely withdraw from its nuclear strike
role by 1972. Since 1963, Canada had agreed to participate in a nuclear sharing
arrangement with the United States as part of its military commitments to NATO
and NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), whereby Canadian
forces were tasked with the delivery of American nuclear weapons during emergency
and war. Laird was shocked by this announcement, and while he knew Canada was
reviewing its defence policy, he was not expecting such severe and widespread cuts to
its alliance contribution. In response, Laird “warned that Canadian action might be
‘disastrous’ by contagion within the alliance. . . [he] criticized making a security deci-
sion for reasons of domestic popularity.”2 When Cadieux pressed Laird for his opinion
on the Canadian proposed plan, Laird responded darkly, “I think it’s a mistake.”3
This episode raises an important puzzle for the field of International Relations
(IR): How and why leaders renege on international commitments despite the incen-
tives to cooperate? This question is especially pertinent with respect to alliance
commitments. Despite realist claims about the fickleness of allies, the bulk of the
literature on alliance reliability conforms with Laird’s assessment about the risks of





defection.4 According to Leeds, Long, and Mitchell’s seminal study on alliance re-
liability, allies uphold their commitments about 75% of the time.5 Underlying this
tendency towards reliability is a powerful incentive structure that discourages defec-
tion: states risk material, reputational, and domestic audience costs if they do not
abide by their alliance commitments.6 This was the lesson that Trudeau’s predeces-
sor, John Diefenbaker, had learned the hard way, when he tried to wriggle out of
Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments in 1963. After being accused of reneging by
both NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the US State Depart-
ment, Diefenbaker’s government collapsed, not only removing him from office, but
also defining his legacy.7 Furthermore, his reneging attempt failed: a nuclear sharing
arrangement was negotiated quickly after Diefenbaker’s ousting in 1963.
However, Trudeau would not suffer the same fate. By 1972, Canada would no
longer have a nuclear role in NATO; it reduced its conventional commitments to
the alliance, halving the number of Canadian forces stationed in Europe. Unlike
Diefenbaker, Trudeau kept his government intact and would win multiple elections
afterwards, serving as Prime Minister from 1968 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984. Most
Canadians were satisfied with the outcome of the Defence review: according to a
July 1969 Poll 64.4% of Canadians approved of Trudeau’s reductions to Canada’s
contributions to NATO.8 Thus, Trudeau was not only able to renege, but he did
so without suffering domestic audience costs. Despite Laird’s ominous warnings,
the Prime Minister also avoided a dramatic public rebuke by allies, who ultimately
refrained from taking a hard-line approach in opposition to Canadian reductions.
This thesis examines how and why leaders abandon and reverse commitments in
settings that should encourage reliability and cooperation. It focuses on contexts
where defection should be especially difficult or costly. First, I examine cases of
‘reneging,’ which is defined as the reversal of a previously fulfilled alliance commitment
without terminating alliance membership. Leaders that renege are faced with a tricky
prospect: unlike alliance withdrawal, they are still invested in the overall health of the
institution and the benefits it provides. Furthermore, they are reversing commitments
that are not just expected to be fulfilled but have been fulfilled by their state, either
in whole or in part. Reneging represents a purposeful change to the status quo, which
4On realist claims on alliance unreliability, see, for example, Mearsheimer, 1994.
5Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
6Kreps, 2010, pp.201-203
7McMahon, 2009, pp.ix, xii.
8Gallup Canada Inc., July 1969. The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and
are not those of Gallup Canada Inc.
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is difficult to obfuscate. All of these factors should make reneging a particularly risky
form of defection, giving leaders plenty of incentives to avoid attempting reneging or
to back down once the costs become apparent.
Second, Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD are a de-
viant case for reneging. Canada is a democracy and a junior alliance member with
a high degree of dependency on the United States; NATO and NORAD are highly
institutionalized alliances. These characteristics should raise the costs of reneging,
making it an even more unlikely outcome.9 Furthermore, the history of nuclear shar-
ing commitments has largely conformed to rational institutionalist expectations of
alliance reliability. Both the United States and nuclear hosts have been reluctant to
unilaterally terminate their nuclear sharing arrangements. Instead, they have opted
instead for an approach that prioritizes alliance solidarity and consensus, which has
prevented nuclear withdrawal after the end of the Cold War.10
This thesis explores how and why reneging occurs despite the presence of powerful
incentives to cooperate. It rejects a traditional neorealist understanding of alliance
commitment, which argues that states renege simply when it is in their self-interest
to do so, unencumbered by any institutional constraints.11 To the contrary, I demon-
strate that some Canadian leaders were frustrated by these very incentives, leading
them to not attempt reneging or fail in their attempts. However, the existence of
these incentives does not preclude the possibility of reneging. I demonstrate that
existing theories of defection do not fully capture how and why leaders may break
their commitments after they have become institutionalized. In particular, I focus on
how the domestic audience costs associated with reneging can fluctuate, giving some
leaders the ability to renege on commitments at a lower cost.
1.2 Case Study: Canada’s Nuclear Sharing Com-
mitments
This dissertation engages in an in-depth analysis of Canada’s shifting policy on its
commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO and NORAD. Since Canada is a deviant
case for reneging, it is well-suited for theory-generation using process tracing. Fur-
thermore, many of the relevant archival records have been declassified, permitting a
rich analysis of how and why various Canadian leaders supported or opposed Canada’s
9See, for example, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Leeds, 2003; Kreps, 2010.
10Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster,
2013; Kristensen, 2005, p.25; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.
11Mearsheimer, 1994.
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nuclear commitments. The Canadian case contains several instances of shifting com-
mitments. This allows me to construct a theory about the mechanisms of reneging,
as well as its causes. I show that existing theories of alliance defection cannot ade-
quately explain the variation in the Canadian case; furthermore, most do not explore
the process of reneging in detail. Thus, the question of how leaders renege and what
reneging looks like in the context of an institutionalized alliance is as important to
this study as the question of why leaders renege.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States signed bilateral agreements with several
members of NATO that allowed for ‘dual-key’ nuclear sharing between them. This
arrangement involved stationing American nuclear weapons on foreign soil. During
times of emergency and war, these would be transferred to the host state for delivery.
NATO allies that engaged in dual-key sharing not only provided the territory for
hosting these weapons, but also purchased nuclear capable delivery systems and had
their personnel trained for nuclear roles.
Canada was unique among these dual-key sharing states, as it took on nuclear
commitments to two alliances: NATO and NORAD. Canada obtained four nuclear-
capable delivery systems in order to fulfill its nuclear roles. Under NATO, Canadian
soldiers in Germany were equipped with the Honest John surface-to-surface rocket
and the CF-104 Starfighter aircraft, which had offensive or retaliatory nuclear strike
roles. Under NORAD, Canada was equipped with the Bomarc surface-to-air missile,
and the CF-101 Voodoo aircraft armed with Genie air-to-air nuclear rockets, both
tasked with anti-bomber interception roles. At its peak, around 250-450 warheads
were ‘shared’ with Canada.12
The initial commitment to engage in nuclear sharing was made by Conservative
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (1957-1963). During the late 1950s and early 1960s,
Diefenbaker tied his hands through public statements and private commitments and
sunk costs through the purchasing of these nuclear delivery systems.13 These actions
not only signalled his intention to fulfill this commitment, but also raised the costs
of reneging. Despite Diefenbaker’s initial support for nuclear acquisition, his fears of
domestic anti-nuclear backlash delayed negotiations with the Americans that would
finalize a nuclear sharing agreement between Canada and the United States. By the
end of October 1962, negotiations were finally progressing, but Diefenbaker’s position




nuclear sharing if it did not involve the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian
soil in peacetime.
In a dramatic turn of events, the Leader of the Liberal Party and official Opposi-
tion, Lester Pearson, reversed his and his party’s long-held anti-nuclear position and
came out in favour of nuclear acquisition in January 1963. As domestic and interna-
tional pressures to accept sharing mounted, the Diefenbaker government collapsed,
and Canada was thrown into an election in which its nuclear commitments were a
central campaign issue. While Pearson now supported acquisition, Diefenbaker force-
fully repudiated this commitment as part of his campaign. He claimed that he would
never accept nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and cast doubt on the necessity of
its nuclear role in NATO. In the end, Pearson and the Liberals narrowly won the
election. This paved the way for Canada to quickly fulfill its nuclear commitments
and sign an agreement with the United States in 1963.
The issue would not remain settled for long. In 1968, Pearson stepped down as
Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party. Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1968-1979,
1980-1984) replaced him, and would quickly cement his position as Prime Minister
by handily winning an election. Trudeau began his tenure with a review of Canada’s
foreign and defence policy and called for a fundamental shift to Canada’s priorities.
As a result of this review and despite the protest of the United States and other NATO
allies, the Canadian government announced that it would reduce its commitment to
NATO, completely withdrawing from its nuclear role by 1972.
Nevertheless, despite Trudeau’s long-held opposition to the nuclear arms on Cana-
dian soil, Canada maintained its nuclear anti-bomber interception role under NORAD
until 1984. While the Bomarcs were withdrawn by 1972, the nuclear-armed CF-101
aircraft remained for over a decade longer, finally being withdrawn in 1984. By 1987,
Canada’s nuclear sharing agreement was essentially defunct and was jointly termi-
nated by the United States and Canada.14
1.3 Argument
This thesis proposes a new theory of reneging. It argues that variation in domestic
coalition type changes the incentive structure that keeps states reliable, focussing
primarily on audience costs. This theory will address two contrasting insights in the
literature about the nature of domestic audience costs and the likelihood of reneg-
ing. On the one hand, scholars like Kreps argue that there are powerful institutional
14Clearwater, 1988, p.54.
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incentives to cooperate within alliances, meaning that leaders and elites should main-
tain commitments even if they are domestically unpopular.15 This aligns with the
literature on domestic audience costs that finds that domestic audiences will punish
leaders when they back down from commitments.16 This implies that leaders will
avoid reneging, regardless of the nature of their coalition. On the other hand, recent
research on audience costs highlight that policy preferences of domestic groups can
mitigate the punishment that they will impose on leaders for defection.17 More gen-
eral theories of foreign policy also highlight changes in domestic coalitions or interest
groups can lead to shifts in policy.18 This implies that leaders may be more or less
fickle, depending on the policy preferences of their coalition. To reconcile these two
sets of literature within my theory of reneging, I compare the effects of two different
types of domestic coalitions that have a strong policy preference in favour of reneging:
anti-nuclear coalitions and nationalist coalitions.
Both of these groups support nuclear withdrawal but offer political leaders differ-
ent incentive structures in relation to reneging. Leaders with the support of nation-
alist coalitions are shielded from audience costs and should be more likely to attempt
reneging than those with the support of single-issue coalitions, such as anti-nuclear
coalitions. Nationalist coalitions seek to eliminate a broad range of alliance commit-
ments to refocus on more ‘national’ aspects of defense. These coalitions see inherent
value in forging an independent foreign and defense policy, emphasize domestic pri-
orities, and see the alliance as being fundamentally out of sync with the interests of
the nation. Thus, they conceive of the material and reputational costs of reneging
differently to traditional institutionalist understandings. In fact, they may see ma-
terial and reputation gains to reneging. In contrast, while members of single-issue
coalitions oppose particular commitments, they do not question the fundamentals
of alliance membership. Therefore, despite the clear policy preference of anti-nuclear
coalitions, they follow what I term a ‘double-edged’ logic that disincentivizes reneging:
leaders can still be punished for reneging despite this coalition’s support for nuclear
withdrawal, because of the coalition’s concerns about the material and reputational
costs of reneging, or because they view inconsistency as an indicator of leadership
incompetence.19
15Kreps, 2010.
16Fearon, 1994, 1997; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Smith, 1998; Tomz, 2007.
17Chaudoin, 2014b. See also, Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger,
2016; Potter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.
18See, for example, Moravscik, 2008.
19Kreps, 2010, pp.201-202; Tomz, 2007.
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Domestic coalition type is not only important for understanding political leader’s
calculations about whether to attempt reneging or not, but also for understanding
what strategy they will adopt, as well as their likelihood of successful reneging. Unlike
the decision to exit an alliance, reneging occurs in a context where the leader still
wishes to maintain the benefits of alliance membership to the greatest extent possible.
Thus, when attempting to renege on an alliance commitment, political leaders have
incentives to engage in negotiation with allies to assess their reactions and minimize
costs.
These dynamics can be modelled with Putnam’s two-level game, where agree-
ments made at the international level require domestic ratification to be finalized.20 I
demonstrate that leaders who attempt to renege on an alliance commitment face this
two-stage process and use domestic coalitions as leverage in negotiations with allies.
While Putnam’s model has been traditionally applied to cases where commitments
have been formed or augmented, such as negotiations on free trade agreements, this
thesis shows that leaders also negotiate when commitments are reduced or wound
down, particularly in institutionalized contexts.
This thesis shows that nationalist coalitions provide reneging leaders with three
sources of bargaining power in intra-alliance negotiations: a credible threat of
withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to re-
structuring by foreign allies. First, the credible threat of withdrawal reflects a high
tolerance of a no-deal outcome and the ability to threaten further reductions to their
commitment set. This gives political leaders the option of threatening to collapse
negotiations, harden their stance, or even leave the alliance unilaterally, while still
maintaining the support of their domestic coalition. Second, these coalitions maxi-
mize leadership’s ability to act unilaterally in the pre-negotiation stage, as they see
issues around alliance commitments as an aspect of national defense rather than
multilateral policy. This allows leaders to tie their hands domestically and commit
to reductions before the beginning of negotiations at the international level. Third,
nationalist coalitions are less vulnerable to restructuring attempts by allies, due to
their sensitivity to foreign influence. This increases the likelihood of pressure lead-
ing to “negative reverberations” or backlash, pushing a reneging leader farther away
from the status quo, or it will dissuade allies from attempting restructuring in the




likely to attempt reneging, more likely adopt more coercive strategies in intra-alliance
negotiations, and more likely to achieve reneging success.
On the other hand, single-issue coalitions do not have a credible threat of with-
drawal, are more willing to act through alliance consensus, and are more vulnerable
to allies’ attempts to influence their stance. Single-issue coalitions have specific policy
agendas and seek limited reductions to their alliance commitments. These minimalist
agendas make them unable to threaten punishment or alliance withdrawal if these
demands are not met. Indeed, unlike nationalist coalitions, single-issue coalitions are
still subject to the double-edged penalty of reneging and have a low tolerance for
the alliance discord that would result from a no-deal scenario. Leaders are incen-
tivized to mitigate this by seeking allied approval for reductions, further undermining
their threat of withdrawal from negotiations. During the pre-negotiation stage, in
an attempt to signal a consensus-building approach, leaders are unlikely to tie their
hands to specific reductions. In fact, they may commit themselves to seeking the
approval of allies before any action can be taken. Single-issue coalitions are therefore
vulnerable to accusations by allies that reneging is taking place, that it would damage
their country’s standing in the alliance, and that it would weaken the strength of the
alliance. Thus, leaders with the support of single-issue coalitions should be less likely
to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies in intra-alliance
negotiations, and more likely to fail to renege.
This thesis explains Canada’s shifting nuclear sharing policy using this argument.
Diefenbaker’s shifts in policy can be explained by his attempts to cater to differing
domestic coalitions. His failed reneging attempt and inability to use his domestic con-
straints as leverage in negotiations with the Americans is related to the weaknesses
inherent to his anti-nuclear coalition. Likewise, despite the support of an anti-nuclear
coalition, Pearson ultimately supported acquisition due to his sensitivities to the in-
ternational and domestic costs of reneging. Trudeau was able to renege on Canada’s
nuclear commitments to NATO due to his skillful management of a nationalist coali-
tion, which provided Canadian negotiators with substantial bargaining power when
negotiating with allies. However, Trudeau was not able to frame reneging on Canada’s
NORAD commitment in similarly nationalist terms and the coalition that favoured
reneging in this case was more narrowly anti-nuclear in nature. Thus, the Prime
Minister’s effort in 1970 to have all nuclear weapons withdrawn from Canadian soil
ultimately failed.
The role of strategic factors is also examined as an alternate explanation to reneg-
ing. Realists would argue that shifting levels or loci of international threat, diminish-
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ing military utility of nuclear weapons systems, or concerns over the domestic safety
and stability within the host state would explain reneging in general and nuclear with-
drawal for the Canadian case.22 However, there is only one instance of reneging that
fits into the realist framework: the withdrawal of the last of its nuclear air-defence
systems in 1984. These weapons were withdrawn due to the diminishing significance
of long-range bombers and the availability of conventional alternatives.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The first chapter examines the concept of reneging within the broader literature on
alliance reliability in International Relations. It lays out the conceptual gaps that this
work aims to fill and presents the theories that will form the foundation for the theo-
retical chapter. The first section situates the definition of reneging that is employed
here within the conceptual understanding of alliance defection that has been devel-
oped in the alliance reliability literature. The second section explores the theoretical
literature on alliance defection. The scholarly consensus is that defection should be
rare. This chapter organizes this literature according to three main types of costs
of unreliability within alliances: material, reputational, and domestic audience costs.
These costs form the basis of the incentive structure to keep alliance commitments
that is referred to throughout this work. Finally, this chapter reviews other studies
that have identified factors that should explain defection, despite these costs. It di-
vides the literature into those that identify static factors, or fixed characteristics of
states or alliances that affect the overall likelihood of defection, and those that iden-
tify dynamic factors, or variable contexts that can increase or decrease the probability
of defection, regardless of the baseline likelihood of defection.
The second chapter presents the theoretical argument. It also introduces and rules
out alternate explanations for reneging in the Canadian case. First, the selection of
Canada’s nuclear sharing history to analyse reneging is justified with reference to the
static factors that were identified in the conceptual chapter. For these theories of
defection, Canada represents a deviant case as it does not conform to their expec-
tations. It is well-suited for theory-generation, as Canada has many characteristics
that should discourage defection: it is a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a
member of two highly institutionalised alliances. After defining the dependent vari-
able, other likely explanations for the variation in Canada’s level of commitment to
nuclear sharing will be ruled out. Next, the theory of domestic coalition type will be
22Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Mearsheimer, 1994; Schofield, 2014; Walt, 1987.
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presented in detail. Using Putnam’s two-level game as a model of international nego-
tiations, it will assert that nationalist coalitions are more likely to renege and succeed
due to the increased bargaining power they provide political leaders in these negoti-
ations. Specifically, leaders with the support of nationalist coalitions have a credible
threat of withdrawal, increased willingness to act unilaterally, and low vulnerability
to restructuring.
The third chapter will analyse the first case study: The Diefenbaker adminis-
tration’s changing policy on nuclear sharing (1957-1963). Diefenbaker’s reneging
strategy and bargaining power shifted according to his changing coalition-building
strategy. Initially, Diefenbaker signalled his intentions to fulfill these commitments,
which raised the potential international and domestic costs of reneging. After 1960,
Diefenbaker’s perception of rising anti-nuclear sentiment caused him to delay fulfilling
Canada’s commitments.23 As further procrastination became politically impossible
after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Diefenbaker still tried to satisfy
his anti-nuclear coalition by negotiating an agreement that would technically ful-
fill Canada’s nuclear commitments while also keeping nuclear weapons off Canadian
soil in peacetime. In 1963, reacting to American intrusions into Canadian politics,
Diefenbaker shifted strategies again in attempt to win the 1963 election. This time,
Diefenbaker tried to appeal to a nationalist coalition that would back reneging, us-
ing the nuclear issue as a central feature of his campaign. This case provides two
primary insights. First, it demonstrates the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions in
intra-alliance negotiations. Diefenbaker’s bargaining power in 1962 was hampered by
the weakness of his anti-nuclear coalition: it required a consensus-based approach
to bargaining; they had no credible threat of withdrawal; and were vulnerable to
restructuring. Thus, Diefenbaker’s attempts to negotiate a compromise ultimately
failed and American accusations that he was reneging led to the collapse of his gov-
ernment. Second, this case also shows the potential strength of nationalist coalitions.
While Diefenbaker lost the election, his national framing of the nuclear issue was
appealing to some voters, who supported reneging as a means of asserting Canada’s
sovereignty and independence. This nationalist messaging also made the Americans
wary of further restructuring attempts. Nevertheless, by the time that Diefenbaker
had formed a coherent nationalist message on nuclear sharing, it was too little and
too late to counter the effect of domestic audience costs.
The fourth chapter examines the second case study: Pearson’s decision as leader
of the opposition to switch from an anti-nuclear stance to a pro-nuclear stance in time
23See McMahon, 2009.
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for the 1963 election. While the Diefenbaker case demonstrates the weakness of anti-
nuclear coalitions in international negotiations, Pearson’s about-face demonstrates
how leaders with the backing of anti-nuclear coalitions may avoid attempting to renege
in the first place. As leader of the opposition, Pearson was in a better position than
Diefenbaker to support reneging: Pearson did not make the commitment to acquire
nuclear weapons. In fact, he had opposed this decision, gaining him the support of
an anti-nuclear coalition. However, Pearson ultimately decided to favour acquisition
due to his fear of the international and domestic costs of reneging. Pearson believed
that the majority of voters would also reject reneging and ran on a platform that
emphasized the importance of Canada’s alliance membership and its international
reputation. In an attempt to retain anti-nuclear voters, Pearson also promised that
the Liberal government would attempt to negotiate out of its nuclear commitments
as soon as it was feasible to do so, emphasizing a consensus-based approach to these
negotiations.
In the fifth chapter analyses the third case study: Trudeau’s successful attempt to
end Canada’s nuclear role in NATO. Despite facing a divided Cabinet, a pro-NATO
public, and highly resistant allies, Trudeau reneged on Canada nuclear commitments.
As a result, the nuclear weapons slated for Canadian use in NATO were withdrawn
by 1972. This chapter shows that Trudeau’s success was due to his ability to form and
maintain a nationalist coalition that was highly skeptical of the value of NATO for
Canadian national defence. By encouraging the inclusion of nationalist and NATO-
skeptic voices in important aspects of the domestic debate, Trudeau signalled that the
possibility of total withdrawal from NATO was on the table. Thus, Trudeau was able
to co-opt status quo members of his Cabinet in his nationalist coalition, by framing
Canada’s nuclear withdrawal and major reductions to its conventional commitments
to NATO as a compromise position.24 This chapter argues that the nationalist char-
acter of the coalition is the key factor in understanding why the United States and
NATO did not push back against Canada’s defections. The nature of the coalition
increased Canada’s bargaining power through a credible threat of withdrawal, a will-
ingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.
The sixth chapter examines the fourth and final case study: Trudeau’s unsuccess-
ful push to withdraw from Canada’s nuclear role in NORAD between 1970 and 1971,
as well as the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984.
Initially, Trudeau and members of the government were skeptical about the retention
of a nuclear capability on Canadian soil. While there are few documents available,
24See Halloran, 2006.
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it seems that some of nationalist rhetoric – which prioritized North American de-
fense over Europe – that justified nuclear withdrawal from NATO, also made it more
difficult to do the same from NORAD. Thus, Trudeau could only construct an anti-
nuclear coalition that supported reneging, weakening his ability to initiate a reneging
attempt and resist pressure from status quo actors. Canada’s withdrawal from its
nuclear role in NORAD in 1984 is best explained by changing strategic incentives,
rather than domestic coalition type. Nuclear withdrawal was related to the decline of
the threat of bombers and the availability of conventional alternatives for Canada to
fulfill its role in NORAD. This chapter demonstrates some limitations of my theory.
Firstly, it shows that there are alternate paths to reneging, while domestic coalition
type may explain some cases of reneging, it does not preclude the existence of other
causal pathways. Second, it demonstrates that nationalist coalitions are difficult and
costly to construct and maintain. A nationalist coalition that supports reneging in
one context does not automatically lend itself to reneging in another.
The conclusion summarizes the central findings of this thesis and suggests avenues
for further research. It highlights the implications of my research on Putnam’s two-
level game theory, the costs of reneging, the strengths of nationalist coalitions, as the
role of political leadership.
2
Conceptualising Reneging
This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the rest of this
thesis. I review the alliance reliability literature related to reneging and introduce the
theories and concepts that I use throughout this work. The central puzzle of this thesis
is how and why leaders renege on international commitments despite the incentives to
cooperate. The alliance reliability literature has identified an institutionalist incentive
structure that should encourage cooperation and discourage defection. In this chapter,
I explain how reneging relates to this set of incentives, what these incentives are, and
why states might still defect, according to previous research.
The alliance reliability literature uses a variety of terms to refer to defection.
Quantitative studies in particular tend to operationalise rather than to engage in in-
depth conceptualization of ‘defection’ or related terms.1 Definitions generally focus
on alliance commitment violations in wartime contexts or the overall duration of the
alliance.2 However, there are a few exceptions. For example, McInnis’s book on
defection in military coalitions thoroughly unpacks her conceptual understanding of
‘defection;’ Snyder’s definition of ‘abandonment’ encompasses peacetime violation of
alliance commitment.3 Due to the relative lack of conceptually developed definitions
that relate to the violation of peacetime alliance commitments, I first specify what
kind of defection I will be engaging with.
In this thesis, I explore why states renege on their alliance commitments. I define
reneging as a type of defection in which a state or leader reverses an explicit
alliance commitment, while still retaining membership in the alliance. This
definition allows me to fill the gap in the alliance reliability literature on peacetime
1See, for example, Gibler, 2008; Langlois, 2012. For studies that try to conceptually unpack
defection see, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000; Mattes, 2012; McInnis, 2020.
2See, for example, Bennett, 1997; Leeds, 2003.
3McInnis, 2020; Snyder, 1984, 2007.
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commitments. It also best addresses the puzzle. In contrast to outright withdrawal
from an alliance, a reneging leader values alliance membership and has an interest
in retaining the benefits they derive from it, even while lessening their contribution.
At the same time, reneging is difficult to hide, as reneging leaders are explicitly
renouncing commitments or withdrawing from roles that they had previously fulfilled.
For these reasons, reneging should be a particularly risky and costly form of defection.
This chapter also unpacks the institutionalist incentive structure that should make
all forms of defection – and especially reneging – an unappealing option for leaders.
According to Kreps, membership within a formal alliance creates a powerful incentive
structure that should discourage defection, even when a commitment is unpopular at
the domestic level.4 Indeed, empirical research on alliance reliability finds wartime
alliance commitments are kept 74.5% of time.5 I identify three central types of costs
that scholars have found to be associated with defection: reputational costs, material
costs, and audience costs.
Despite this incentive structure, defection and reneging still occur. Scholars have
identified various factors that may weaken the incentives to keep alliance commit-
ments. Some studies have identified particular characteristics of states or alliances
that should make reneging more or less costly, including regime type, the level of
institutionalization of the alliance, and the power distribution in the alliance.6 Be-
cause these are ‘fixed’ characteristics that affect the overall likelihood of reneging for
a given state, I refer to these as static factors, which will be helpful in identifying a
case where reneging should be particularly costly and therefore unlikely. Another set
of studies has identified dynamic factors associated with defection.7 These represent
changing contexts or situations that increase the likelihood that a given state will re-
nege. These factors can be divided into different categories: changes at the systemic
level, changes at the domestic level, or a combination of both. This discussion of
dynamic factors serves as the starting point for the theories that are developed and
tested in the next chapter.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section sets out the definition of reneg-
ing and situates it within the alliance reliability literature. Next, I outline the the-
oretical and empirical foundation of the incentive structure that should discourage
defection. I show that there are three primary costs related to reneging and defection:
reputational costs, material costs, and domestic audience costs. Finally, I describe
4Kreps, 2010.
5Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
6See, for example, Leeds, 2003; Walt, 1997.
7See, for example, Leeds, 2003; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.
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previous explanations for defection within alliances, identifying theories that high-
light static characteristics of states or alliances as well as dynamic shifts in strategic
and domestic contexts.
2.1 What is Reneging?
The term ‘reneging’ is not commonly used as a primary concept in the literature on
alliances. Scholars usually use terms like ‘abandonment,’8 ‘violation,’9 ‘abrogation,’10
or ‘defection’11 instead of or alongside ‘reneging’ when discussing instances of nonful-
fillment of alliance commitments – often interchangeably.12 In this section, I explore
the various ways that these concepts have been defined. I build on this conceptual
work in order to develop a clear definition of reneging that will be used in this dis-
sertation. It is important that reneging be precisely defined for this study, as it will
help specify the dependent variable and establish the scope of the theory that will be
developed.
A few articles use the term ‘reneging’ in their title, although they do not concep-
tually unpack the term in the main body of the text. Instead, they define reneging
implicitly or propose how to measure it empirically. In his article, ‘The Costs of
Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,’ Gibler considers ‘reneging’ to mean
failing to fulfill a central purpose of the alliance in wartime.13 Langois more con-
sistently uses the term reneging in her article, ‘Power and Deterrence in Alliance
Relationships: The Ally’s Decision to Renege.’14 While she also does not explicitly
define reneging, her article discusses the decision to intervene militarily on behalf of
an ally after providing promises of extended deterrence, linking reneging to allied
wartime behaviour.15
This approach to defining reneging, defection, or other related terms as non-
fulfillment of commitments in wartime is one of the most frequently used in the
8Snyder 1984, 2007.
9Gibler, 2008; Mattes, 2012.
10Kreps, 2010; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009; Leeds and Savun, 2007.
11McInnis 2020; Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.
12For example, Mattes (2012) uses all four terms throughout her article. More neutral terms like
‘alliance reliability’ are also used in discussions relating to nonfulfillment of alliance commitments.
13Gibler, 2008, p.437. Despite the title of this article, the term ‘reneging’ is only used once in this
text: “If past actions predict future behavior, few leaders would want to ally themselves with states
that have reneged on their agreements in the past, and leaders with reputations for violating their
agreements should be unable to find alliance partners” (p.432). Instead, the term ‘violation’ is most
consistently used when describing non-fulfillment of alliance commitments.
14Langlois, 2012.
15Ibid.
2. CONCEPTUALISING RENEGING 23
alliance reliability literature.16 For example, Leeds’s seminal article on alliance vio-
lations defines this concept as “instances in which alliance commitments are invoked
by a war” and then not fulfilled.17 Like Gibler, she does not include in her analysis
cases where alliances require states to consult each other during crises, as well as cases
where alliances “only commit leaders to refrain from conflict with one another,” as
these commitments would not be invoked by war.18 In another study, Leeds, Long,
and Mitchell develop both the conceptual and theoretical understanding of alliance
violation by accounting for the specific nature of the alliance obligations in order
to measure whether states have violated its terms or not.19 However, their analysis
excludes consultation requirements or peacetime commitments.20
More recent articles, some using the term reneging, have a narrower focus on de-
fection in the context of multilateral military coalitions.21 In most of these texts,
defection is defined by a state’s withdrawal or exit from a multilateral coalition be-
fore the end of the conflict or mission.22 However, McInnis, in her book How and
Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions, develops this definition
and engages in nuanced conceptualization of defection. She highlights that both the
defector and their allies have incentives to hide defection and therefore, a defecting
state may avoid total withdrawal while still substantially diminishing the defector’s
contribution to the coalition.23 According to McInnis, defection should be defined
broadly: “coalition defection is a significant change to a nation’s operational profile
that minimizes a nation’s exposure to risk while increasing the operational burden of
other coalition partners.”24 Under this definition, total withdrawal is considered de-
fection, but partial withdrawal, augmenting caveats, and moving to re-role personnel
or equipment can also be strategies of defection.25
16For further examples, see Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Gibler,
2008; Leeds and Anac, 2005.
17Leeds, 2003, p.811.
18Ibid., p.812.
19Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
20Ibid., pp.693-694.
21See, for example: Choi, 2012; Davidson, 2014; Massie, 2016; McInnis, 2019, 2020; Pilster,
Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015; Tago, 2009; Weisiger, 2016.
22For example, according to Choi (2012, p.627): “For this study, fulfilling or maintaining com-
mitment is defined according to the abandonment behavior of states during war. In other words,
whether states maintain or fail to maintain their commitments refers to whether coalition member
states leave the war before it ends or fight together until the war’s conclusion.”
23McInnis, 2020, p.9.
24Ibid., p.18. Further, the timing of these changes is significant and must occur “significantly
prior (generally at least one year) to a mission’s conclusion.” See also p.73.
25Ibid., pp.17, 73. Furthermore, McInnis highlights that not all withdrawals are defections: some
withdrawals are ‘routine’ and ‘pre-planned’ and are conceptually distinct from unplanned defections.
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There are two reasons for this focus on wartime commitments when defining al-
liance defection. Alliances are military institutions, which centre on promises and
commitments that are usually activated in times of war or crisis.26 Moreover, these
studies allude to a more practical justification: focusing on war facilitates operational-
ization and analysis, particularly for quantitative studies.27 Instances of interstate
war have been extensively coded, resulting in a reliable dataset that is readily available
to scholars that wish to study alliance behavior. However, this approach excludes a
significant set of cases that would provide a more complete theoretical understanding
of alliance defection.28 In fact, their research leaves the question of why states renege
in peacetime unaddressed. During peacetime, one of the main motivations for reneg-
ing – the desire to not engage in military conflict – is not a proximate factor, but the
incentives that should encourage cooperation, discussed below, are still applicable.
Other studies examine alliance reliability by operationalizing it as alliance dura-
tion, providing a concept of defection that can apply outside of wartime contexts.29
However, extrapolating a general theory of reliability from these studies conflates
defection with alliance termination; these are often distinct outcomes. Leeds and
Savun highlight that what they call opportunistic abrogation or the abandonment
of “alliances in violation of their terms” is only one of several different pathways to
alliance termination. There are at least three other paths to alliance collapse, each
potentially associated with its own unique causal process: scheduled termination,
loss of sovereignty, and mutual renegotiation.30 Although not discussed by Leeds and
Savun, there may also be different causal pathways for different types of defection.
For example, state that commits an alliance violation that results in alliance collapse
may do so for very different reasons than for a violation that occurs within an alliance
that continues to function.
Finally, in his research on alliances, Snyder provides a definition of abandonment
that is quite broad in scope, encompassing alliance violations during war and peace-
Important factors for distinguishing these two concepts include whether “the departure is well-
planned, and conditions on the ground are such that the departure of the coalition is minimally
disruptive to the local community” (pp.69-70, 71-72, 74-77).
26Morrow, 2000, p.63.
27Gibler, 2008, p.437.
28See Mattes (2012, p.693) for a discussion of the importance of counting instances of peacetime
alliance violations.
29See, for example, Bennett, 1997; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009; Mattes, 2012;
Morrow, 1991; Reed, 1997; Walt, 1997.
30Leeds and Savun, 2007, pp.1118-1119. According to their sample, 34% alliances ended oppor-
tunistically, 16% because they reached their scheduled termination date, 11% because at least one
alliance member could “no longer execute an independent foreign policy,” and 25% were renegotiated
and replaced “with a new agreement with different obligations” (p.1119).
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time. He recognizes that defection or ‘abandonment’ in alliances can also constitute
the failure of allies “to make good on his explicit commitments; or. . . to provide sup-
port in contingencies where support is expected.”31 However, the broadness of this
definition leaves some aspects unclear: for example, the relevance of intentionality.
The phrasing of Snyder’s definition implies that instances where support is ‘expected’
should be contrasted with ‘explicit’ commitments, implying that the former is a va-
guer kind of obligation. This idea of ‘expectation’ allows for a situation where one
state can perceive abandonment, while the other state does not regard their actions
as amounting to such, given their understanding of their alliance commitments. The
difficulty in trying to theoretically understand abandonment lies in this subjective
element. A state that is knowingly abandoning an ally or intentionally violating a
commitment may do so for very different reasons than a state that misjudges how
their actions will be interpreted by an ally.
In this dissertation, reneging is defined to encompass all types of alliance commit-
ments, regardless of their centrality to the alliance or their applicability in wartime.
However, unlike the broadness of Snyder’s definition of abandonment, reneging is
more specified. It refers to situations in which a firm commitment has been made,
not merely where cooperation is expected or implied. Reneging, therefore, is a specific
kind of defection. Reneging is going back on a commitment where progress
towards fulfillment has been undertaken, without leaving the alliance out-
right.
This definition of reneging has three key components. Firstly, the commitments
that the reneging party is breaking must be explicit, rather than vague or implied.
The explicitness of a commitment is crucial for clarifying the intentionality associated
with reneging. The reneging party needs to have subscribed to these commitments
in some capacity, creating the expectation that these commitments would be or con-
tinue to be fulfilled. A state does this through hand-tying or cost-sinking measures.32
Broadly, there are three levels of ratification that increasingly bind a state to a com-
mitment. Firstly, verbal or written promises that the commitment will be fulfilled.
These promises can be secret or public, whereby public promises have more binding
power than secret ones. Second, partial fulfillment of the commitment, whereby the
state has taken steps towards fulfilling the commitment. Lastly, complete fulfillment
31Snyder, 1984, p.466. According to Snyder, in these two situations, “the alliance remains intact,
but the expectations of support which underlie it are weakened.” He also provides two other instances
of defection: “the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance
contract.”
32See Fearon, 1997.
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of the commitment, where the state is fully delivering on the commitment. While
the first level involves only hand-tying mechanisms, the latter two levels involve both
hand-tying and cost-sinking mechanisms.
Second, reneging is distinct from alliance withdrawal and alliance termi-
nation. Allies must be trying to defect on a particular commitment or set of com-
mitments within the alliance rather than leaving the alliance outright. Thus, states
that renege are still subject to incentives that should make them reluctant to defect;
they wish to maintain their status in and the integrity of the alliance.
Third, reneging needs to represent some kind of reversal of an explicit commit-
ment. Reneging changes the status quo. States need to explicitly or formally change
some aspect of their behavior in order to renege: In the case of promises, a state will
have to renounce and reverse the promise in order to be considered reneging. In the
case of partial or complete fulfillment, a state is considered reneging when they re-
nounce and reverse the steps that they have taken towards fulfilling the commitment.
Before attempting to renege, the momentum reinforced fulfilling or maintaining a
particular commitment; reneging halts and reverses this process. A state reneges not
when it merely fails to fulfill a verbal promise, but renounces it or downgrades it,
removing the expectation that it could be fulfilled. This backwards momentum is
a key feature of reneging and what makes it so puzzling, as the incentive structure
described in the next section should create friction against this kind of reversal of
commitment.
A common example of an alliance ‘violation’ within NATO is the failure of most
states to live up to the 2 percent of GDP defence spending threshold. However, this
would not meet the definition of reneging. Even though most members of NATO have
not met this guideline, they have not renounced this commitment. This leaves room
for states to claim that they are working towards meeting this commitment even if
they have not fulfilled it yet.
Reneging can also be distinguished from two other forms of defection on commit-
ments: free-riding and cheating. Free-riding occurs when states benefit from pub-
lic goods while offloading the costs onto other parties; in this sense it is similar to
reneging.33 However, free-riding is a more passive action than reneging. Free-riding
implies that states do not act to meet their responsibilities, rather than decrease or
reverse their provision of a commitment. The main difference between ‘cheating’ and
‘reneging’ is the level of openness and awareness of allies about the reduction to com-
mitment. Reneging is mostly done openly; states try to maintain their institutional
33Palmer, 1990, p.149.
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status and benefits through negotiation. Cheating is done surreptitiously; states try
to maintain their membership in the institution through deception.34
‘Reneging’ is a kind of defection that warrants further theoretical scrutiny. McIn-
nis highlights that the literature on coalition defection is “surprisingly thin” because
members of a coalition will “often go to considerable lengths to mask the fact that
a defection is, indeed, occurring” so that these actions do not undermine the “in-
ternational legitimacy” and “solidarity” of the coalition.35 Therefore, leaders have
incentives to “mask” or gloss over instances of defection to avoid various costs.36 De-
fecting leaders can opt for measures that are less dramatic than total withdrawal, but
considerably reduce their commitment to a coalition, such as through partial with-
drawal of troops or re-tasking them.37 Thus, McInnis argues, they rarely completely
withdraw or renege from military coalitions.38 The same logic can apply to alliances
in general, where states have incentives to publicly mask defection and to maintain
some token element of commitment.39 Indeed, scholars have argued that democratic
leaders may deliberately make weaker, more contingent, or more ambiguous alliance
commitments in order to avoid being technically non-compliant in their obligations.40
With reneging there is no such mitigation: states are unambiguously ending partic-
ular commitments that they had previously subscribed to, opening themselves up to
costs. Furthermore, unlike with alliance withdrawal, states still have a stake in bene-
fits that alliance membership can provide, which should provide a powerful incentive
against reneging.
2.2 The Costs of Reneging: Reputational, Mate-
rial, and Domestic Audience Costs
One of the central questions of alliance reliability and commitments is the extent to
which alliances are binding: Are they merely “temporary marriages of convenience”
or more robust vehicles of cooperation in the security sphere?41 This question reflects
34As discussed below, leaders will usually try to minimize reneging and other commitment viola-
tions to avoid material and audience costs. The distinction between this kind of ‘window dressing’
to blunt the costs of defection and outright cheating is whether allies are themselves aware that a
state is defecting on their commitments.
35McInnis, 2020, p.6.
36Ibid.
37Ibid., pp.6, 9-13, 93.
38Ibid., p.93.
39Ibid.
40Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Fjelstul and Reiter, 2019.
41Mearsheimer, 1994, p.11.
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a more fundamental debate within IR about the nature of cooperation, commitment,
and institutions in the international sphere. In the past, realists argued that cooper-
ation is time-limited and not robust.42 States simply leave institutions or back out of
commitments once they no longer serve their interests. Reneging, therefore, should
occur relatively frequently. Institutionalists, on the other hand, saw institutions as
durable facilitators of international cooperation. Once commitments become insti-
tutionalized or formalized, they become “sticky,” taking “on a life and logic of their
own,” and becoming difficult to break.43 They argued it actually served the interests
of states to make lasting commitments and states were willing to subject themselves to
rules and other accountability mechanisms to facilitate long-term cooperation.44 The
creation of institutions, including alliances, therefore changes the incentive structure
that states face in a way that should promote cooperation and discourage reneging.
Aspects of this debate crystalized in the early 1990s over the durability of NATO.
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the common threat of the Soviet
Union, several realist scholars expressed doubts that NATO could continue.45 Insti-
tutionalists, however, argued that NATO’s institutionalized status would allow for
its continuation after the Cold War, having taken on a role beyond a narrow defence
pact aimed at a particular rival.46 In the end, NATO did not collapse. Indeed, over
thirty years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, NATO remains an impor-
tant security institution for its members, and has also expanded its membership and
mandate.
Beyond alliance endurance and collapse, empirical research has found that defec-
tion is rare within alliances, supporting the institutionalist understanding of alliances
and alliance commitments. A seminal study is Leeds, Long, and Mitchell’s article on
alliance reliability. This examined alliances from 1816 to 1944 and found that allies
kept their commitments about 75% of the time.47 From this finding, the durability of
alliance commitments has become “conventional wisdom in scholarship.”48 However,
Berkemeier and Fuhrmann note that these results do not include the post-WWII era,
which could reveal different alliance dynamics. Their study of alliances from 1816 to
2003 finds that states only honored their commitments 50% of the time.49 Further-
42Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994; Waltz, 1979.
43Ikenberry, 2002, pp.228, 229; Keohane and Martin, 1994; Simmons, 2010.
44Ibid.
45Mearsheimer, 1994, pp.13-14; Waltz, 1993, pp.75-76.
46Keohane and Martin, 1994, p.40; McCalla, 1996; Wallander, 2000.
47Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000.
48Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018, p.1.
49Ibid.
2. CONCEPTUALISING RENEGING 29
more, there is a substantial difference between alliance compliance rates before and
after WWII and between different alliance types.50 Specifically for defense pacts like
NATO, they find that while about 61% of these pacts were honored from 1816 to
1944, the percentage drops to about 14% in the period from 1945 to 2003. However,
this disparity may not be related to changing rates of compliance or reliability among
alliance members, but rather the nature of the alliances that are ‘challenged’ in the
first place.51 Indeed, Berkemeier and Fuhrmann suggest that this discrepancy may
be related to the advent of nuclear weapons and the increased reliability of certain
alliances, as nuclear-backed defence pacts “have rarely been challenged by war” in
the post-war era, suggesting a selection effect.52 Moreover, they note that “NATO
does not appear in our dataset. . . precisely because potential adversaries perceive it
as effective.”53 The fact that such nuclear-backed alliances are unlikely to be drawn
into war highlights the importance of studying peacetime commitments to under-
stand defection. In his study of conventional force levels of the Central Region54 in
NATO during the Cold War, Duffield found a “record of marked stability” despite
shifting levels of international threat, demonstrating that the reluctance to defect
extends to peacetime commitments.55 Finally, a recent study on military coalitions
in the post-Cold War era has found that defections were rare: only about 14% (19
of 134) of coalition experienced defections.56 Overall, these empirical studies provide
compelling evidence that leaders usually keep their alliance commitments.
In line with these findings, scholars have identified different mechanisms that
should disincentivize defection and promote cooperation and durable commitment. I
organise these mechanisms into three broad categories of costs that can result from
reneging: reputational costs, material costs, and audience costs. The first two apply
to states at the international level; the latter is experienced by political leaders at the
domestic level.
50Ibid. According to the authors, they essentially followed the methodology and procedures of
Leeds, Long, and Mitchell with some updates to the data.
51Morrow, 2000, p.67.
52Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, 2018, p.3.
53Ibid. See also Gaubatz (1996, p.124), who justifies the use of alliance duration rather than a
more direct measure of reliability in order to avoid selection effects.
54During the Cold War, the Central Region encompassed “Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), less its territory north of the Weser river” (Duffield,
1992, p.821 ft.3). According to Duffield (1992, p.821), “the Central Region, has comprised one of
the most important components of the alliance’s overall military posture. These forces have formed
the first line of defense in a region (Western Europe) that has been regarded as both vital to the
security of the alliance as a whole and highly vulnerable to a direct Soviet invasion.”
55Duffield, 1992, p.820.
56McInnis, 2020, pp.77-78.
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Reputational costs occur when a state suffers a loss of standing, status, or influ-
ence due to past defection. According to Kreps, “Defecting earns states a reputation
for unreliability, since failing in one instance casts doubt on the reliability of fu-
ture commitments.”57 Several scholars have found that states and governments with
records of violating their alliance commitments are less likely to form alliances at a
later date. This demonstrates that leaders take each other’s reputations for reliability
into account in decision-making about alliance formation.58 LeVeck and Narang have
argued that the context surrounding alliance violations matters and that states take
this into account when considering potential alliance partners. Thus, reputational
costs are more likely to be paid by states that do not have ‘valid’ reasons for breaking
their commitments.59
There are also material costs associated with defection, such as the denial of
benefits and the infliction of punishment.60 One key benefit that an alliance provides
is security; in the case of defense pacts like NATO, this is primarily through their
ability to deter aggression.61 Reneging on particular peacetime commitments may
weaken an alliance’s warfighting ability as it disrupts the “prewar coordination of
military and foreign policy.”62 Thus, reneging may diminish an alliance’s ability to
deter by making it materially weaker. On the other hand, alliances are signals of allies’
willingness to fight on each other’s behalf; an alliance’s ability to deter aggression
and reassure its members is not solely based on its military resources, but also the
credibility of its members to follow through on their commitments.63 Reneging can
undercut this alliance-level credibility, sending a signal that the foundations of the
alliance may not be solid. At its extreme, reneging on key commitments can therefore
invite an attack or lead to the unraveling of an alliance, as enemies and allies lose
faith that allies will actually come to each other’s aid in war. A less severe, but
still costly, effect of reneging could be an increase in external provocations short of
direct aggression and increased intra-alliance tensions. Finally, defecting states can
be directly punished by allies. For example, they can be expelled from the alliance,
denied key positions or find themselves deprioritized within the alliance structure.
57Kreps, 2010, p.202; Duffield, 1992, p.836. For a discussion of reputational costs in the context
of alliances see Miller, 2003. For how reputational affects alliance design, see Mattes, 2012. Material
and reputational costs are tightly connected, as a loss of reputation will usually entail material
consequences.
58Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, and Wood, 2012; Gibler, 2008. See also Miller, 2003, pp.55-56.
59LeVeck and Narang, 2016.
60Duffield, 1992, p.836.
61Leeds and Anac, 2005, p.185; Mattes, 2012, p.683.
62Morrow, 1994, p.272; Mattes, 2012, p.683.
63Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, pp.969-970; Mattes, 2012, p.683; Morrow, 1994, 2000.
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Outside of the security sphere, punishment can therefore also occur as a ‘spillover’
effect, where defection leads to a cooling of relations among allies that have economic
or political entanglements.64
At the domestic level, leaders can face audience costs for backing down from
prior commitments.65 Domestic audience costs are usually conceptualized as a loss
of domestic support for leaders, which, at its extreme, could threaten their political
survival.66 In democracies, audience costs can lead to the ousting of leaders and
their parties from government if defection becomes a salient electoral issue.67 The
mechanisms that underlie these costs are related to lowered public perceptions of
the leader’s competence and public concern that unreliability will be damaging for
their state’s international reputation or future credibility.68 Several studies have
hypothesized that leaders are reluctant to defect on alliance commitments because of
their desire to avoid these domestic audience costs.69
These international and domestic factors make a powerful incentive structure for
leaders to keep their commitments even when they are domestically unpopular.70 In
her study on NATO allies’ contributions to operations in Afghanistan between Au-
gust 2006 and December 2009, Kreps found that despite the low “public support” for
these missions, most leaders did not reduce or withdraw their troops in Afghanistan,
but rather “have generally increased their troop numbers and gradually lifted restric-
tions on how troops can be used.”71 This tendency to keep alliance commitments
is explained through elite consensus on the benefits of reliability and the risks of
defection:
64Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.970; Mattes 2012 686-687; Leeds and Savun, 2007, pp.1122-
1123.
On the interplay between strategic and economic ties between allies, see Mastanduno 1998, 2020;
Powers, 2004.
65See, for example, Fearon, 1994, 1997; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Smith, 1998;
Tomz, 2007. Some authors argue that the audience cost effect is not consistent across varying
contexts and societal groups. These arguments will be explored in the next section. While the term
‘audience cost’ has become synonymous with actions related to inconsistency and reneging, Fearon
(1997, p.67) originally defined the nature of audience costs more broadly, as a negative domestic
reaction concerning “whether foreign policy is being successfully or unsuccessfully by the leadership.”
See also Fearon, 1994, p.577.
66Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, p.989; Tomz, 2007, p.823.
67Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, pp.968, 971; Fearon, 1994, p.581.
68Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998;
Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.
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The high costs of defection and the prospect of forgoing the benefits of
cooperation create an institutional stickiness that offsets the domestic un-
popularity of fulfilling alliance commitments. The incentives to maintain
international commitments are powerful enough that they transcend po-
litical parties and thereby help guard the leading party from electoral
consequences.72
Reputation and commitment are important for both international and domestic au-
diences. This prevents the government and even opposition parties from trying to
obtain easy domestic political victories at the expense of their international alliance
commitments:
Indeed, even domestic audiences are concerned with their country or
leader’s international reputation. . . The opposition has no interest in its
state suffering reputation costs of defection that make it difficult to re-
ceive the benefits of future cooperation, when it might be the government
leader.73
Thus, the domestic gains of reneging on an unpopular commitment are likely to be
double-edged and offset by the domestic audience costs associated with defection. Fur-
thermore, institutionalized alliances like NATO cast “a long shadow of the future,”
stretching out the benefits that they can provide on a large time scale, compounding
the material costs of defection.74 This makes states even more unwilling to jeopar-
dize the long-term benefits of loyal alliance membership for dubious and short-term
domestic gains of reneging.75
Duffield has found that this institutionalist model of incentives applies to peace-
time conventional commitments in NATO. According to Duffield, because of these
incentives to cooperate, “we should expect to see few proposals for change in a coun-
try’s NATO force contribution.”76 In situations where defection is attempted, Duffield
argues that these proposals will either be retracted or be “diluted” through attempts
to achieve allied consensus and due to domestic pushback.77 Thus, the costs of de-
fection should not only make leaders less likely to attempt reneging in the first place,
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2.3 Why Do States Renege, Despite the Costs?
An Overview of the Literature
Despite these findings on the costs of defection, the empirical record indicates that
states do violate their alliance commitments at least some of the time. Thus, the
central puzzle for the institutionalist model of alliance commitment is when and why
states defect, despite these costs. Previous studies have provided several theories as to
why alliance violations occur. Their hypotheses centre on factors that affect the cost
and benefit structure that discourages defection. This section examines the literature
on alliance commitment to provide the foundation for the theoretical chapter of this
thesis. Within the alliance reliability literature, the factors that drive defection and
reneging can be divided into two categories: static and dynamic.78
2.3.1 Static Factors
Static factors are characteristics of states or of alliances that should make alliance
violation more or less likely. These factors are endogenous features of the actors or
alliances. The literature on alliance commitment highlights three static factors: the
regime type of allies, level of institutionalization of the alliance, and power distri-
bution within the alliance. Overall, the literature suggests that democracies, more
institutionalized alliances, and junior members of asymmetric alliances should be less
likely to renege on their commitments, due to the increased costs defection. All of
these propositions are contested to some degree, and this is discussed below.
Many studies have proposed that regime type can affect the likelihood of defection,
arguing that democracies are more reliable allies than non-democracies.79 There are
two main causal mechanisms that should discourage defection within democracies.
The first mechanism is related to increased vulnerability to audience costs.80 This is
related to democracy’s “defining feature”: the ability of the public to remove their
leaders from office if they are not satisfied with their conduct.81 Because domestic
78These categories are based on those identified by Leeds (2003, pp.813, 815) in her study of
the causes of defection: “Characteristics of the Alliance Member” and “Changes Since Alliance
Formation.”
79For example, Bennett, 1997, p.873; Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds,
2003; Reed, 1997.
80While this argument does not preclude the fact that non-democratic leaders can suffer audience
costs, it does assert that this effect will be weaker, see Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.972 ft
6. For critiques of the claim that democracies should be more susceptible to audience costs than
non-democracies, see Weeks, 2008 and Brown and Marcum, 2011.
81Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015, p.968. These scholars argue that due to these increased costs
for defection, democracies are more selective about the alliance commitments that they agree to.
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publics are assumed to punish defection and inconsistency, these accountability mech-
anisms result in increased domestic audience costs for defection, making democratic
leaders less likely to renege.82 The other mechanism is related to democratic insti-
tutional structure. Because of the increased number of veto players in-built within
democratic institutions, individual leaders will be prevented from making drastic de-
cisions to defect.83 These two factors should encourage democracies to keep their
commitments, while autocracies, lacking these features, should be more likely to de-
fect.
On the other hand, Gartzke and Gleditsch have argued that democracies are actu-
ally less reliable allies.84 They suggest that the prevalence of formal alliances among
democracies might be related to the fact that democracies are actually less likely to
keep their commitments and therefore require more powerful institutional mechanisms
to make credible commitments.85 They argue that the main source of this unreliabil-
ity is related to democratic leaders’ need to accommodate shifting preferences over
time about whether to go to war on behalf of allies.86 Therefore, the formalization
and institutionalization of democratic alliance commitments are needed in order to
ensure that they can bind future governments and leaders to fulfill these promises. In
a later study, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, argue that the discrepancy between these
findings on democracy is related to how different scholars defined alliance violation.
While Leeds only counts cases “in which specific alliance obligations were invoked”
and finds support for democratic reliability, Gartzke and Gleditsch count all cases
where a state in a defence pact did not come to its ally’s aid in war, regardless of the
“specific terms of the treaty.”87
They “are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high probability of fulfilling,” which
can result in them making “flexible or limited commitments,” such as setting preconditions for them
entering a conflict on behalf of an ally. This study suggests that democracies are able to set the
parameters of their commitments and do so strategically; therefore, these findings deepen the puzzle
for why a democratic regime would first commit to one thing and then renege on it. See also Fjelstul
and Reiter, 2019; Leeds, 1999.
82Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds 2015, p.968; Fearon 1994, pp.581-582; Leeds 1999, 986-987, 2003,
813; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009.
83Choi, 2012; Leeds 2003, p.813.
84Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004.
85Ibid., p.777.
86Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004, pp.776-777, 781. This tendency is related to “[d]emocratic cycling”
or shifts in the ruling coalition and varying levels of issue saliency from the initial commitment to
when it needs to be fulfilled (p.777).
87Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds 2015, pp.979-980. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004, p.778) speculate
that the discrepancy between their research and previous studies that have found links between
democracy and reliability is in part due the fact that these studies measure reliability in terms of
alliance duration.
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Gartzke and Gleditsch’s article highlights another factor that can affect the strength
of the incentive structure promoting cooperation: the level of institutionalization of
the alliance. Other scholars have made similar claims about the links between insti-
tutionalization and increased alliance reliability and stability.88 For example, Kreps
hypothesizes that defection should be particularly difficult for states in NATO because
of its highly institutionalised status and “extended history of security benefits and
credible promise of future cooperation.”89 Furthermore, Morrow argues that states
with increased “prewar military coordination” makes alliances more effective.90 This,
in turn, “makes allies more likely to come to one another’s aid.”91 Increased insti-
tutionalization can be associated with the increase of all three types of costs. Since
highly institutionalized alliances are more likely to be more effective in warfighting
and provide a more varied package of security, this raises the material costs of reneg-
ing. In addition, increased formalization and institutionalization of an alliance should
heighten the reputational and domestic audience costs leaders will face for reneging
due to their increased “public profile” and formal entanglements.92
However, analysis by Leeds and Anac indicates that greater institutionalization
may not lead to increased reliability.93 They “find no evidence that alliances with
higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reli-
able when invoked by war.”94 In their article, they register surprise with these results
and offer a variety of tentative explanations for them.95 These explanations indicate
that they have not dismissed the potential link between institutionalization and reli-
ability. For example, their measurement of military institutionalization is “noisy,” as
they base this on the level of coordination specified in the alliance agreement, rather
than through a direct measure of the amount of coordination that actually occurred:
Because we only know what the states promised to do, and not what they
actually did, we can’t be sure that these plans for coordination actually
came to fruition. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that in some cases,
the coordination obligations were not fulfilled. Similarly, some allies may




92Leeds and Anac, 2005, pp.187, 190; Morrow, 2000.
93Bennett (1997, pp.855-856) also finds that increased institutionalization is not associated with
longer alliance duration; however, he operationalizes institutionalization very narrowly, the overall
duration of the alliance, finding more direct measures of institutionalization too difficult to construct.
94Leeds and Anac, 2005, p.183.
95Ibid., p.195.
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engage in significant coordination despite the fact that such actions are
not provided for in their written agreements.96
They also argue that the negative relationship between increased formalization and
reliability could be related to leaders’ reluctance to terminate these alliances, even
after their underlying interests have changed.97 This hypothesis implies that it may
be harder to break alliance commitments in peacetime rather than when they are
invoked by war. Overall, the authors are not convinced that their analysis definitively
undermines the link between alliance institutionalization and reliability.
Finally, the power distribution within the alliance can also affect a state’s like-
lihood of defection. The nature of the alliance can interact with characteristics of
states within the alliance, making minor powers in asymmetric alliances more re-
liable: “minor powers are particularly likely to uphold their commitments to major
powers.”98 Leeds hypothesizes that minor powers face greater costs for defection than
major powers.99 Weaker states are more dependent on alliances for the provision of
their security and are therefore less willing to jeopardise their position or face “retri-
bution” by breaking their commitments.100 This raises the material costs of reneging
are higher for weaker states when compared to stronger states. These findings are
also supported by studies such as Morrow, who finds that asymmetric alliances last
longer than symmetric alliances.101
2.3.2 Dynamic Factors
The other main set of theories highlight the role of dynamic factors. These relate to
changing contexts that should promote or discourage reneging, regardless of a par-
ticular state’s overall propensity towards being unreliable. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell
affirmed an overall tendency for states to keep their alliance commitments. Leeds
then conducted a follow-up study to identify variables that were associated with the
cases of defection in order to explain the remaining 24.5 percent of cases that did not
fit the general trend towards alliance reliability.102 While she identifies certain static
characteristics of states that made them more or less likely to renege (as noted above),
she also finds that defection is most likely to occur when “one or more of the alliance




100Ibid.; Morrow, 1991 pp.913, 918.
101Morrow, 1991; See also Walt, 1997.
102Leeds, 2003.
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members has experienced significant changes that affect its decisions regarding par-
ticipation in war since the alliance was formed.”103 Her statistical analysis highlights
the importance of two changes in particular for understanding reneging: changes in
regime type and changes in relative power.104 New regimes should have different for-
eign policy priorities and a different strategic calculus.105 Leeds argues then that the
costs should be lower for reneging under these circumstances: “The reputational costs
that are incurred for breaking agreements internationally and domestically also may
be muted when the agreement is associated with the ancient regime.”106 Increases
and decreases in power are also associated with defection, as it changes the calculus
of the desirability of alliance membership. States that become weaker are less attrac-
tive allies and can less afford to go to war on behalf of other states.107 States that
become stronger are less reliant on allies to pursue their strategic goals, which can
also encourage defection on previous alliance commitments.108
Reflecting Leeds’s findings, there are two primary dynamic theoretical strands of
when and why states renege on their alliance commitments. The first involves changes
on the domestic level. Tago argues that for democracies, elections can be a driver
of early withdrawal from military coalitions.109 For example, incumbents can use
defection from unpopular commitments as a means to garner domestic support and
secure re-election.110 Others examine domestic factors applicable to both democracies
and non-democracies. Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago find that leadership turnover is
associated with reneging.111 They argue that new leaders are likely to have different
strategic outlooks than their predecessors and are less likely to feel bound by previous
administration’s decisions.112
Another set of domestic dynamic factors that may affect when leaders renege on
their alliance commitments comes from the literature on audience costs. Although
most of these studies do not address alliance commitments specifically, their insights
on how leaders can mitigate the effects of these costs is relevant to this discussion,
103Ibid., p.820.
104Ibid., p.816.
105Ibid. Leeds notes that democracies should be reluctant to ally with autocracies and vice-versa.







111Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015. See also Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009, who find that
leadership turnover is associated with alliance defection in autocracies, but not democracies.
112Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.
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as domestic audience costs are one of the primary incentives that should keep allies
reliable. According to Levendusky and Horowitz, leaders can lessen audience costs if
they provide a justification “on the basis of new information” for why they are reneg-
ing on a commitment.113 The same article also highlights the role of elite cohesion:
bipartisan support for reneging can also lessen audience costs.114 Other studies have
suggested that not ‘domestic audiences’ uniformly punish inconsistency and commit-
ment violation: access to information, issue salience, policy preferences, and partisan
affiliation may mitigate the audience cost effect for reneging.115
The second strand links changes at the systemic level with alliance violations. This
largely echoes the realist argument that states will engage in abandonment oppor-
tunistically when commitments no longer serve the national interest. For example,
Weisiger argues that coalition defection is associated with fluctuations in “battle-
field circumstances” and that states will be more likely to leave coalition when they
have more strategic independence or when the chance of overall victory has been
decreased.116 Some studies present theories that combine strategic and domestic dy-
namic factors to explain defection. McInnis argues that defection from coalitions is
related to “heightened perceptions of political and military risk” and the choice of
defection strategy is “largely a function of alliance and international pressures.”117
She adopts a neoclassical realist approach whereby alliance politics, domestic politics,
military capability are all important independent variables for explaining defection.118
Davidson, in his study of coalition defection in democracies, contends that elite con-
sensus can break down when there is disagreement about the value of the alliance or
mission, or when it appears that there will be few international audience costs for
defection, or if the mission appears to be failing.119 Finally, in her study on New
113Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012, p.323.
114Ibid.
115Chaudoin 2014b; Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Pot-
ter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011. Interestingly, Chaudoin’s (2014b, p.242) survey
experiment involved a scenario that would be highly salient to nationalist proclivities – involving a
decision about whether to impose import restrictions on European “metal brackets” to protect Amer-
ican jobs. While Chaudoin (2014b, p.241) notes that there may be “many reasons why respondents
might have ex ante preferences over import barriers that have nothing to do with potential inconsis-
tency” such as “their factor endowments, their sector of employment, or their negative perceptions of
the overall effect of free trade,” it is unclear whether a respondent’s policy preferences on free trade
are specific or part of a wider belief set about the relative virtues of nationalism/protectionism and
multinationalism/openness. Chaudoin (2014b, pp.248-249, 252) found evidence for a “consistency
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Zealand’s decision to renege on its peacetime nuclear commitments to ANZUS (The
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), Catalinac finds that lowered
levels of threat perception can cause domestic pushes for greater autonomy within
alliances.120
My research builds on several of these theories and addresses several gaps within
the literature on defection. Firstly, the process of how states negotiate out of their
commitments does not feature strongly in the many of these articles. In other words,
the causal mechanism remains elusive. For example, while Pilster, Böhmelt, and
Tago’s mixed-method study proposes several mechanisms that explain why leader-
ship changes should make coalition withdrawals more likely, these do not provide
much empirical insight about the actual content of negotiations.121 In their qualita-
tive analysis, negotiations around reneging are black-boxed. For example, it is unclear
why it took two years to negotiate the withdrawal of Australian troops from Viet-
nam, what the terms of withdrawal were, and how much leverage the United States
had in negotiations.122 Even more detailed qualitative articles tend to examine re-
cent events, meaning that they have to rely on unclassified material and interviews.
This limits their ability to analyze the process of defection without access to classi-
fied documents that can more directly trace its causal path.123 Secondly, with a few
exceptions, the literature on alliance reliability has focused on defection in wartime,
rather than peacetime commitments.124 An important subset of cases related to de-
fection is thereby omitted. Finally, in the case of the audience cost literature, most
studies of the dynamic effects of audience costs in international interactions involve
crisis bargaining scenarios and the credibility of threats against rivals. 125 The vary-
120Catalinac, 2010, see especially p.319.
121Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago (2015, p.464) argue that the political costs of reneging should be
lower under a change of leadership because their preferences and their evaluation of information may
be different from their predecessors; furthermore, they argue that new leaders are less “entrapped”
by their predecessor’s decisions.
122Ibid., pp.479-480.
123Massie, 2016; McInnis, 2020; Pelletier and Massie, 2017. A possible exception to this trend
is Davidson’s (2014) study on early withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, which uses leaked
diplomatic cables. However, it has the same limitations as Pilster, Böhmelt and Tago (2015) in
terms of describing and explaining the process of negotiations on reneging, as Davidson (2014,
p.253) only seeks to explain “the announcements of withdrawal rather than the withdrawal itself.”
Catalinac’s (2010) article, while analyzing events from the 1970s and 1980s, relies on interviews
conducted in 2005 and public statements in Parliament.
124Catalinac (2010) and Duffield (1992) are key exceptions.
125For example, Brown and Marcum 2011; Clare, 2007; Fearon, 1994; Levendusky and Horowitz,
2012; Schultz, 2001; Smith, 1998; Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Tomz, 2007; Trachtenberg, 2012;
Trager and Vavreck, 2011. Exceptions include: Leventoglu and Tarar (2005), who explore the
effects of audience costs in generalized bargaining scenarios, examining when public versus secret
negotiations are more advantageous for arriving at an agreement; Chaudoin (2014a), who examines
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ing effects of audience costs on bargaining power in negotiations with allies outside
of crisis scenarios is not explored to the same depth. In addition, the current dom-
inance of experimental methods to test hypotheses related to audience costs misses
a crucial element: the role of the leader.126 While survey experiments may point to
the existence of consistency-related audience costs among the general population, its
effect on policy decisions depends on whether leaders believe that their audiences will
actually punish them for inconsistency.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have laid the conceptual foundation for my definition of reneging. I
explored how reneging and other related concepts have been used within the alliance
reliability literature. ‘Reneging’ is defined here as a reversal or revocation of an
explicit alliance commitment, while still maintaining membership in the alliance.
This concept is important to IR because of the central finding within the alliance
reliability literature that defection is costly, and therefore should be rare.127 Reneging
is conceptually significant because of its riskiness and costliness: it does not simply
lessen commitment, but unambiguously reverses it, making this kind of defection
more difficult to hide or mitigate. For this reason, reneging should make leaders
particularly vulnerable to international and domestic costs.
In reviewing the literature, I identified three distinct costs associated with de-
fection in general: material costs, reputational costs, and domestic audience costs.
Reputational costs include the inability to form an alliance at a later date or a loss
of standing or status among allies. Material costs include the weakening of the al-
liance or ‘spillover’ economic and political punishment that can occur as a result of
defection. Domestic audience costs include the decline in public opinion or the ejec-
tion of leaders from office as a result of their alliance unreliability. This structure of
the interaction between audience costs and the timing of initiation of foreign trade disputes. The
hypotheses that can be generated about relative audience costs in crisis versus non-crisis scenarios
can be radically different. For example, Kertzer and Brutger (2016, p.13) hypothesize that in a
crisis diplomacy scenario, nationalist individuals should be more likely to punish their leaders for
inconsistency as backing down from a threat of force violates “national honor.” On the other hand,
in non-crisis scenarios such as Chaudoin’s (2014b) vignette involving trade protectionism, one would
expect higher degrees of nationalism would be correlated with increased tolerance for reneging. This
idea will be explored further in the theoretical section.
126For experimental studies of audience costs, see for example: Chaudoin, 2014b; Kertzer and
Brutger, 2016; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015; Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.
127See for example, Duffield, 1992; Leeds, 2003; Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000; Kreps, 2010;
McInnis, 2020.
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costs provides a powerful incentive structure for leaders to keep their alliance commit-
ments.128 Furthermore, if defection or reneging is attempted, leaders have incentives
engage in consensus-building with allies and water down their reductions when faced
with domestic and allied opposition.129
Despite this powerful incentive structure, defection and reneging still occur. Schol-
ars have identified different factors that affect the likelihood of reneging, which I
organised into two primary categories: static and dynamic factors. Static factors
are characteristics of states that should affect their overall likelihood to defect, such
as: regime type, relative power within the alliance, and level of institutionalization.
Dynamic factors are events that can shift the likelihood of a given state reneging,
regardless of their baseline characteristics. For example, at the strategic level, shifts
in the balance of power or battlefield circumstances can increase the likelihood of de-
fection; at the domestic level, shifts in leadership or provision of a good justification
for defection can also make reneging more likely and mitigate costs.
This chapter has established the core conceptual and theoretical foundations of
the thesis and of the theory that is presented in the next chapter. Reneging has been
identified as the foreign policy outcome of interest because it is an especially costly
form of defection; this conceptual development helps to clearly define the dependent
variable and allows me to explore the dynamics of peacetime alliance commitments.
This chapter has established that the institutionalist model of cooperation – the
‘incentives to cooperate’ in my puzzle – is firmly entrenched in the alliance reliability
literature. A theory of reneging must take these constraints seriously. I have also
examined previous explanations of defection. The characteristics that should further
increase the costs of reneging – making it an even more puzzling outcome – will guide
case selection. The next chapter demonstrates that the case of Canada’s nuclear
sharing commitments to NATO and NORAD is a deviant case for reneging, as it is a
democracy, a member of highly institutionalized and formalized alliances and is the
junior member of those alliances. It also shows that established dynamic theories






The previous chapter provided an overview of the alliance reliability literature, which
finds that defection should be rare and difficult due to the international and domestic
costs that it entails. Building on this research, I defined reneging as a type of defection
where the disincentives to break from commitments should be especially high. Despite
this, reneging still occurs within alliances. The question at the heart of this thesis is
why and how do leaders renege, despite these costs? Previous scholars have grappled
with this question in two ways: some have identified state or alliance characteristics
that should affect the overall likelihood of defection; others have identified dynamic
factors that should encourage or discourage defection based on shifts in characteristics
or contexts. Their research serves as the foundation for my case selection and theory-
building.
In this chapter, I first justify my case selection. I chose the case of Canadian nu-
clear sharing commitments during the Cold War in order to best address the gaps in
the literature on alliance reliability. Canada represents a deviant case, as it has static
characteristics that should make it particularly unlikely to renege: it is a democracy,
a junior alliance partner, and its commitments are to two highly institutionalized
alliances, NATO and NORAD. Selecting a single case with a large amount of de-
classified archival material available allows for in-depth process tracing. Through the
analysis of this case, I am able to build not only a theory of reneging, but also a
model for how reneging is negotiated within institutionalized settings. This chapter
introduces a theory and pathway for why and how leaders renege in institutionalised
alliances that has not been explored within the existing literature.
The theory I present sees reneging as the outcome of both intra-alliance and
domestic-level politicking. Using Putnam’s two-level game as the starting point for
modeling this process, I highlight that reneging has both international and domestic
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components that are interrelated. Reneging is neither a purely domestic ‘foreign pol-
icy option’ nor the result of bargaining between black-boxed states. Political leaders
can use domestic coalitions as leverage in international negotiations to minimize the
costs of reneging and achieve desired outcomes. I argue that certain domestic coali-
tions lower the domestic audience costs of reneging. Furthermore, they can also be
used as leverage at the international level and potentially minimize allied retribution
for reneging. The amount of bargaining power that a leader has in intra-alliance ne-
gotiations is related to three factors: the credibility of the threat of withdrawal from
negotiations, their willingness to act unilaterally rather than through consensus, and
their susceptibility to ‘restructuring’ or foreign influence.
I argue that the key variable for understanding leverage is the type of domestic
coalition that supports reneging. The important factor that I highlight is not how
‘popular’ or broad a particular coalition is, but rather that the very nature of a coali-
tion’s preferences in relation to reneging affects the extent that a political leader can
use them as leverage. I distinguish between single-issue and nationalist coalitions.1
Coalition type not only explains why states renege, but how they do so and whether
they are likely to be successful or not. Single-issue coalitions oppose a particular
commitment, but not membership of the alliance itself. I argue that these coalitions
provide leaders with less leverage: they do not give leaders with a credible threat of
withdrawal, they prefer that leaders act through consensus with allies, and they are
more vulnerable to foreign appeals. Therefore, these types of coalitions are bound by
the double-edged logic of reneging, where defection on unpopular commitments can
still lead to domestic audience costs. By contrast, nationalist coalitions are skeptical
of alliance commitments in general and even alliance membership itself. They provide
leaders with more leverage in negotiations: they have a credible threat of withdrawal,
are more willing to act unilaterally, and are less susceptible to restructuring efforts.
This coalition type changes the cost structure that keeps states from reneging, as they
are less concerned with appearing as a good ally and more hostile to foreign interven-
tion into domestic affairs. Leaders with the backing of anti-nuclear coalitions are less
1Coalition is defined as the group that ratifies reneging at level II. As will be demonstrated in
the empirical chapters, the ratifying group is often heterogeneous, with some elements supporting
the status quo and others supporting reneging. Thus, I use the term ‘coalition’ rather than ‘con-
stituency.’ Coalition type refers to who is mobilized against alliance commitments and for what
reason. According to Saunders (2015, p.468), domestic publics take cues from elites on matters re-
lating to foreign policy, meaning that elites can act as a “fire alarm” for public dissent. Furthermore,
for defence matters shrouded in secrecy, the elite may be the primary domestic audience (Boyer,
2000, pp.193-197). Thus, the role of the elite is particularly pertinent to my analysis of domestic
coalitions.
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likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-based strategies in intra-
alliance negotiations, and more likely to see their reneging attempts fail. Leaders
with the backing of nationalist coalitions are more likely to attempt reneging, more
likely to adopt coercive strategies, and are more likely to achieve reneging success.
To demonstrate the necessity of a new theory of reneging, I consider, then rule
out plausible alternate explanations for Canada’s shifting nuclear commitments. The
first set of alternate explanations use systemic-level logics of leverage in order to
explain the outcomes of negotiations on alliance commitments. These are examined
detail. The second set of alternate explanations, ranging from previous theories of
reneging to more generalized explanations of foreign policy, are ruled out using simple
comparative analysis.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will justify my case selection, arguing
that Canada represents a deviant case and particularly fertile ground for theory gen-
eration. Next, I describe the dependent variable: instances of reneging and reneging
attempts related to Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD. I then
present my theory of reneging, which explains how domestic coalition type affects
decisions to renege and operates within the context of negotiations between allies.
Next, I consider two systemic-level explanations that also involve leverage as the key
causal mechanism to explain reneging: a realpolitik model, which relates outcomes
to strategic optimization, and Snyder’s model of intra-alliance bargaining, which re-
lates outcomes to levels of dependence, commitment, and interest. Finally, I consider
other dynamic explanations for Canada’s nuclear sharing policy that fall outside of
the bargaining framework, which will be discounted using comparative analysis.
3.1 Canada’s Nuclear Sharing Commitments: A
Deviant Case
The history of Canada’s nuclear sharing policy for NATO and NORAD is a deviant
case for reneging. Canada’s characteristics between 1957 to 1984 should discourage
defection: it was a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a member of two highly
institutionalized alliances. Based on the static factor theories of alliance reliability
examined in the previous chapter, one would expect that, if Canada made nuclear
commitments, it would be likely to keep them. Nevertheless, Canada’s actual foreign
policy on nuclear sharing fluctuated: at times, the government maintained these
commitments; other times it has sought to renege on them.
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The unique status of these nuclear commitments should further discourage reneg-
ing. Firstly, the history of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements has demonstrated
that they are unlikely to be reinstated after total nuclear withdrawal. This means
that reneging is likely to be a permanent termination of a commitment. In order to re-
ceive nuclear weapons under a dual-key arrangement, the host state needs to invest in
dual-capable delivery systems as well as have personnel trained for their nuclear role.
Once the weapons are gone, the host state may retire their nuclear-capable infrastruc-
ture, which greatly raises the material costs of restarting a nuclear role. Additionally,
trying to reinstate a nuclear program can entail high domestic costs.2 Secondly, nu-
clear weapons have special status in the alliance and are therefore not commensurate
with conventional forces, making them more difficult to replace. These two features
raise the stakes of nuclear withdrawal in NATO, making allies more likely to pay at-
tention to and resist attempts to renege on these commitments, raising international
costs.
Indeed, reneging on nuclear sharing commitments has been rare within NATO.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece,
Canada, and the United Kingdom concluded bilateral agreements that enabled dual-
key nuclear sharing with the United States. Despite the Cold War ending, large
reductions to the overall number of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the domestic
unpopularity of nuclear weapons in host states, only three NATO nuclear hosts –
Canada (1972 for NATO; 1984 for NORAD), Greece (2001), and the United King-
dom (mid-2000s) - had all nuclear weapons withdrawn.3 While reductions have been
common, both host states and the United States have been mostly unwilling to uni-
laterally end their dual-key sharing commitments.4 For example, the United States
2Perkovich, Chalmers, Pifer, Schulte, and Tandler, 2012, p.9.
3The status of Turkey is more opaque than other nuclear hosts, as Kristensen and Korda (2021
p.157) speculate that Turkey’s nuclear strike role may have been “mothballed” after 2010, although
due to the secrecy around these programs, this cannot be confirmed. See also Foradori, 2012, p.292
ft 10; Norris and Kristensen, 2011, p.67. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s decision in 2019
to prevent the delivery of the F-35 to Turkey may have implications for retention of its nuclear
role, as some of these aircraft “were intended to be used in the nuclear mission” (Kristensen and
Korda, 2021, p.57). This move reveals that Turkey’s nuclear sharing role had not been completely
scrapped, but also puts doubt on its continuity without obtaining F-35s. Lastly, the 2016 attempted
coup in Turkey, which resulted in power being cut to the Incirlik base where the nuclear weapons
are housed, has increased concerns among American officials and commentators about the security
of the nuclear weapons stored on Turkish soil (Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.57; Lamothe, 2016;
Starr, 2016). However, according to the most recent reports, nuclear weapons still remain in Incirlik;
however, the overall number of nuclear weapons has been reduced from 50 to approximately 20 B61
gravity bombs (Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.57).
4At the peak of nuclear sharing with NATO, over 7,000 nuclear warheads were stationed in
Europe, with 2,000 designated for delivery by the host state. Since that time, there has been a
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was reluctant to pull all of its nuclear weapons out of Greece after the military coup in
1967 and after the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in 1974, despite
concerns about the physical security of the weapons.5 While the overall number of
weapons in Greece were reduced, the Americans did not withdraw all of the nuclear
weapons stationed there, “after the State Department warned that removal would fur-
ther alienate the Greek government from NATO.”6 Similarly, Germany, Belgium, and
the Netherlands have broad anti-nuclear constituencies that support the withdrawal
of nuclear weapons from its soil; yet, these states have been reluctant to renege on
their nuclear commitments due to the opposition that they face within the alliance
and their desire to maintain alliance cohesion.7
Canada has been selected out of these three cases of total nuclear withdrawal for
several reasons. Firstly, the Canadian cases of reneging and attempted reneging oc-
curred during the Cold War. While the more granular level of insecurity fluctuated,
the bipolar confrontation that was the basis for NATO and dual-key nuclear sharing
was relevant throughout this time period, providing increased pressure to maintain
alliance commitments. For both Greece and the UK, total nuclear withdrawal oc-
curred after the end of the Cold War and before the rise of a significant challenger
to the United States. Secondly, the UK, while certainly ‘junior’ to the United States
within NATO in terms of power and prestige, is still considered a major power and has
substantial military capabilities, including an independent nuclear arsenal.8 Lastly,
because of the time elapsed since the end of Canada’s nuclear roles in NATO and
NORAD, there is a large amount of declassified and relevant archival material. This
abundance of documentary evidence allows for the use of process tracing to map out
the trajectory and outcome of domestic discussions and international negotiations
related to reneging.
According to Gerring, deviant cases are most suitable for the generation of new
theories and explanations of outcomes.9 By definition, deviant cases do not fit existing
substantial decline in the number of shared nuclear weapons in NATO. Based on recent estimates,
there are approximately 100 American tactical nuclear bombs in Europe. See Kristensen, 2005, p.25;
Kristensen and Korda, 2021, p.56; Norris and Kristensen, 2010, pp.66-67.
5Kristensen, 2005, p.25.
6Ibid.
7Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster,
2013; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.
8Unlike Canada and Greece, the UK still has a nuclear role within NATO through its own nuclear




theories, revealing a gap in the theoretical understanding of a given phenomenon.10
The dominance of quantitative studies on alliance reliability and the paucity of re-
search on peacetime alliance defection further points to a theoretical gap within the
literature. Quantitative studies are well suited to theory-testing, particularly in de-
termining the generalizability of particular theories. As these studies usually measure
the level of correlation between variables, they are less well suited for determining
causal mechanisms than methods that can actually ‘look inside’ the case to trace the
relationship between variable and outcome. Quantitative studies are also limited in
the types of variables they can test, as their analysis can be restricted by issues of
data availability and the feasibility of operationalizing variables. It is therefore likely
that particular explanations of reneging have been missed, which further justifies an
intensive single-case study.
Through process tracing, I show how and why Canada negotiated out of its nuclear
commitments. In so doing, I isolate the variables that explain Canada’s shifting
nuclear sharing policy over time, as well as what differentiated Canada from the
nuclear hosts that have retained their commitments. This case study enables me
to make a more generalizable claim about why some allies and not others renege
on their commitments, which can be applied to other cases and tested in future
studies. My research therefore falls between “explaining-outcome” processes tracing,
which explains particular outcomes in particular cases, and “theory-building” process
tracing, which establishes more generalizable claims that can be applied and tested
in future research.11
3.2 Primary Sources
This study draws upon a variety of archival material in order to trace the process
of reneging in each relevant case. In order to track Canadian decision-making and
internal discussions on nuclear sharing, I consult a large volume of primary sources.
Firstly, the records of relevant Cabinet meetings were accessed via electronic copies of
the Cabinet Conclusions from 1957 to 1979.12 While these records are not verbatim
accounts of these meetings, many provide detailed information about the content of
discussion and identity of the speakers, particularly for the sessions before the early
1970s. Second, I accessed documents from the Clearwater papers, which are a collec-
tion of documents about Canada’s nuclear weapons sharing program and provide an
10Ibid., pp.655-656.
11Beach 2017, pp.19-22; Beach and Pedersen, 2013 pp.9-22.
12Records after 1979 are not yet available online at the time of writing.
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especially valuable source for the debate around nuclear acquisition in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. Third, I utilized the Raymont Papers, mainly to understand the
decision to renege on Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO. This collection also
contained documents related to NATO’s bargaining position on this matter. Fourth,
collections related to specific administrations such as the L. B. Pearson Papers, the
Pierre Elliott Trudeau Papers, Paul T. Hellyer Papers, and the Douglas Scott Hark-
ness Papers were also used. Finally, in order to trace perspective and decision-making
of the United States, I consulted primary source material from the Office of the His-
torian’s Foreign Relations of the United States, the John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library, and the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. This primary source material
is supplemented by secondary source materials such as historical studies, memoires,
and collections of interviews.
3.3 The Dependent Variable: Canada’s Shifting
Nuclear Sharing Policy
Utilizing Canada as a single case study holds static factors constant, meaning that
it provides a good basis for testing and generating dynamic theories. This thesis
considers the time period between 1957 to 1984, capturing the initial commitment to
engage in nuclear sharing to the time when the last nuclear weapon was withdrawn
from Canadian soil. I will focus on the administrations of three Prime Ministers: John
G. Diefenbaker (1957-1963); Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968); Pierre Elliott Trudeau
(1968-1979, 1980-1984).13
Canada initially agreed to take on nuclear sharing commitments to NATO and
NORAD early into the tenure of John G. Diefenbaker, who led the Conservative
Party. Diefenbaker took steps to fulfill this commitment, tying his hands through
private promises to allies and public announcements to domestic audiences, as well
sinking costs through the procurement of expensive delivery systems that required
nuclear weapons and warheads to be militarily effective. However, as time went on,
Diefenbaker became increasingly opposed to nuclear acquisition. Frustrated with the
delay, American officials tried to intervene by appealing to the Canadian public, which
drew further attention to the nuclear issue and led to the collapse of the government.
This culminated in an election campaign in 1963 where Diefenbaker rejected bringing
13Joe Clark was Prime Minister from 1979-1980, heading a government that collapsed before it
could pass a budget. Clark’s short tenure is not relevant to the trajectory of Canada’s nuclear
sharing commitments and therefore will not be discussed in detail here.
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nuclear weapons onto Canadian soil and cast doubt on the viability of Canada’s
nuclear commitments to NATO. However, Diefenbaker and lost this election. At
the same time, Lester B. Pearson, the Leader of the Liberal Party, abandoned his
previous anti-nuclear stance to run on a pro-acquisition platform and won a minority
government in 1963. After taking office, Pearson quickly fulfilled Canada’s nuclear
commitments and maintained them throughout his tenure. In 1968, Pierre Elliott
Trudeau took over as leader of the Liberal Party and as Prime Minister of Canada,
winning a majority government in an election shortly thereafter. Trudeau, a long-
time critic of Canada’s nuclear commitments, called for a reassessment of Canada’s
defence and foreign policy soon after assuming leadership. As a result of the defence
review, Canada withdrew from its nuclear role in NATO, but retained its nuclear
interceptors under NORAD. Indeed, Canada remained a nuclear host until the end
of Trudeau’s tenure, with these weapons withdrawn only in 1984.
There are four instances of reneging and attempted reneging that require expla-
nation within the Canadian case, which are examined in separate chapters.14 First,
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from Canada’s nu-
clear sharing commitments from late 1962 to his electoral defeat in 1963. Second,
Pearson’s decision to support nuclear acquisition in January 1963, despite a history
of opposing nuclear sharing during his time as Leader of the Opposition. Third, Prime
Minister Trudeau’s successful reneging attempt on Canada’s nuclear sharing role in
NATO by 1972, which also resulted in a reduction of Canada’s conventional commit-
ments to NATO. Fourth, the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Canadian soil
in 1984, after Trudeau’s aborted attempt to renege on this commitment in the early
1970s.
3.4 Argument
To arrive at the outcome of reneging, leaders face two sequential choices. The first
is whether to initiate a reneging attempt or not. Leaders can be deterred by the
international or domestic costs of reneging from even attempting negotiations to get
14As reneging is defined as the reversal of commitment rather than reduction of commitment, I
will only examine cases where Canada attempted to completely withdraw from its nuclear role in
NATO or NORAD and not where it merely reduced the weapons systems or nuclear weapons that
were assigned to this nuclear role. Moreover, this study is concerned with Canada’s nuclear alliance
commitments and therefore will not examine the trajectory of the American nuclear weapons that
were stationed on Canadian soil that were solely for the use of American forces. Clearwater (1999)
provides an in-depth history of the nuclear weapons in Canada for the use of American forces. For
analysis of why Canada rejected an independent nuclear arsenal after World War II, see Buckley,
2000.
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out of a particular alliance commitment.15 Increased sensitivity to these costs or the
belief that negotiations would ultimately fail should strongly disincentivize leaders
from initiating reneging attempts. However, if they decide to proceed with attempting
to roll back a commitment, they will then choose what strategy to pursue in terms of
how they renege. Leaders within institutionalized alliances have incentives to mitigate
the costs of reneging through bargaining with allies. Leaders can try to deflect costs
in a variety of ways that can be categorized into two broad strategy types: They can
adopt a coercive approach, using threats of further defections to get allies to accept
more limited defections; Alternatively, they can adopt a consensus-based approach,
seeking allies’ approval through inducements and reassurances.
There are risks and benefits to each approach to bargaining. A coercive strategy
essentially uses the logic of material costs against status quo allies, where a leader
threatens of further alliance instability and reciprocal reprisals if allies do not accept
a reduced commitment. Thus, a leader may avoid costs if status-quo allies decide it
would be better to accept reneging rather than further endanger the alliance. How-
ever, this strategy is risky: if these threats fail and no agreement can be struck, this
could have high international and domestic costs. If these alliance tensions spill over
into the public sphere, leaders can face high audience costs: allies could easily por-
tray such leaders as damaging their state’s reputation and the alliance itself. On the
other hand, a consensus-based strategy attempts to mitigate the costs of reneging
by signalling commitment to the alliance. Consensus-based strategies include giving
allies control or a veto over the commitment restructuring process or offering to take
on other commitments to compensate for their defections in other areas.16 While this
strategy risks watering down reneging or having reneging attempts fail, it can miti-
gate audience costs: a consensus-based approach is more conducive to reinforcing a
leader’s image as a ‘good ally’ and obscuring the fact that reneging is taking place.17
My argument focuses on how the costs of reneging can vary and how this variation
can affect intra-alliance bargaining and the likelihood of reneging success. Much of the
alliance reliability literature portrays the costs of reneging as a powerful disincentive
for political leaders, making defection a unappealing foreign policy option in institu-
tionalised alliances.18 Even if reneging is attempted, leaders are expected to adopt
15Duffield, 1992; Kreps, 2010.
16These inducements can also include flexibility over the time frame of the withdrawal of com-
mitments or agreeing to transform an individual commitment reassessment into an alliance-wide
reassessment as a means for gaining alliance-wide consensus.
17See Duffield, 1992, pp.840, 847.
18For example, Kreps, 2010.
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a consensus-building strategy, which may lead to the abandonment or “dilution” of
their reneging attempt.19 However, several studies on domestic audience costs have
demonstrated that not all domestic audiences will punish reneging, particularly if
they have a strong preference for a given foreign policy outcome.20 According to this
logic, the domestic disincentive to renege should be variable. I argue that, given the
potential ‘double-edged’ nature of reneging, not all domestic policy preferences are
created equal when they operate in institutionalized contexts. In the next section,
I compare and unpack two different types of coalitions that can have a preference
for reneging: nationalist coalitions and single-issue coalitions. Leaders with the sup-
port of nationalist coalitions will experience lower audience costs for reneging than
those with the support of single-issue coalitions. The type of domestic coalition that
supports reneging will affect a leader’s decision to attempt reneging, the strategy
adopted, and the likelihood of success.
3.4.1 Independent Variable: Domestic Coalition Type
Not all types of domestic coalitions value institutional membership and international
reputations for reliability equally. As Catalinac finds in her examination of New
Zealand’s reneging on its nuclear commitments to ANZUS, this decision was related to
domestic concerns about foreign policy autonomy and the sovereignty concerns related
alliance membership.21 In the New Zealand case, refusing port to nuclear armed ships
was not framed just as a narrow nuclear issue, but as “a matter of national pride.”22
As a result, New Zealand’s Prime Minister and ruling Labour party did not suffer
domestic audience costs, even in the face of reprisals from the United States.23 While
Catalinac does not frame her argument specifically in terms of nationalist domestic
movements – indeed, she argues that calls for autonomy are related to decreased
threat perception – this case highlights the importance of domestic coalition type
for explaining reneging.24 The Canadian case will demonstrate how two types of
domestic coalitions that oppose alliance commitments can lead to different outcomes
in relation to reneging.
19Duffield, 1992, pp.840, 847.
20On policy preferences and audience costs, see Chaudoin, 2014b. On other sources of variability
of audience costs, see Clare, 2007; Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016;
Potter and Baum, 2013; Trager and Vavreck, 2011.
21Catalinac, 2010.
22Ibid., p.331. By comparison, while Australia also had a “vibrant anti-nuclear movement,” it




Nationalist coalitions support reneging not solely based on their opposition to
particular commitments, but as part of a broader agenda to reorient foreign policy
in a way that affirms their state’s sovereignty and independence. This emphasis
means these coalitions are more likely to be skeptical of multilateral institutions,
if those institutions are seen as not directly catering to these national priorities.
Nationalist coalitions should therefore be particularly sensitive to the sovereignty
costs of alliance membership. Sovereignty costs entail “[t]he potential for inferior
outcomes, loss of authority, and diminution of sovereignty” over particular or broad
issue areas as a result of institutional membership.25 In the case of alliances, the
main sovereignty cost is having less authority and control over defence policy. In
addition to their sensitivity to the sovereignty costs, I show in the empirical chapters
that nationalists can perceive material and reputational gains from reneging on their
alliance commitments. Materially, reneging frees up resources that can be reoriented
towards national defense or non-security-related domestic priorities. Reputationally,
reneging demonstrates to allies that their leaders will ‘stand up’ for national priorities
and put the interest of the nation first. Leaders backed by a nationalist coalition
should be more likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt coercive strategies,
and more likely to succeed in their reneging attempts
On the other hand, single-issue coalitions, like anti-nuclear coalitions, oppose a
particular commitment that their state has taken on, but still value alliance mem-
bership and do not fundamentally question its benefits to the state. Therefore, these
coalitions still care about the material and reputational costs of reneging, making
leaders with the support of these coalitions susceptible to ‘double-edged’ domestic
audience costs. This should make leaders less likely to attempt reneging, more likely
to adopt consensus-based strategies, and more likely to ultimately back down from
reneging attempts.
While this logic of reneging focuses on domestic audience costs, the maximalist
nature of the demands of nationalist coalitions can also be used to deflect or lessen
international material and reputational costs. When supported by nationalist coali-
tions, leaders are able to threaten broader defections and status-quo allies can be
concerned about exacerbating nationalist sentiment through threats of punishment
for defection. Thus, a leader’s ability to deflect domestic audience costs can also
translate into an ability to deflect costs at the international level.
25Abbott and Snidal, 2000, p.437.
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3.4.2 Reneging as a Two-Level Game
This interplay between the international and domestic incentives makes Putnam’s
two-level game model of international negotiation particularly pertinent for under-
standing the dynamics of reneging on alliance commitments.26 Several assumptions
provide a foundation for using Putnam’s two-level game as a model of intra-alliance
negotiation. This model applies to leaders of states within institutionalized relation-
ships – NATO nuclear hosts in particular – that have made the decision to initiate a
reneging attempt on a commitment or series of commitments. While a reneging state
may have a wide array of grievances with the alliance or institution, it is assumed
that some form negotiated settlement is preferable to withdrawing wholesale. It is
also assumed that the reneging state still has an interest in minimizing the costs that
can be administered by their allies to the greatest extent possible, as well as poten-
tial audience costs. In order to do so, reneging state leaders need to negotiate with
their allies so that they determine what their allies will tolerate and mitigate negative
repercussions.
More generally, Putnam’s two-level game model of international negotiation as-
sumes that there are two states that are bargaining over a given issue, each being
represented by a chief negotiator or the “national political leader.”27 These indi-
viduals must find an agreement that will be accepted not only by the other state
at the international level (Level I), but also by their coalition at the domestic level
(Level II). Ignoring the preferences of the opposing state(s) or their domestic coali-
tion therefore risks the collapse of a negotiated settlement, either at the bargaining
stage (Level I) or the ratification stage (Level II).28 The domestic realm is especially
important, as in order to maintain their position, the chief negotiator depends on a
domestic coalition of support.29 Therefore, a negotiator’s ‘win-set,’ or the range of
agreements that they will accept, is largely determined by his domestic coalition at
Level II. When the win-sets of both negotiators overlap, an agreement can be struck.
According to Putnam, the more constrained a negotiator is at Level II, the smaller
26Indeed, as Snyder (2007, 165) notes, bargaining is essential to all forms of alliance manage-
ment: “Management involves pursuing both common interests and competitive interests and thus is
essentially a process of bargaining, either tacit or explicit.”
27Putnam, 1988, p.434. For a review of how Putnam’s two-level game has been applied by re-
searchers, see da Conceição-Heldt and Mello, 2017.
28Putnam defines ratification broadly. It does not need to follow a formal procedure and a variety
of actors can engage in ratification: “I use the term [ratification] generically to refer to any decision-
process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally
or informally...The actors at Level II may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social
classes, or even ‘public opinion’ ” (Putnam, 1988, p.436).
29Putnam, 1988, p.457.
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their win-set will be, which increases their bargaining leverage at Level I.30 However,
narrow win-sets increase the risk of deadlock or the complete collapse of negotiations.
Putnam’s model is particularly useful for negotiations within institutionalized
alliances, as he notes that no agreement does not always mean a reversion to the
status quo (i.e., the state retaining its nuclear commitment), but can also involve
the risk of a “worsening situation.”31 Once the issue has been launched into Level I
negotiations, the reneging leader needs to agree to back down to maintain the status
quo, meaning that this is an outcome of ‘successful’ negotiation. In terms of nuclear
sharing, a ‘worsening situation’ can encompass anything from diminishing diplomatic
or political relations between the allied states, to negative economic repercussions,
or even the ejection of the reneging state from the alliance. Reneging statesmen
that lack bargaining power are therefore incentivized to moderate their terms or
back down when faced with resolved status-quo allies. Likewise, allies may have to
tolerate defection in order to placate a dissatisfied state and avoid further reductions
or alliance instability. Consequently, having a credible threat of withdrawal if
demands are not met is an important source of leverage for a reneging state against
status quo allies; it represents the degree of tolerance a domestic coalition has of the
costs associated with a no-deal. Thus, ‘withdrawal’ here can mean withdrawal from
an alliance or withdrawal from negotiations. If leaders leave negotiations without a
deal, there is a risk that they may still decide to renege without tacit approval of
allies, which may result in more severe reductions to commitments than a negotiated
settlement.
While Putnam’s two-level conceptualization implies that negotiations occur se-
quentially between Level I (negotiation) and then Level II (ratification), Putnam
makes it clear that this is more of an idealization “for the purposes of exposition”
rather than a firm rule of international agreements.32 Putnam argues that negotiation
between domestic actors will likely occur prior to Level I “to hammer out an initial
position for the Level I negotiations.”33 This stage, pre-negotiation Level II policy
30Ibid., p.440.
31Ibid., p.442. Eichenberg (1993, p.46), in his application of the two-level game to NATO’s INF
posture, highlights the importance of reaching an agreement “on important issues within a valued
international institution” like NATO. He argues that political leaders have unique incentives to
reach an agreement in these contexts due to the domestic audience costs associated with failure
and the “potential source of general domestic support” associated with “international agreement”
(Eichenberg, 1993, p.46). He finds that under these circumstances, the narrowing of domestic win-
sets can actually lead to agreements being struck, because both parties value maintaining good




formulation, is particularly important for reneging states, as this is when the chief
negotiator will attempt to build the domestic coalition that will support their policy.
The extent to which the pre-negotiation Level II stage provides leverage in negoti-
ations depends on the coalition’s willingness to act unilaterally or set out firm
positions that have been effectively pre-ratified at the domestic level before entering
Level I. On the other hand, if the leader does not tie their hands domestically in this
pre-negotiation stage, or binds themselves to a consensus-based decision, they will
lose leverage in Level I negotiations vis-à-vis their allies.
It is also important to note that win-sets are not necessarily static and can be
“restructured” in a variety of ways.34 For example, the election of a new government
can also affect a state’s bargaining position, if the new government depends on a
different domestic coalition for support. Furthermore, foreign political leadership can
directly appeal to domestic actors in the opposing state in the hope of widening the
other’s win-set or promoting a particular negotiated outcome. A reneging state’s
vulnerability to restructuring by foreign allies is therefore another important
source of leverage in negotiations.
In the most abstract version of this model, I assume that these negotiations are
essentially bilateral, involving the reneging state and a status quo-oriented actor,
either a particular ally or representing the alliance itself. In the context of this two-
level game, nuclear withdrawal is a form of a renegotiation of a given state’s alliance
contributions or ‘commitment set.’ I also assume that there is only one state that
wants to reconfigure its alliance contribution at one time. The initiator state wants
to change the status quo to lessen their alliance contribution, while the other state
is assumed to want to preserve the status quo to the greatest extent possible. The
bargaining range is the totality of a given state’s potential contributions to the alliance
that will be accepted by both parties.
3.4.3 Coalition Type and Leverage
Single-issue coalitions have specific demands in relation to their state’s alliance com-
mitments. Within the context of nuclear sharing, the primary goal would be to
remove nuclear weapons from the host’s soil. Single-issue coalitions do not ques-
tion their state’s overall role in NATO and still value alliance membership. There
is no risk that the reneging state will leave the alliance, making it difficult for its
leader to threaten punishment if their demands are not met. It is more likely that
34Ibid., p.454.
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leaders with the backing of single-issue coalitions will attempt to achieve a consen-
sus decision within the alliance, fearing the domestic and international reputational
and audience costs they might face if they reneged coercively. Finally, because these
coalitions are more sensitive to allied reactions and opposition, they are more vul-
nerable to restructuring. Thus, leaders with the backing of these coalitions are more
likely to apply consensus-based negotiation strategies. The weakness of single-issue
anti-nuclear coalitions explains why states like Germany, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, despite their broad anti-nuclear constituencies that would support withdrawal,
continue to host nuclear weapons.
In contrast, nationalist coalitions have substantially more bargaining power. These
coalitions see value in forging an independent foreign and defense policy, emphasize
domestic priorities, and see the alliance as being fundamentally misaligned with na-
tional interests. Under these conditions, a coercive bargaining strategy becomes more
domestically viable. Chief negotiators can more credibly threaten to pull out of the
alliance or negotiations if their demands are not met to a sufficient degree, as a na-
tionalist coalition is unlikely to ratify any agreement that is too close to the status
quo. Limited reductions, or nuclear withdrawal, can be more credibly framed as a
compromise outcome, especially if the reneging state is willing to retain more im-
portant commitments within the alliance. As they are more likely to see defence
priorities as national rather than collective, these coalitions are also more likely to
favour unilateral declarations of policy before Level I negotiations have begun, which
increases their bargaining power. Finally, a nationalist coalition is less vulnerable to
restructuring influences, as they are more likely to see these attempts as unwarranted
foreign intrusions, which may intensify their demands. A skillful chief negotiator can
effectively use nationalist demands as leverage to push their state’s renegotiated com-
mitment set away from the status quo. I expand on this pathway to reneging in the
empirical chapters that will follow.
3.4.4 An Example of Leverage: Single-Issue vs Nationalist
Coalitions
To elucidate the variation in leverage of anti-nuclear and nationalist coalitions when
faced with an ally that wants to maintain the status quo, I show how the differences
their relative preference orderings35 can affect the outcome of negotiation. Here, one
35The preference ordering of each Level II coalition is related to, but conceptually distinct from, the
win-set at Level II, which contains the commitment ‘packages’ that would be ratified at the domestic
level. Some of the items included in the preference ordering may not be viable for ratification. Win-
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can see what options are eliminated from the bargaining range by virtue of changes
within a political leader’s coalition.
The status quo ally’s first choice is for the reneging state to back down and to
maintain their level of commitment to the alliance. However, a smaller reduction in
commitment is preferable to a large reduction in commitment, while a large reduction
is preferable to a complete withdrawal from the alliance. Therefore, the preference
ordering of a status quo ally is:
Status Quo > Limited Reductions > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance
If the chief negotiator of the reneging state is supported by an anti-nuclear coalition,
their demands on reductions are narrowly focused on the state’s nuclear commitments.
These groups have no interest in fundamentally restructuring their state’s position
within the alliance. This coalition still values alliance membership and therefore would
prefer no change to the status quo over major reductions or leaving the alliance:
Limited Reductions > Status Quo > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance.
Finally, a nationalist coalition’s first preference would be broad reductions in the
level of alliance commitment. This coalition contains actors that are skeptical of
alliance membership and want their country to move away from multilateral defence
commitments in order to reorient defence policy towards more national or domestic
priorities. Some level of reductions is preferable to leaving the alliance outright,
meaning that there is some maximum level of commitment that the coalition would
accept. However, for nationalist coalitions, the status quo is untenable and leaving
the alliance is preferable to no reduction in commitment:
Major Reductions > Limited Reductions > Leave Alliance > Status Quo36
With a status quo ally and an anti-nuclear coalition, the bargaining range is limited
to the status quo and limited reductions:
sets contain more specific and concrete outcomes or agreements, while preference orderings involve
more general and abstract outcomes.
36It is possible for nationalist coalitions to be more extreme in their demands: Major Reductions >
Leave Alliance > Limited Reductions > Status Quo. Furthermore, it is also possible for nationalist
coalitions to be more moderate in their demands, such as Limited Reductions > Major Reductions
> Leave Alliance > Status Quo or Major reductions > Limited Reductions > Status Quo > Leave
Alliance or Limited Reductions > Major reductions > Status Quo > Leave Alliance. In the latter
two cases, where alliance withdrawal is off the negotiation table, the credible threat of withdrawal




Status Quo > Limited Reductions > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance
Single-Issue Coalition:
Limited Reductions > Status Quo > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance
The chief negotiator of the reneging state has little leverage from their domestic
coalition under these conditions. There is no risk that the reneging state will leave
the alliance, making it difficult for its leader to threaten withdrawal or punishment if
their demands are not met. Counterintuitively, having more moderate defection de-
mands becomes an ‘all or nothing’ scenario, with no middle ground between the two
parties. Because the anti-nuclear domestic coalition still values alliance membership,
there is still potential for political leaders to face domestic audience costs if nuclear
withdrawal is framed as undermining the state’s position within the alliance or al-
liance cohesion overall. For these reasons, leaders will seek the approval of their allies
through a more consensus-based mode of bargaining, which dilutes their bargaining
power.37 Similarly, these costs make anti-nuclear coalitions vulnerable to restructur-
ing attempts by allies through such framing attempts. Overall, these factors make
nuclear withdrawal an unlikely outcome.
The German attempt to renege on its nuclear sharing commitments in 2009 shows
how these more limited demands can work against nuclear withdrawal. In 2009, the
political parties CDU, CSU, and FDP signed a coalition agreement that explicitly
called for the removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, which was an unprecedented
step towards withdrawal among the NATO retainers.38 However, this pledge “did not
lead to tangible disarmament steps.”39 Instead, NATO reaffirmed the status quo of
its nuclear posture twice: in the 2010 Strategic Concept and after the conclusion of
the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review in 2012.40 Germany upgraded its dual-
capable fighter jets, extending its life until 2024 and pledging 250 million euros for
the modernization effort, pushing the decision down the road.41
Why did the initial moves towards reneging fail? The effort to remove nuclear
weapons from Germany was championed by Guido Westerwelle, the foreign minister
37See Duffield, 1992.
38Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.90.
39Davis and Jasper, 2014, p.15.
40Ibid., p.20; Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.82.
41Berger, 2012.
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and leader of the FDP.42 His base of support for nuclear withdrawal was rooted
in the broad anti-nuclear sentiment within the German population.43 The relevant
clause to nuclear sharing within the coalition agreement carefully appeals to this
single-issue base; it reaffirms Germany’s support for the alliance, while calling for
nuclear withdrawal: “. . . we will advocate within the Alliance and with our American
allies the removal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany.”44 Therefore, in
the pre-negotiation phase, the German government only promised to advocate for,
rather than deliver, nuclear withdrawal. By seeking a multilateral, consensus-based
approach to the issue, Germany gave other members of the alliance veto power over
its nuclear status. Since France and other members of NATO strongly object to any
moves towards nuclear withdrawal, the status quo prevailed.45
On the other hand, the reneging state gains leverage when it is backed by a
nationalist coalition. This scenario is analysed in detail in Chapter 6, which discusses
Trudeau’s reneging on Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO:
Status Quo Ally:
Status Quo > Limited Reductions > Major Reductions > Leave Alliance
Nationalist Coalition:
Major Reductions > Limited Reductions > Leave Alliance > Status Quo
Under this scenario, some level of reductions becomes a more likely outcome of
negotiations. Chief negotiators can more credibly threaten to pull out of the alliance
or withdraw from negotiations and renege unilaterally if their demands are not met,
as their nationalist coalition is unlikely to ratify any agreement that is too close to the
status quo. Because of this credible threat of withdrawal, status quo allies are forced
to reconsider their preferred outcome and the scope of negotiations encompasses the
extent of reductions that both sides can tolerate. Leaders are also more likely to lock
themselves into a reneging position during the pre-negotiation phase, which appeals
to nationalist and unilateral sentiments, and makes it more difficult for these leaders
to back down in Level I negotiations. This coalition is less vulnerable to restructuring,
as they are more likely to see these attempts as unwarranted foreign influence, which
may intensify their anti-commitment demands.
42Davis and Jasper, 2014, p.24.
43Ibid., pp.24-26.
44The Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU, and FDP, 2009, p.143.
45Horovitz, 2014; Sauer and van der Zwaan, 2012, p.82.
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In this scenario, the size of the win-set, amount of bargaining power, and the ac-
ceptance of ‘no deal’ outcomes operate differently to what Putnam posits. According
to Putnam, narrow win-sets should be associated with increased tolerance of no deal,
giving negotiators more bargaining power at Level I.46 However, reneging skews this
logic: anti-nuclear coalitions have less bargaining power than nationalist coalitions
despite the fact that their win-sets are narrower. In this case, the tolerance of no
deal (i.e., the credible threat of withdrawal) is not related to win-set size. Indeed, in
cases of reneging, increased win-set size can represent an increased ability to threaten
further reductions if a deal is not struck. This discrepancy relates to the type of inter-
national negotiation that the two-level game is applied to. Putnam is concerned with
how international commitments and agreements are contrived. All of his examples
relate to the production or development of international cooperation. In contrast,
I focus on how commitments are reduced or wound down. Thus, for a negotiator
that seeks to renege or defect on commitments, a larger win-set can represent a lower
‘floor’ for reductions, providing them with more bargaining power against status-quo
allies.
Having introduced my theory that links domestic coalition type to reneging, I now
consider alternate explanations. Examining and ruling out alternate explanations is
necessary to demonstrate that a new theory is needed to explain reneging in the
case of Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments. The first set of explanations consider
the importance of systemic sources of leverage in intra-alliance negotiations: the
Realpolitik model and Snyder’s theory of intra-alliance bargaining. I show that both
of these theories struggle to explain the variation in the Canadian case.
3.5 Alternate Explanation: Realpolitik Model
The basis for this explanation is drawn from realist understandings of alliances and
nuclear sharing. According to realists like Mearsheimer and Walt, alliances are formed
in response to threats and should adapt or collapse based on their strategic value.47
This view of alliance commitment aligns with Fuhrmann and Sechser’s and Schofield’s
texts on nuclear sharing. These scholars argue that the causes of nuclear sharing are
related to the maximization of security of donors and, to a lesser extent, hosts.48
46Putnam, 1988, pp.440, 442.
47Mearsheimer, 1994; Walt, 1987. Catalinac (2010) argues that threat fluctuation in threat per-
ception should lead domestic efforts to seek greater autonomy within alliances, highlighting the
importance of systemic variables. However, as I will argue below, the causal direction between
lowered threat perception and domestic calls to renege is unclear.
48Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; Schofield, 2014.
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Furthermore, some scholars have argued that dual-key nuclear sharing arrangements
still have strategic or military value within NATO, which explains why these commit-
ments have been retained after the end of the Cold War.49 Under this logic reneging
and defection should occur when systemic pressures fall below a certain threshold.
According to this model, the process of bargaining is not theoretically relevant: the
outcomes of negotiations should optimize the alliance’s strategic posture.
Waltz has argued that neorealist theory is ill suited to explain or predict partic-
ular foreign policy outcomes; instead, it should only be applied to general trends in
international politics.50 While states may seek survival and balance against powerful
challengers, the specifics of how these tendencies play out on the international stage
is beyond the scope of neorealism. As he argues in Theory of International Politics,
“balance of power theory. . . does not tell us why state X made a certain move last
Tuesday.”51 Surely, Waltz would argue that mapping the changes in Canada’s nu-
clear sharing posture qualifies as the theoretical examination of foreign policy and
not international politics.
Nevertheless, there can be ‘realist’ theories of foreign policy, as long as they place
a sufficient degree of causal weight on systemic factors.52 A neorealist approach to
reneging, which only takes into account systemic factors and no domestic intervening
variables, provides a parsimonious theory of defection that can be tested, that I
refer to as the Realpolitik model. The Realpolitik model predicts that changes in
foreign policy relating to alliance commitment should primarily be based on changes
in the international system or the distribution of capabilities. Allies should be seeking
to maximize their power or security through their alliance commitments, dropping
them if they no longer provide strategic value. Four factors will be emphasized here:
changes to balance-of-power, changes to balance-of-threat, changes to geostrategic
value of nuclear host countries, and the military value of particular weapons systems.53
49Kroenig, 2016; Suchy and Thayer, 2014; Yost, 2009.
50Waltz, 1979, 1996.
51Waltz, 1979, p.121.
52Carlsnaes, 2013; Elman, 1996.
53The internal stability of the host state should also determine its nuclear posture. Although this
technically a unit-level factor, it still fits into the Realpolitik model, as stability is only important
insofar as it affects the security and usability of the tactical nuclear weapons. Both the United States
and the hosts should try to ensure that these weapons do not fall into the hands of actors that may
use these weapons for purposes that may undermine their security (Schofield, 2014). Instability can
involve the likelihood of theft by non-state groups or of the violent overthrow of the government
of the host state. While the Canadian government and military considered in 1967 the threat
of Quebecois separatist attempts “to steal a warhead” or cause violence around nuclear bases in
Quebec, these concerns were ultimately dismissed and no extra safety precautions were taken at
that time (Clearwater, 1998, p.211).
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The first set of hypotheses for reneging applies Waltz’s concept of the balance-
of-power and Walt’s concept of the balance-of-threat to nuclear sharing in NATO.54
States will balance against other states based on their relative capabilities and hostile
intentions.55 If a rival state becomes weaker or one’s own alliance becomes stronger,
certain capabilities may no longer be necessary to ensure one’s security and may
even be too costly to maintain. As the perceived intentions of states change, rivals
may become less threatening, which can also lead to the redundancy of certain ca-
pabilities. Thus, nuclear commitments could be withdrawn based on changing power
and threat dynamics. On the other hand, new threats may emerge over time, while
old threats dissipate within the international system. This means that nuclear host
states can lose their geostrategic value as threatening states are located farther away
from their territory. Indeed, Fuhrmann and Sechser argue that one of the primary
purposes of nuclear sharing is the projection of power.56 If hosts no longer provide a
viable platform to project the donor’s or alliance’s power, nuclear weapons may be
withdrawn.
While the discussion above treated nuclear commitments as part of the aggregate
capabilities of NATO, the next set of explanations relate to their specific military
functions. Since these weapons are costly to maintain, they should not be deployed if
they are not useful in some kind of tactical military scenario, otherwise they may lose
their value as deterrents as well.57 Thus, as weapons become obsolete, they should
be withdrawn. Modernization can also lead to reductions in the number and kinds of
weapons that are deployed abroad.58 Withdrawal should be more likely if there are
cost-effective conventional alternatives to the nuclear options deployed in host states.
In both of these cases, withdrawal should occur close to the end of the service lives
of the weapons involved.
I demonstrate that there is a link between an individual’s assessment of these
strategic variables and their support for reneging or retention of commitments. How-
ever, these differences did not affect the outcomes observed. Status-quo supporting
officials in Canada and in allied states believed that the international system was
threatening, and that Canada’s nuclear weapons were a valuable means of combating
those threats.59 On the other hand, officials that supported reneging in Canada of-
54Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987.
55Ibid.
56Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014.
57Kamp and Remkes, 2011, p.79.
58See Foradori, 2013; Futter, 2011, p.549.
59Simpson, 2001.
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ten justified this stance by highlighting that the Canadian nuclear contribution was
marginal to security, that these weapons had little military value, or that the interna-
tional situation was easing.60 The empirical chapters will show that the latter did not
win over the former because they were convinced that systemic pressures had eased.
Indeed, when strategic concerns were present, they were often used to support
domestic agendas rather than the other way around. For example, during his 1963
campaign, Diefenbaker emphasized the concerns around the efficacy and accuracy
of the Bomarc but not the CF-101s. Yet, he was calling for reneging on nuclear
sharing in its entirety, rather than merely scrapping the dubious Bomarc. However,
despite the doubts about its accuracy and military utility, Pearson agreed to retain
the Bomarc as part of Canada’s nuclear sharing role. Trudeau also invoked strategic
factors when justifying his call to reduce Canada’s commitment to NATO. However,
in a later interview he noted that the decision to halve its forces was “arbitrary,”
based on concerns related to his domestic coalition and alliance politics rather than
strategic optimization.61 The Realpolitik model only provides a plausible explanation
for reneging for one case: the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in
1984. The decline of the level of international threat, the obsolescence of the weapons
systems, and the availability of conventional alternatives explain why Canada reneged
on its nuclear role in NORAD.
3.6 Alternate Explanation: Snyder’s Theory of
Intra-Alliance Bargaining
Like the Realpolitik model, Snyder also highlights the importance of systemic factors.
Unlike the Realpolitik model, for Snyder, outcomes of intra-alliance negotiations are
not simply the product of security optimization, but are related to relative bargaining
power between actors. Like my theory of domestic coalition type, Snyder highlights
the role of a credible threat of withdrawal or breakdown of the alliance.62 However,
a significant point of divergence between these two theories is the locus of bargaining
power. My theory focuses on the domestic level. For Snyder, the relevant variables
exist at the system and state level, with the domestic level mostly black-boxed within
60Ibid.
61Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.378.
62According to Snyder (2007, 168), threats of defection and withdrawal “even if mostly implicit
or existential, are perhaps the most important tactical source of bargaining power.”
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the analysis.63
Three variables affect the amount of bargaining power an ally has relative to the
other members in its alliance: dependence, commitment, and interests. I examine
each of these factors in turn. According to Snyder, “a state’s bargaining power will
be greater, the lower its dependence, the looser its commitment, and the greater
its interests at stake.”64 Snyder’s theory is couched in general terms and applies to
intra-alliance bargaining scenarios beyond reneging, but its application to reneging
can be extrapolated. By his logic, a state should be more likely to renege when it
has a high degree of bargaining power relative to its allies. To approximate relative
bargaining power, Snyder assigns a three-point score to each of these variables to
“arrive at a composite indicator of [a given ally’s] bargaining power.”65 Allies with
a higher score have more bargaining power and are more likely to “stand firm even
at considerable risk of breakdown” of negotiations, while those with a lower score
have less bargaining power and are more malleable.66 The outcome of negotiations
depends on the relative bargaining score of each side: a wide difference in bargaining
is likely to result in the higher scoring state’s favour, while a narrow difference should
result in “compromise.”67
Next, I apply the level of dependence, commitment, and interests to the Canadian
case in order to test the viability of Snyder’s theory in explaining its fluctuating
nuclear commitment policy. 68 I conclude that while some of Snyder’s concepts are
relevant to the Canadian case study, his theory of intra-alliance bargaining does not
provide additional causal weight over and above my theory of domestic coalition type.
3.6.1 Dependence
Throughout the time period under study, Canada was overwhelmingly dependent on
the United States for the provision of security. According to Snyder, dependence is
related to a state’s need to rely on allies for security, the extent that a particular
ally or alliance provides security, and the availability of alternate means for providing
63While the ‘interest’ variable could relate to domestic politics, it is narrowly defined as the level





68Snyder (2007, p.166) explicitly includes “the sharing of preparedness burdens in peacetime” as
one of “the most prominent issues in intra-alliance bargaining.” Therefore, this theory of intra-
alliance bargaining power directly pertains to the issue of nuclear sharing.
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security.69 While Snyder notes that level of dependence is not directly equivalent
with relative military capabilities, the yawning power imbalance is clearly relevant
for understanding Canada’s dependent position.70 Canada has a small military force,
large landmass, and is geographically proximate to the United States. This means
that it relies on the United States for many core security needs and is also unlikely
to seek an alternative alliance. One could argue that, as Canada is geographically
separated from the main operations of NATO, Canada is more dependent on NO-
RAD than NATO for the provision of its core security needs. Therefore, Canada
has more bargaining power against NATO than NORAD, explaining why reneging
occurred only in the former case in the early 1970s. However, deducing the relative
dependency of Canada on each of these alliances is far from straightforward. NATO
provided an essential security function for Canada by keeping the Cold War cold: any
outbreak of hostilities in Europe would carry with it the likelihood of escalation to
a global conflict. Furthermore, it is unclear if one can separate these two alliances
in terms of Canada’s relationship with and bargaining power over the United States.
It is also important to highlight that Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments, while
integrated within NATO as well as NORAD, resulted from a bilateral agreement with
the United States. The empirical chapters demonstrate that the United States was
involved in the negotiations on Canada’s nuclear commitments at each stage and
provided clear signals that it opposed reneging on these commitments. This shows
that Canada’s relationship with the United States could not be easily separated from
its relationship with NATO. If, despite these caveats, one still wishes to separate
NATO from NORAD in terms of scoring the dependency of Canada and therefore
its relative bargaining power, issues still remain in explaining Canada’s fluctuating
nuclear policy. 71 Canada’s greater dependency on NORAD than NATO is a static
variable throughout this time period. Canada would always have greater relative
bargaining power against NATO; therefore, it cannot explain the timing of reneging.
Furthermore, Diefenbaker’s reneging attempt in 1963, which was primarily aimed at
Canada’s nuclear commitments to NORAD, is difficult to explain with this theory.
Finally, according to Snyder’s index, Canada’s higher dependency score would likely
69Ibid., p.167. While Snyder (2007, p.166) acknowledges that dependence can be broadly defined
to include “a wide range of values in addition to military security,” such as “prestige” and “domestic
stability,” he focuses primarily on military dependence. Even if one expanded the concept of de-
pendence, Canada’s dependence on the United States extended beyond the military realm as well,
including the provision of status, cultural, economic, and political benefits.
70Ibid., p.167.
71Snyder (2007, p.168) highlights that the notion of dependency should be understood in relative
terms, as mutually dependent allies could not easily make credible threats of withdrawal.
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be offset by NATO’s higher interest in Canada’s nuclear commitments, which will
be discussed further below. As the empirical chapter on Trudeau and NATO shows,
both Canada’s conventional and nuclear contributions to the Central Front were con-
sidered by strategic planners within NATO to have high military value; reductions to
these commitments would leave a substantial gap that would need to be filled.72
3.6.2 Commitment
Given the level of formalisation and institutionalisation involved in NATO and NO-
RAD, as well as the alignment of their core security interests, Canada, the United
States, and other allies in NATO are scored as having equally high degrees of com-
mitment to their alliances. According to Snyder, increased levels of commitment
undermine the credibility of threats of withdrawal.
3.6.3 Interests
Finally, a state’s interests in a particular issue can also affect their bargaining power.73
A state that is highly invested in a particular outcome is likely to have more clout
in negotiations than a state that has only a lukewarm stake in the issue.74 In each
instance of attempted reneging or withdrawal, Canada has a high interest in the
nuclear sharing issue, as it directly influences their security, sovereignty, and material
investment in its alliances. The act of attempting to renege on a commitment indicates
a high degree of interest in the issue, given the potential costs associated with the
initiation of negotiations.
For the United States and the rest of NATO, their level of interest is less easily
determined. Firstly, Snyder is unclear as to whether interest is a relative or absolute
concept. For example, the United States’ interest in stationing nuclear weapons in
Canada in the early 1960s could be conceivably construed as low if one compares it
with alliance issues that are more directly related to the Soviets, such as the Berlin
Crisis. However, as I will show in Chapter 4, President Kennedy and other key mem-
bers of his administration were increasingly frustrated by Diefenbaker’s unwillingness
to make good on his nuclear commitments, saw the failure to deploy nuclear weapons
on Canadian soil as a security gap, and took a keen interest in trying to resolve the
impasse.75 If one takes a relative view of interest, one would argue that the American
72DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.
73Snyder, 2007, p.170.
74Ibid., p.171.
75See, for example, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961.
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interest in this issue was low. If one takes an absolute understanding of interest, it
was clear that the Americans were actively vested in the outcome of negotiations,
and one could argue that they had a moderate level of interest. Secondly, given that
the nuclear sharing issue directly affects alliance military capabilities, there is some
overlap between dependence and interests in this case. A state that is more depen-
dent on an ally for security is also likely to be more interested in the particular issue
under discussion, when it directly involves the means of providing that security.
3.6.4 Relative Bargaining Power: Canada, the United States,
and NATO
This section applies Canada’s relative bargaining power against the United States
and NATO according to Snyder’s three-point scale. In each of these cases, Canada
has a score that is only within one point or tied with each of these actors. When
bargaining with the United States over nuclear weapons sharing, Canada would have
a dependency score of 1 (high), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score
of 3 (high). The United States would have a dependency score of 3 (low), a com-
mitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 1/2 (low to moderate), depending
on how one weighs its relative interest in the Canadian nuclear issue. Canada’s to-
tal score would be 5, while the United States would have a score of 5 or 6. When
bargaining with the rest of NATO, Canada would have a lower dependency score
of 2 (moderate), a commitment score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 3 (high).
NATO would have a dependency score of 1/2 (high to moderate), a commitment
score of 1 (high), and an interest score of 2/3 (moderate to high). Canada would
have a score of 6 in these negotiations and NATO would have a score of 5, regard-
less of how one evaluates the importance of the Canadian contribution. 76 In both
scenarios, according to Snyder, the relatively close scores between allies would be
expected to lead to an outcome of “compromise” rather than one state dominating
over the other.77 How does this prediction square with the outcomes observed and
the conduct of negotiating allies? Trudeau’s successful reneging attempt on Canada’s
nuclear commitment and substantial reduction of its conventional commitments pro-
vides a straightforward case of defection and reneging. As I explain in Chapter 6,
Trudeau refused to compromise on Canada’s nuclear commitment, insisting on total
76As noted before, the dependency score and the interest score are related: their scores depend on
how one evaluates the military value and necessity of Canada’s nuclear and conventional contribution
to NATO. The more dependent they are on Canada’s military commitments, the more interested
NATO would be in these negotiations.
77Snyder, 2007, p.175.
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withdrawal by 1972 despite the objections of NATO and the United States. Despite
the closeness in relative bargaining power scores, the Canadian government’s conduct
in negotiations seems to better fit with Snyder’s predictions about states with wide
gaps in bargaining power, with the Canadian government largely “stand[ing] firm”
on their priorities and “threaten[ing] credibly to cause breakdown if it did not get
its way.”78 Canada succeeded because negotiators could credibly threaten withdrawal
when bargaining with the United States and NATO, which caused them to back down
and accept Canadian defections.
If Canada’s bargaining power was not so strong according to Snyder’s calculus,
why did it behave as if it was dominant? One possible explanation can be found
in Snyder’s theory, which highlights the fact that it is not the objective measures of
bargaining power that matter, but rather opposing allies’ perception of their relative
power. Snyder assumes that negotiators would “have a better idea of the interests
and dependence of their own state than those of the allied state.”79 States therefore
have “incentives to deceive” in order to try to achieve better bargaining outcomes, by
convincing their allies they are less dependent or more interested than they actually
are.80 However, neither the United States nor NATO were under the impression that
Canada was not dependent on them for security; Canada’s defections and conduct
were baffling to them for this very reason. There is no evidence that the Canadian
government misrepresented their level of interest, so the outcome in this case cannot
be traced down to misperception.
Having exhausted the variables that Snyder presents in his theory, it is clear that
the domestic level needs to be accounted for in order to explain why Canada reneged
on its nuclear commitments to NATO, which will be explored in detail in Chapter
6. I show that Trudeau’s bargaining power in these negotiations was related to the
nationalist coalition that supported him, which enabled defection on conventional
commitments and reneging on nuclear commitments. It was this domestic level factor
that gave Canada a credible threat of withdrawal.
3.7 Excluding Plausible Dynamic Theories
Finally, I rule out plausible dynamic theories that fall outside of the intra-alliance
negotiation framework. These theories are rejected using simple comparative analysis;





do not correspond to the theory’s predictions. This section examines five plausible
alternative explanations. The first two were discussed in the previous chapter as
dynamic explanations of reneging: leadership turnover and elections. While these
theories will ultimately be rejected, both contain insights about the importance of
shifting constituencies and coalitions in explaining defection. The next three theories
are not taken from the literature on alliance commitment, but instead are explanations
of foreign policy that could plausibly explain reneging: the role of political parties,
the role of international norms, and the role of the beliefs of leaders.
Leadership turnover. Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago argue that leadership turnover
should provide a pathway to reneging, as new leaders are more likely to have different
preferences than their predecessors, leading to different perspectives and priorities.81
They would not be beholden to the constituencies of the old leadership and likely
face lower audience costs for reneging.82 Therefore, a new leader should correspond
with reneging. Pearson’s abandonment of nuclear withdrawal is particularly puzzling
from this perspective. In 1963, leadership turnover led to the fulfillment of Canada’s
nuclear commitments, rather than reneging. Pearson decided to support nuclear ac-
quisition, despite his and the Liberal Party’s previous opposition to nuclear acquisition
and appeals to anti-nuclear constituencies. This theory also encounters difficulty in
explaining both Diefenbaker’s and Trudeau’s inconsistent decision-making trajectory.
Diefenbaker attempted to renege despite the fact that he had made the commitments
to NATO and NORAD only a few years before. Trudeau had clear anti-nuclear
preferences and made promises during his 1968 leadership and electoral campaign to
reassess Canada’s defense commitments. Yet, this only resulted in Canada reneging
on its NATO nuclear commitments, while its NORAD nuclear interception role was
retained until 1984.
Elections. Tago, on the other hand, argues that elections themselves, rather than
leadership turnover, are the driver of defection from alliance coalitions.83 He argues
that incumbents who face “a challenger that opposes an international commitment,
may announce the termination of the ongoing commitment policy to counter the op-
position parties’ campaigns.”84 According to his theory, incumbents will “reverse an
unpopular commitment to win national election” and found that leaders were more
likely to announce the withdrawal of their forces from the Coalition of the Willing





during election months.85 While the 1963 and 1968 electoral campaigns in Canada are
significant to my study, Tago’s theory does not provide much insight into Canadian
decision making. Firstly, while Diefenbaker’s stance on reneging crystalized during
his election campaign in 1963, he was not incentivized by a challenger who was crit-
ical of maintaining Canada’s nuclear commitment. In fact, Pearson had announced
his support for nuclear acquisition shortly before the collapse of the Diefenbaker gov-
ernment. On the other hand, incumbent Diefenbaker did face pressure to reverse his
stance on nuclear sharing during the 1962 election, when Pearson was still supporting
an anti-nuclear platform. Yet, during 1962, Diefenbaker chose not to announce his
intention to renege, nor did he make Canada’s nuclear commitments a major feature
of his campaign. Second, while Trudeau promised a review of national defense and
a reexamination of Canadian security commitments during the 1968 campaign, he
only announced a “planned and phased reduction” of its commitments to NATO al-
most a year later.86 The precise nature of this reduction was only specified several
months after this announcement. While it could be argued that Trudeau aimed to
fulfill an electoral promise, the announcement and specification of the reductions to
Canada’s commitments were not election-winning tactics, as Tago envisions. More-
over, while there was a sense across the political spectrum during the 1968 campaign
that Canada needed to reexamine its defense commitments, Canada’s specific nuclear
sharing commitments were not a central feature of the campaign and did not come
under particular scrutiny.
Partisan shifts in government. Another possible explanation could examine
the partisan shifts in the Canadian government over the course of this time period.
While there are multiple parties with seats in Parliament and some wield political
influence, the government has been dominated by two parties: The Liberals and the
Conservatives. They fall along a traditional left-right axis, with the Liberals being a
center-left party and the Conservatives being a center-right party. Since conservative
or right-wing voters have been theorized to have greater sensitivity to “sovereignty
costs” and are less trusting of multilateral institutions than those on the left, govern-
ments led by right-wing or conservative parties should be more likely to renege on their
alliance commitments.87 While the prediction that right-leaning parties should be
85Ibid., pp.225, 230.
86DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
87Rapport and Rathburn, 2020, pp.1-2, 3-4. This article examines the role of party ideology on the
institutional design of alliances, rather than on the likelihood of defection. However, the proposition
that right-leaning parties and individuals should be more sensitive to sovereignty costs should also
have implications for reneging.
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more sensitive to these costs maps on well to Diefenbaker’s reneging attempt, as well
as Pearson’s reluctance to alienate allies, this theory fails to explain Trudeau’s trajec-
tory. Despite being a member of the left-leaning Liberal Party, Trudeau drew upon
nationalist rhetoric and alliance-skepticism in order to justify reneging on Canada’s
nuclear and conventional commitments to NATO in the early 1960s. While domestic
coalitions and politics are significant for explaining reneging, the divide between the
left and the right does not appear to be deterministic in this case. Instead, focusing
more directly on nationalist coalitions that would be most sensitive to sovereignty
costs provides an explanation that transcends the traditional left-right split.
The NPT. A systemic norms-based theory would focus on the emergence of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Some scholars have highlighted the water-
shed nature of the NPT, referring to the time period after its passage as the “second
nuclear age.”88 The NPT is significant because it provided a formal international
proscription against nuclear proliferation, providing a clear-cut norm and legal prin-
ciple against the spread of nuclear weapons.89 Canada was an early signatory to the
treaty and ratified it in January 1969. It is possible, therefore, that the passage of
the NPT and the debate around the spread of nuclear weapons led to an anti-nuclear
“norm cascade” within Canada that empowered Trudeau to reject Canada’s nuclear
commitments.90 However, this theory cannot explain why Trudeau withdrew from
his NATO commitments by 1972, yet retained nuclear weapons on Canadian soil
until 1984, as these were the weapons that were most problematic for anti-nuclear
activists. In addition, under Trudeau, the debate around the withdrawal of Canada’s
nuclear commitments to NATO and NORAD centered more around the merits of the
alliances themselves rather than the NPT or anti-nuclear ideals. In the early 1970s,
when the NPT was invoked in Cabinet, it was to justify the retention of Canada’s
nuclear-armed interceptors:
In contrast to the situation in 1963 [when nuclear weapons were acquired],
the non- proliferation treaty is now in effect and Canada conforms to the
provisions of that treaty whereby countries other than the existing nuclear
powers can have nuclear weapons on their territory only under a two-key
system of control.91
88Solingen, 2007, p.3.
89Ibid., Robinson, 2015, pp.60-61.
90Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.895.
91Senator Paul Martin in LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.
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In other words, it was thought that the NPT did not apply to nuclear weapons that
were shared under dual-key. This statement suggests that the passing of the NPT
may have relieved some normative pressure on Canadian political elites, as it divorced
the concepts of nuclear proliferation and nuclear sharing.
Leaders’ anti-nuclear beliefs. Finally, norms can also operate at the individual
level. Regardless of the systemic tolerance of nuclear sharing or nuclear weapons,
leaders’ personal anti-nuclear beliefs could explain the variation in reneging. The
role of individual leaders is especially pertinent to the Canadian case because of
the high level of executive power concentration and largely majoritarian democratic
structure.92 Indeed, Chapter 6 will show that Trudeau’s personal anti-nuclear beliefs
played a role in his support for reneging on Canada’s nuclear commitments. However,
his opposition to nuclear weapons does not explain why he backed down from reneging
on Canada’s nuclear role in NORAD in 1971, despite his consistent opposition to
nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Furthermore, the role of personal anti-nuclear
beliefs is even more puzzling for explaining the actions of Pearson and Diefenbaker.
While Pearson is considered to have betrayed his principled stance on disarmament
and nuclear weapons by supporting acquisition in 1963, Diefenbaker did not have
deeply rooted anti-nuclear beliefs and had an ambivalent relationship with the anti-
nuclear movement.93
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented my case study: Canada’s shifting nuclear sharing com-
mitments to NATO and NORAD during the Cold War. I showed that Canada was a
deviant case for reneging, as it has many static characteristics that should encourage
reliability: it is a democracy, a junior alliance member, and a member of two highly in-
stitutionalized alliances. Nevertheless, there is substantial variation on the dependent
variable. I demonstrated that the dual-key nuclear sharing provides a useful starting
point for analysis, as the historical trajectory of nuclear sharing commitments in other
NATO host states has largely conformed to institutionalist expectations. Due to the
amount of time that has elapsed since the end of Canada’s nuclear sharing commit-
ments, a large amount of formerly classified archival material is now available. This
allows for in-depth process tracing. This case is therefore particularly well suited for
generating a new theory of reneging on alliance commitments.
92Studlar and Christensen, 2006.
93McMahon, 2009.
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In the empirical chapters that follow, I will show that reneging is related to the
domestic coalition that supports defecting on commitments. In this chapter, I have
outlined two primary types of coalitions that oppose alliance commitments: national-
ist coalitions that have broad agendas to distance their country from an alliance and
single-issue coalitions that seek to disengage from a particular commitment rather
than the alliance as a whole. For leaders of single-issue coalitions, the double-edged
logic of reneging applies; it is likely to be a costly activity, even if the commitment
under scrutiny is unpopular. Leaders with single-issue support will have little lever-
age in international negotiations because of this vulnerability to domestic audience
costs. They will have no credible threat of withdrawal, be expected to seek consensus,
and will be vulnerable to restructuring attempts. Nationalist coalitions, on the other
hand, are not subject to the same structure of costs. Because nationalist coalitions
value their state’s independence over their allies and see material and reputational
gains from defection, leaders will be less vulnerable to domestic costs and have more
leverage in intra-alliance negotiations. They will have a credible threat of withdrawal,
have the ability to act unilaterally and coercively, and will have low vulnerability to
restructuring. For this reason, leaders with nationalist backing for reneging should
be more likely than those with anti-nuclear coalition to attempt to renege and more
likely to succeed when they do.
In order to demonstrate the value added of a new theory, this chapter has also
considered and ruled out established theories that could explain reneging in this
case. I demonstrated that systemic sources of leverage, leadership turnover, elections,
partisanship, global anti-nuclear norms, and individual anti-nuclear beliefs do not
provide an adequate explanation for the variation that is observed. However, my
theory does not represent the only pathway to reneging for all cases. Indeed, I show
that the final instance of withdrawal is best explained by strategic optimization, or
what I call the ‘Realpolitik model.’
4
Case Study 1: John G. Diefenbaker
“The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they
are armed with nuclear warheads. . . It is our intention to provide Canadian
forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfill their re-
spective roles.”
– Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, February 20 19591
“We oppose the spread of the nuclear club. We will not acquire nuclear
weapons for our forces in Canada so long as there is hope East and West
can come together for an acceptable disarmament.”
– Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, May 30 19622
“We are not going to accept [the] role for Canada of nuclear ammunition
dump nor will we be [a] decoy target. . . I want Canada’s decisions [to] be
made in Canada. I want Canada strong not subservient.”
– Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, April 3 19633
This chapter explores the shifting nuclear sharing policy of the Diefenbaker ad-
ministration (1957-1963). Early in his tenure as Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker
committed Canada to a nuclear sharing role in NATO and NORAD. These commit-
ments involved tying hands through public and private statements in support of ac-
quisition, as well as formal agreements. Diefenbaker also shored up Canada’s nuclear
commitments through sinking costs by purchasing weapons systems that required
nuclear warheads to be militarily effective. By the end of October 1962, Diefenbaker
firmly opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. Yet,
1DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.
2DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
3JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 5 April 1963. Quoted from speech
extracts that were sent to Secretary of State.
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the Prime Minister still sought a consensus-based solution that would allow him to
retain the image of a ‘good ally.’ During the election in the spring of 1963, however,
Diefenbaker openly embraced reneging and pursued a nationalist coalition. Canada,
Diefenbaker claimed during the campaign, would not be “a dumping ground for nu-
clear warheads.”4 He also implied that Canada’s nuclear role in NATO would no
longer be necessary in the near future.5
As discussed in previous chapters, material, reputational, and audience costs
should dissuade leaders from reneging on commitments and from making commit-
ments that they do not intend to keep. Studies on audience costs suggest that do-
mestic populations punish their leaders for inconsistency, viewing them as incompe-
tent and as damaging national reputation if they make commitments only to break
them.6 According to the polls available to the government at the time, a majority of
Canadians supported nuclear acquisition throughout Diefenbaker’s administration.7
Members of Diefenbaker’s party, the Progressive Conservatives, also largely supported
acquisition throughout this time period. Strategic conditions also seemed to encour-
age acquisition: Cold War tensions dramatically increased after the Berlin Crisis
in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, underscoring the need for Canada to
shore up its alliance commitments. Accordingly, the United States strongly pressured
Canada to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in both NORAD and NATO.
All these factors should have discouraged reneging; yet, as time went on, Diefen-
baker’s reluctance to follow through on his commitments increased. First, he delayed
decision making. Next, he sought a compromise with the United States to keep nu-
clear weapons off Canadian soil. Finally, he ran a nationalist campaign that cast the
United States as encroaching on Canadian sovereignty, where the rejection of nuclear
weapons was a central feature. Thus, the central puzzles of this chapter are: Why
did Diefenbaker make nuclear commitments, only to attempt to renege a few years
later? Why did Diefenbaker first attempt a consensus-based approach only to switch
to an antagonistic and nationalist campaign in 1963? And why did his attempts to
renege fail?
4JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 13 March 1963a.
5Ibid. “Now, there is a doubt whether that [NATO] strike-reconnaissance role should be contin-
ued, in view of the recent Nassau declaration concerning nuclear arms.”
6Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998;
Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.
7Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963. This Gallup poll asked, “Just from what you know, or have
heard, in your opinion should Canada’s armed forces be armed with nuclear weapons or not?” 58%
responded ‘yes,’ compared to 37.8% ‘no.’
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While some scholars attribute Diefenbaker’s actions to a pathological inability to
come to a decision, Patricia McMahon argues that Diefenbaker’s vacillations were
based on political calculation.8 Diefenbaker was worried that acquiring nuclear wea-
pons would provide force to Canada’s growing anti-nuclear movement and, by ex-
tension, to the anti-nuclear Liberal opposition.9 While Diefenbaker himself did not
identify with this anti-nuclear sentiment, he feared it.10 Furthermore, several mem-
bers of his Cabinet, including the influential Secretary of State for External Affairs
Howard Green, were strongly opposed to nuclear acquisition. Rather than deal with
the political fallout of a controversial decision, Diefenbaker delayed and obfuscated
his position. Through this lens, Diefenbaker was not indecisive, but trying to keep
both the pro- and anti-nuclear factions within his coalition on side through a straddle
strategy.11
Nevertheless, Diefenbaker could not delay a decision forever. By not forcing a
consensus at the elite level and allowing both sides to become more entrenched in
their positions, Diefenbaker needed a political compromise to satisfy these opposing
positions on nuclear sharing. As the anti-nuclear coalition did not oppose membership
in NORAD or NATO, focussing on the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil
was the only way out. Diefenbaker eventually supported the ‘standby’ and ‘missing
part’ proposals, which would mean that nuclear weapons would not be brought onto
Canadian soil until an impending emergency. Effectively, settling the nuclear issue
in this way would amount to reneging on the NORAD commitment, while fulfilling
Canada’s commitment to NATO. However, Diefenbaker hoped to mask this through
a consensus-based approach. If the United States agreed, he could credibly claim to
domestic audiences that he had fulfilled his commitments.
The Prime Minister’s negotiating position was undermined by three critical fac-
tors related to the anti-nuclear nature of his coalition: the need for a consensus-based
solution, the lack of a credible threat of withdrawal, and its vulnerability to restruc-
turing. First, Diefenbaker adopted a consensus-based approach to reneging in order
to reduce costs and satisfy both the pro- and anti-nuclear factions. More practically,
Canada could not unilaterally impose a standby or missing part arrangement: it
required the support of the United States. Second, the reliance on an anti-nuclear
coalition undermined any threat of withdrawal if the United States did not accept
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Cabinet supported nuclear acquisition and would not tolerate a public rebuke from
a trusted ally, meaning Diefenbaker could not walk away from negotiations easily.
Finally, because of this vulnerability, the United States used their own dissatisfac-
tion with Diefenbaker’s unreliability to attempt to restructure Canada’s bargaining
position.
The Americans’ restructuring attempt had desired and unintended consequences.
On the one hand, it directly contributed to the collapse of Diefenbaker’s government,
setting the scene for an election that would substantially alter Canada’s negotiating
position in the Americans’ favour. By calling out Diefenbaker’s attempt to renege,
the United States undercut the pro-nuclear elements of the Prime Minister’s already
wobbly coalition and damaged his reputation domestically. However, this clear at-
tempt at American interference also provided the impetus for Diefenbaker to form a
nationalist coalition, which opposed nuclear sharing as a means of asserting Canadian
sovereignty and independence. If Diefenbaker had won this election with a nation-
alist coalition that supported reneging, he would have been in a more advantageous
position to withdraw from Canada’s nuclear commitments.
This chapter shows that leaders with the support of anti-nuclear coalitions will
face considerable constraints when attempting to renege on commitments. Caught
between demands to withdraw from a specific commitment while still appearing to
support the alliance as a whole, leaders will either try to delay decision-making or
seek allied approval. However, due to the threat of audience costs if they do not gain
allied approval, a reneging leader’s bargaining power will be constrained.
The threat of nationalism was salient in this case. Indeed, Diefenbaker’s electoral
performance demonstrates the potential of nationalist domestic coalitions. Many
voters were attracted to this nationalist messaging and supported reneging on these
grounds. Nevertheless, Diefenbaker’s effort to construct a nationalist coalition was too
late for him to attract enough support to retain his Premiership. While the Americans
dismissed the potential threat of an anti-nuclear backlash to nuclear acquisition, they
consistently worried about how nationalist sentiment within Canada might affect its
reliability. They adopted a cautious approach after Diefenbaker tried to appeal to
nationalist sentiments.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, the political context in which Diefenbaker
came to power is described. Next, Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO and
NORAD are detailed. I establish that Diefenbaker committed himself by tying hands
through public and private statements and sinking costs through the purchasing of
delivery systems that required nuclear arms to be maximally effective. The third part
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of this chapter demonstrates that Diefenbaker delayed finalizing acquisition until 1962
due to his concerns about growing anti-nuclear sentiment. Delaying a decision was
part of a straddle strategy intended to keep the anti- and pro-nuclear elements in his
coalition onside. The fourth section explores Diefenbaker’s failed attempt at reneg-
ing. The first stage occurred in November 1962, when negotiations with the United
States to finalize the nuclear sharing agreement were restarted after years of delay.
At this time, Diefenbaker continued his straddle strategy, attempting to minimize
costs by adopting a consensus-based approach that would keep nuclear weapons off
Canadian soil while appearing to keep its commitments. Diefenbaker’s bargaining
power was undermined by his anti-nuclear coalition and the American’s belief that
he could not credibly form a nationalist coalition. After a restructuring attempt by
the State Department, Diefenbaker switched strategies and directly appealed to a
nationalist coalition in support of reneging. This next stage of Diefenbaker’s reneging
strategy encompassed the 1963 campaign. While Diefenbaker was ultimately pun-
ished for his waffling and unreliability at the ballot box, there is evidence that his
nationalist strategy mitigated the effect of reneging-related audience costs for some
voters. Diefenbaker’s nationalist appeals also affected the behaviour of the United
States, deterring them from further attempts at restructuring.
4.1 Background
Throughout its history, control of the Canadian government has alternated between
Canada’s two primary political parties: center-left Liberal Party and the center-right
Conservative Party. The Canadian government had been the domain of the Liberal
Party for over two decades before, concurrently winning five elections. Diefenbaker
and the Conservative Party’s victory in 1957 represented an emergence from the po-
litical opposition that had previously defined Diefenbaker’s career and the party’s
standing in Parliament.12 While the Conservatives had won only a minority govern-
ment in 1957, they quickly cemented their position by calling another election in 1958.
This was a landslide victory for Diefenbaker. With 208 seats out of 265, Diefenbaker’s
majority was the largest in Canadian history at that time.13
Diefenbaker’s rise also coincided with a resurgence of nationalism14 and anti-
12McKercher, 2016, p.6.
13This victory was only surpassed in 1984, where Brian Mulroney and the Conservatives won a
majority of 211 seats.
14The nationalism that will be discussed throughout this dissertation is English Canadian nation-
alism, focusing on the pride and place of Canada as a country, which is distinct from the Quebecois
nationalist and separatist movement.
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Americanism within Canadian politics.15 Diefenbaker’s 1957 campaign was distinctly
nationalist in character, accusing the rival Liberals of seeking “to make Canada into “a
virtual 49th economic state.” ”16 As McKercher observes, this campaign marked the
end of the “postwar lull in Canadian anti-Americanism.”17 This anti-American streak
within Canadian nationalism has old roots: the United States’ preeminent position
and geographical proximity always represented a threatening force that also served
as a critical binding agent for Canadian society.18 In the 1940s and 1950s, this feeling
“abated somewhat” in the face of military cooperation during WWII and an influx
of American investment within the Canadian economy.19 However, by the end of the
1950s, anxieties related to American economic, cultural, and political dominance were
on the rise again, in part fuelled by these closer economic ties.20 Diefenbaker’s appeals
to Canadian distinctiveness and promises to lessen dependence on the United States
therefore tapped into historical as well as contemporary undercurrents of Canadian
politics.21
History, or rather, historians, have not been kind to Diefenbaker.22 He is often
portrayed as a petty and indecisive individual, who let perceived personal slights drive
his policies; as being paralyzed when faced with a difficult or unpopular decision; as a
nationalist and populist that needlessly antagonized relations with Canada’s closest
ally, the United States.23 However, he was also noted as an effective campaigner,
passionate orator, and “strong believer in the sanctity of human rights.”24 What
is clear is that domestic considerations and public opinion were at the forefront of
15The distinction between Canadian nationalism and anti-Americanism is often blurred and an
in-depth analysis of this important distinction is beyond the scope of this study. However, many
scholars have explored the link between Canadian nationalism and anti-Americanism, see McKercher
(2016, pp.11-14) for discussion and citations.







22According to McKercher (2016, p.6), “Overwhelmingly, studies of Diefenbaker are unfavourable.
He was, apparently, a “renegade in power,” a “rogue Tory,” and “a bit megalomaniacal, so paranoid,
and almost certainly a bit mad.” ”
23According to McMahon (2009, p.xii), “Words such as “inept” and “indecisive” are routinely
employed to describe his [Diefenbaker’s] behaviour [on the nuclear issue], and “Why Diefenbaker
dithered” could easily have been the title of this book.”
24McKercher, 2016, p.157; Bothwell, 2007, p.135. Diefenbaker is noted for supporting “South
Africa’s expulsion from the Commonwealth over apartheid and gave Canada a Bill of Rights” (McK-
ercher, 2016, p157).
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Diefenbaker’s decision-making calculus, even for matters of foreign policy.25 While
Diefenbaker’s nuclear policy was characterised by inconsistency and indecisiveness,
he still made difficult policy decisions over the course of his tenure that he believed
would be unpopular.26 For example, after protracted waffling, Diefenbaker eventually
authorized the cancellation of the Canadian-made Arrow interceptor aircraft, despite
knowing that it would lead to the loss of thousands of jobs and would be a massive
blow to the Canadian aircraft industry.27 He also rashly decided to peg Canada’s
currency to the American dollar in the midst of the 1962 electoral campaign, which
precipitated an economic crisis.28 Diefenbaker’s fiery rhetoric could also make way
for the realities of government: early in his tenure, Diefenbaker promised to shift 15%
of Canada’s trade from the US to the UK.29 However, this proposal never got off the
ground.30 Indeed, “ultimately the Tories proved largely unwilling or unable to take
action against American economic interests in Canada,” as this would be too costly
to be practical policy.31
In many ways, Diefenbaker was a classic ‘Cold Warrior’ and a strong supporter
of the Western Alliance.32 He was not a neutralist, nor did he identify personally
with the growing anti-nuclear and disarmament movements in Canada.33 During
international crises such as the Berlin Crisis, Diefenbaker supported the United States,
even during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when Canadian public opinion was against the
Americans.34 In this respect, his cool attitude towards the Americans during the
Cuban Missile Crisis was somewhat of an outlier.35 However, Canada and the United
States parted ways in some of their Cold War dealings. While maintaining his anti-
Soviet stance, Diefenbaker was pragmatic about Canada’s economic relationships with
Communist states and did not fully cut trade with Cuba and China.36
25See McKercher, 2016, pp.6-7; McMahon, 2009, pp.28-29.
26Indeed, on the nuclear sharing issue, Bothwell (2007, p.178) notes that early in his tenure,
“Diefenbaker was not hesitant on taking decisions or making commitments” related to nuclear
weapons and defence, which will be discussed in greater detail below.
27See Story and Isinger, 2007. However, Diefenbaker delayed the decision until after the 1958
election, see McMahon, 2009, p.17.
28See McKercher, 2016, pp.141-144.
29Ibid, pp.22-24.
30McKercher (2016, p.23) bluntly refers to it as a “dud.”
31Ibid., p.24.
32Ibid., p.13.
33Ibid.; McMahon, 2009, p.x.
34McKercher, 2016, pp.66-68, 149.
35Ibid., p.149.
36Ibid., p.15.
4. CASE STUDY 1: JOHN G. DIEFENBAKER 81
4.2 Canada’s Nuclear Commitments
4.2.1 Tying hands: Public and Private Commitments
This section will show that, while the formal agreement to acquire nuclear weapons
was not concluded until after Diefenbaker’s defeat in 1963, Diefenbaker agreed to
the principle of nuclear acquisition early into his tenure. According to Fearon, lead-
ers tie their hands by “creating audience costs” at the domestic or international
level.37 Diefenbaker tied his hands primarily through public pronouncements, but
also through formal agreements relating to Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments.
With these, he committed himself at the domestic and the international level to the
principle of nuclear sharing, laying the groundwork for audience costs if he reneged.
The Americans first broached the prospect of nuclear sharing with Canada in
January 1956, albeit informally. During this time, the government was headed by
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and the Liberal party. American officials were
hoping to secure the use of Canadian soil and airspace for the storage and deploy-
ment of nuclear-armed aircraft or missiles for the interception of Soviet bombers that
would come through the north.38 Anticipating pushback stemming from concerns over
sovereignty and control, American officials indicated that they would be willing to
train Canadian military personnel to use these weapons.39 Thus, a nascent framework
for nuclear sharing and joint control was proposed by the Americans. The St. Laurent
government did not come to any final decision or make any firm commitments. The
question of whether Canada should acquire nuclear weapons was therefore a decision
for the Diefenbaker government alone.
The decision to join NORAD was also taken by the Diefenbaker government. The
NORAD agreement committed the United States and Canada to the joint protection
of North American airspace.40 While this agreement did not specify nuclear weapons
acquisition, it provided the framework for cooperation between the United States and
Canada on the surveillance and protection of North American airspace, meaning that
the detection and interception of Soviet bombers in Canadian airspace was a priority.
The Americans hoped that Canada would accept nuclear sharing, as they believed
37Fearon, 1997, p.70.
38DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 10 January 1956; DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 11 January 1956; DHH, CP, 98/15-
89, 16 March 1956.
39DHH, CP, 98/15-89, 12 March 1956. One of the biggest sticking points that was anticipated by
the Americans was on the question of custody, as American law did not allow for custody of nuclear
weapons to be transferred to non-American nationals.
40McKercher, 2016, p.26.
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that arming the Canadian military with nuclear weapons would ensure rapid and
effective interception of Soviet bombers that penetrated North American airspace.41
At the same time, NATO was also increasing its strategic reliance on nuclear
weapons. In May 1957, the importance of nuclear weapons for NATO defence was
enshrined in the documents MC 14/2, which outlined NATO’s strategic concept, and
MC 48/2, which specified measures for the implementation. These documents laid
the foundation for nuclear stockpiling and nuclear sharing in Europe, as they called
for a rapid and nuclear response to Soviet attacks.42 Diefenbaker participated in
his first NATO meeting in December 1957, where these documents were approved.
Diefenbaker endorsed these documents and the principle of nuclear stockpiling in
Europe. According to Simpson, his words at the meeting and approval of nuclear
stockpiling “implied his agreement to the concept of nuclear weapons for Canadian air
and land forces in Europe.”43 In fact, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe’s
(SHAPE) planning guidance for 1958 shows that NATO expected that Canada would
acquire nuclear weapons, recommending nuclear-armed missiles and fighter-bombers
for Canadian forces in Europe.44 The Canadian government saw these actions as
significant, as well. In a Cabinet discussion in December 1960, the Cabinet agreed
that,
in the discussion at the N.A.T.O. meeting this month, Canadian Minis-
ters should recognize that the government has agreed, at the meeting in
December 1957 and at other times, and is morally bound, to supply Cana-
dian forces under N.A.T.O. command equipped and ready to use nuclear
weapons if and when they are necessary.45
This shows that the government perceived itself as tying its hands through these
formal measures.
Diefenbaker did more than simply agree to the principle of nuclear sharing in
private: he publicly declared this commitment. The Prime Minister announced
his government’s intentions to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in the
House of Commons on February 20th 1959. The public nature of the announcement
and Diefenbaker’s confident tone about the military necessity of nuclear acquisition
41FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1, Doc.293, 30 December 1958; FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1,




45LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.
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demonstrated the government’s favorable attitude towards nuclear sharing and be-
lief that it would fulfil these commitments. This speech therefore further tied the
government’s hands to nuclear sharing:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they
are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examin-
ing with the United States Government questions connected with the ac-
quisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and for other defensive weapons
for use by the Canadian forces in Canada and the storage of warheads in
Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian Brigade
in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO’s defence task are
also being studied.
We are confident that we shall be able to reach formal agreement with the
United States on appropriate means to serve the common objective. It
will of course be some time before these weapons will be available for use
by Canadian forces.46 The government, as soon as it is in the position to
do so, will inform the House, within the limits of security, of the general
terms of understanding which are reached between the
governments on this subject.
. . .
It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient
weapons to enable them to fulfill their respective roles.
. . .
We must reluctantly admit the need in present circumstances for nuclear
weapons of a defensive character.47
Overall, these statements are vaguer on the subject of Canada’s nuclear commitments
to NATO than to NORAD. Only the Bomarc missiles are specified, which would be
stationed on Canadian soil. However, contained within this message was a ringing
endorsement of the principle of nuclear sharing. It also set the expectation at the
domestic level that these commitments would be fulfilled. The fact that Canada’s
nuclear sharing commitments were public knowledge, as well as the strength of Diefen-
baker’s endorsement, would later come back to haunt him at the ballot box when he
tried to reverse these commitments.
46While this aspect of the statement can be seen as a hedge, it also reflects the fact that the
weapons systems would only become available and ready to be armed with nuclear warheads in
several years.
47DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.
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4.2.2 Sinking Costs: The Delivery Systems
The Canadian government committed themselves further by obtaining four weapons
systems that required nuclear arms to be maximally effective: the Bomarc and the CF-
101 for NORAD and the CF-104 and the Honest John for NATO.48 The government
made these purchases with the understanding that they could only be justified by
nuclear acquisition. Therefore, they knowingly sunk costs during this period to shore
up their commitment to nuclear sharing by spending millions of dollars on specialized
equipment.
The Bomarc missile became the centre of domestic furor around Canada’s nu-
clear commitment by the end of Diefenbaker’s tenure. However, the Cabinet’s initial
decision to purchase the Bomarc in September 1958 was relatively smooth and uncon-
troversial. The Canadians acquired the Bomarc B anti-bomber missile, which could
only be armed with a nuclear warhead, as no conventional warhead was produced for
this weapons system.49 Diefenbaker later claimed that he had thought the Bomarc
that had been purchased by Canada could be effective with either a conventional or
nuclear warhead. From this perspective, buying the Bomarc did not represent a firm
commitment to bring in nuclear weapons.50 However, his statements in the House
of Commons indicate that he knew that a nuclear warhead was necessary to make
the Bomarc effective. On January 18th, 1960, the Prime Minister stated, “Eventually
Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be
kept effective. For example, the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to be effective would
require nuclear warheads.”51 Indeed, the nuclear capacity of the Bomarc missile was
48For a detailed technical history of these weapons systems, see Clearwater, 1998.
49The weapons system that the government purchased was the Bomarc B, as opposed to the
Bomarc A, which could be fitted with a conventional warhead. The Bomarc A was discussed by
Cabinet on February 6th 1960, where the Minister of Defence laid out the differences in ranges
between the Bomarc A and B (LAC, CC, 19406, 6 February 1960). However, Cabinet records
more consistently refer to either the Bomarc B specifically or directly mention the Bomarc’s nuclear
capability. On May 3rd 1960, the Cabinet records show that the Cabinet specifically discussed
the Bomarc B, indicating that they knew which missile they would receive: “Improvements in air
defence – Bomarc B missile and launching bases” (LAC, CC, 19734, 3 May 1960). On December 6th
1960, the Cabinet records show again that Ministers knew that the Bomarc B missile would only be
effective with a nuclear warhead (LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; See also: LAC, CC, 22826,
23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961). Nuclear weapons were thought to be more
effective than conventional arms for anti-bomber interception due to their larger blast radius and
ability to totally destroy the Soviet bombers, preventing the triggering of “dead man fuses” at lower
altitudes (Simpson, 2001, pp.103-104; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 19 December 1961; LAC, CC, 22826, 23
August 1961).
50Simpson, 2001, p.104.
51DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a. Simpson (2001, p.104) also cites Diefenbaker’s February 1959
speech, which explicitly refers to the efficacy of nuclear arms.
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discussed in Cabinet and viewed as an asset by some Ministers, due to its strategic
utility and cost-effectiveness.52
The decision to acquire the CF-101 Voodoo aircraft, also for an anti-bomber in-
terception role, came considerably later: in June 1961, after a protracted period of
domestic and international negotiation.53 Citing fear of domestic backlash, Diefen-
baker ensured that the purchase of the CF-101s would not be formally or publicly
tied to nuclear acquisition, much to the disappointment of the Americans.54 How-
ever, records show that the Prime Minister was aware that the aircraft’s military
effectiveness was tied to nuclear armament and that the Americans expected them
to be nuclear-armed, despite dropping the formal provision from the agreement.55 In
a meeting with President Kennedy about the CF-101 deal in May 1961, Diefenbaker
promised to shore up domestic support for nuclear sharing across Canada, reassur-
ing American officials that he expected “that in a few months, the decision could be
taken.”56 After the Americans agreed to provide the aircraft without a prior commit-
ment on nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker “indicated [to Merchant] he believed matter
would work out as he and President desired.”57 Thus, in public, Diefenbaker was
cautious about nuclear commitment that was tied to the acceptance of the CF-101.
In private, there was recognition among both American and Canadian officials that
52LAC, CC, 17438, 28 August 1958.
53LAC, CC, 22558, 12 June 1961. For the extensive Cabinet discussions on whether and how
to acquire this weapons system, see also: LAC, CC, 9397, 4 February 1960; LAC, CC, 19406, 6
February 1960; LAC, CC, 19491, 8 March 1960; LAC, CC, 19931, 4 July 1960; LAC, CC, 19973,
15 July 1960; LAC, CC, 30378, 16 July 1960; LAC, CC, 20034, 9 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20078,
12 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20098, 17 August 1960; LAC, CC, 20129, 31 August 1960; LAC, CC,
20136, 6 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20165, 12 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20200, 16 September
1960; LAC, CC, 20219, 20 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20222, 21 September 1960; LAC, CC, 20238,
28 September 1960; LAC, CC, 21993, 19 January 1961; LAC, CC, 22173, 25 February 1961; LAC,
CC, 22190, 2 March 1961; LAC, CC, 22299, 30 March 1961; LAC, CC, 22490, 23 May 1961; LAC,
CC, 22530, 6 June 1961; LAC, CC, 22548, 9 June 1961.
54LAC, CC, 22558, 12 June 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum
5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-5/63, 17 May 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-
5/30/61, 23 May 1961.
55JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-
5/63, 17 May 1961; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 24 May 1961. The
Canadians also accepted the aircraft without modifications, so that it still had the capability of
carrying nuclear rockets, see JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 28 May 1961a.
Furthermore, the agreement made a distinction between which kinds of armaments could be trans-
ferred to Canada. According to a telegram to the Secretary of State this distinction was made for
the eventually of nuclear acquisition: “Purpose of distinction is to preserve basis for later furnishing
other armament (i.e., nuclear weapons) title to which would not be transferred and would not be
subject to cost sharing” (JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 28 May 1961b).
56JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-
5/63, 17 May 1961.
57JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 5/15/61-5/30/61, 23 May 1961.
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nuclear weapons would eventually be obtained for this aircraft.
Canada agreed to acquire two nuclear weapons systems for NATO in the 1950s.
Like the Bomarc, these were relatively uncontroversial decisions within Cabinet. The
decision on the CF-104 was related to the growing obsolescence of the F-86, the pre-
vious aircraft to the Canadian Air Division in NATO.58 The replacement aircraft
fulfilled The Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) recommendation that
the Canadians take on a nuclear strike and reconnaissance role.59 While some Min-
isters worried that this strike role would amount to an offensive nuclear role, the
Cabinet adhered to the Minister of Defence’s recommendation and purchased the
CF-104.60 Records show that this aircraft had also been specifically designed to take
on a nuclear role. This was brought to the attention of Cabinet in December 1960
by an unnamed minister, who noted that “the CF-104 would have to be redesigned
to take a conventional weapon.”61 In 1960, the government agreed to obtain the
Honest John rocket for its infantry brigade in Germany.62 The Honest John could be
armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead, but Ministers noted that equipping
this rocket with a conventional armament would undercut its effectiveness.63
Diefenbaker and his Cabinet therefore knew that these weapons systems would
eventually require nuclear weapons for them to be maximally effective. Some Cabinet
Ministers even explicitly referenced the binding nature of sinking costs in August 1961:
Some said that Canada was, in effect, committed to obtaining nuclear
weapons when the decisions were made to procure the Bomarcs, the Hon-
est John missiles and the CF-104s. These weapons were known to require
nuclear weapons to be fully effective in the roles assigned to them.64
By buying these weapons systems, the government had knowingly created momentum
that pushed them towards acquisition.
58LAC, CC, 18528, 19 June 1959. According to the Minutes the Minister of National Defence




61Ibid. He also noted that “It had to be remembered that these weapons [the CF-104, the Bo-
marc, and the Honest John] would be virtually ineffective without nuclear warheads. . . conventional
warheads were not being produced for the BOMARC II. The Honest John could be fitted with a
conventional H.E. warhead.”
62Simpson, 2001, p.109. Initially, Cabinet agreed to obtain the Lacrosse II missile in October
1958, also knowing that the Lacrosse would require nuclear arms (LAC, CC, 17541, 15 October 1958;
Simpson, 2001, p.109). However, due to the “complexity of the Lacrosse system,” the government
decided to change to the Honest John missile instead (Simpson, 2001, p.109).
63LAC, CC, 19591, 31 March 1960; LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.
64LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.
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Additionally, purchasing these weapons systems had a knock-on tying hands effect.
If the government appeared to be wasting public funds by buying weapons systems
that they would not or could not effectively arm, they would incur domestic audience
costs. This pressure only increased as these weapons systems became operational. As
one Minister warned during a Cabinet meeting in December 1960:
The CF-104s would start coming off the assembly lines towards the end of
1961 and the BOMARC would be ready about the same time. If a decision
were not made soon, the government would be acutely embarrassed by
having very expensive but virtually useless equipment on its hands.65
Sinking costs also opened the government up to international audience costs by deep-
ening Canada’s commitment and its allies’ expectations that it would be fulfilled.
The hesitation in concluding an acquisition agreement after agreeing to buy these
weapons systems was especially bewildering for American officials. The American
Ambassador to Canada, Livingston T. Merchant, highlighted this tension in Canada’s
partial fulfilment of their commitment in a telegram to the State Department, where
his frustration was palpable: “[the] question [of nuclear acquisition] has been stalled
on dead center despite fact Canadian Armed Forces have now taken delivery sub-
stantial quantities expensive military hardware which next to useless without nuclear
tips.”66
Thus, while Canada did not sign a formal nuclear sharing agreement, the govern-
ment had made a substantial effort to bind itself to its nuclear commitments through
hand-tying and cost-sinking measures. These measures were mutually reinforcing in
increasing both domestic and international expectations that Canada would acquire
nuclear weapons. This amounted to a partial fulfillment of this commitment. At this
level of commitment, Diefenbaker could expect substantial international and domestic
costs if he attempted to renege on these promises.
4.2.3 Alignment Over Joint Control
The particulars of how these nuclear weapons would be administered or ‘shared’
would become a major stumbling block for negotiations. This section shows that
65LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960. See also: LAC, CC, 19929, 4 July 1960: “The question
relating to warheads for Canada’s forces had arisen at this time because other questions were being
asked as to why large sums of money were being spent on equipment and weapons which would not
be effective unless equipped with nuclear warheads.”
66FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.429, 26 February 1962.
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the Canadian and American positions were actually aligned on this matter. Diefen-
baker and the government advocated for an arrangement of ‘joint control’ until 1962,
when Diefenbaker began favouring an approach that would not have nuclear weapons
on Canadian soil.67 While the specifics of ‘joint control’ are hazy, one central and
consistent feature was that Canada would have final authorization over the use of
these nuclear weapons.68 Several times, Diefenbaker articulated a preference for an
arrangement similar to the United Kingdom, essentially amounting to dual-key con-
trol.69 The Americans were amenable to this kind of arrangement.70
The Canadians received reassurance that the Americans were aligned with a dual-
key arrangement. On February 19th 1961, Diefenbaker met with President Kennedy;
Diefenbaker’s stated aim for this meeting was to ascertain “how far President Kennedy
would go in the direction of joint control over the use of nuclear arms if located in
Canada.”71 In the meeting, Diefenbaker emphasized that “joint control and joint
custody” were essential to any agreement.72 The President responded favourably to
this demand: “The President inquired as to whether or not the arrangements we
have in this regard with the British Government would satisfy the Prime Minister.”
The Prime Minister responded affirmatively.73 Diefenbaker relayed the details of this
meeting to Cabinet the next day.74 This should have increased the confidence that
Canada could get favourable terms on joint control from the United States.
Thus, fundamental unalignment over American and Canadian positions on the
nature of nuclear sharing does not explain the long delay in formal negotiations. With
such firm commitments and basic agreement over key principles of the arrangement,
why did Diefenbaker stall?
67Simpson, 2001, pp.111-112, 114-118; For Cabinet discussions on joint control, see, for example,
LAC, CC, 18760, 26 August 1959; LAC, CC, 22812, 21 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August
1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961. For Diefenbaker’s and his government’s public statements
on joint control, see DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
68For example, LAC, CC, 17541, 15 October 1958.
69LAC, CC, 16961, 29 April 1958; LAC, CC, 17438, 28 August 1958; LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February
1961.
70FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.VII, Pt.1, Doc.293, 30 December 1958. This National Security Council
report indicates a clash between the Canadian and American positions: While Canadian officials
hoped that greater Canadian control and authority over these weapons would slow down the decision-
making process, United States officials wanted to cede custody and control of these weapons to the
Canadians to speed up the release of these weapons.
71LAC, CC, 22110, 14 February 1961; See also LAC, CC, 22128, 17 February 1961.
72JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 1/61-3/61, 20 February 1961.
73Ibid. “The Prime Minister said that he thought something along these lines would do so.”
74LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February 1961.
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4.3 Straddle Strategy: Dither and Delay
4.3.1 Pro- and Anti-Nuclear Sentiment
The delay can be explained by the consolidation of anti-nuclear sentiment in Canada,
which permeated Diefenbaker’s Cabinet, partisan politics, and the Canadian public.75
While the anti-nuclear position was never the majority view in Canada, its increasing
political salience deeply affected Diefenbaker.76 The Prime Minister, faced with anti-
nuclear Ministers within his own Cabinet, an anti-nuclear Opposition, and organized
anti-nuclear activist campaigns, felt that he needed to accommodate this sentiment
within his coalition. However, he needed to balance this with domestic pro-nuclear
sentiment and American pressure to acquire nuclear weapons.
In March 1959, Sydney Smith, the Secretary of State for External Affairs died
unexpectedly in office. His position was filled by Howard Green, who would quickly
become the chief critic of nuclear acquisition within Cabinet and a key proponent of
disarmament.77 Initially, Green did not oppose measures that committed Canada to
nuclear sharing; however, this changed only a few months later, when Green learned
of the horrific effects of nuclear fallout.78 These principled anti-nuclear beliefs under-
girded his opposition to nuclear acquisition. For example, during the Berlin Crisis,
Green made an impassioned plea to Cabinet, arguing that nuclear acquisition would
essentially make Canada “a nuclear power,” putting the horrors of nuclear war in stark
perspective: “It was an issue that might determine whether or not Montreal, Toronto,
Hamilton, Ottawa, and other Canadian cities might be blotted off the map.”79 While
Green was a sharp critic of nuclear weapons and was skeptical of American interfer-
ence in Canadian affairs, he did not oppose Canada’s membership within NATO or
NORAD; indeed, during the Berlin crisis, he did not oppose the Defence Ministers
proposal to build up Canada’s conventional commitments in Europe.80
75McMahon, 2009.
76Ibid.
77McKercher, 2016, p.28; LAC, MG32 B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963;
Simpson, 2001, p.111.
78Heidt, 2012.
79LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961. Interestingly, Mr. Green highlighted that he was primarily
opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces and “that he did not have as
much objection to the storage of nuclear weapons on leased bases” in Canada for American forces.
The Minister believed that this could be justified as it was “not implying that Canada was becoming
a nuclear power.” While the Prime Minister also stated that the negotiations for the weapons at
Goose Bay and Harmen Field for American forces no longer needed to be held up, nothing was done
on this matter.
80LAC, CC, 22811, 17 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22812, 21 August 1961; McKercher, 2016, p.28;
Simpson, 2001, p.121-122.
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Green was a consistent thorn in the side of pro-nuclear officials in his efforts to
frustrate nuclear acquisition.81 As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Green
helped stall negotiations with the United States through a protracted battle with
the Department of National Defence over Canada’s draft nuclear sharing proposal.82
In Cabinet, he argued that nuclear acquisition would represent an expansion of the
nuclear club; that it would undermine global disarmament efforts as well as Canada’s
reputation abroad; that the United States would never accept meaningful joint con-
trol.83 Other members of Cabinet echoed these sentiments along with claims that
questioned the military necessity of nuclear weapons.84
As Green was gaining influence within the government, the anti-nuclear move-
ment in Canada was consolidating. Three organizations were the primary forces
behind this movement: the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Haz-
ards, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Voice
of Women.85 Through protests, letter-writing campaigns, and petitions, these groups
aimed to organize and galvanize anti-nuclear sentiment within Canada and dissuade
the Diefenbaker government from nuclear acquisition.86 These efforts reached a pin-
nacle in the fall of 1961, when after a 73-hour pro-disarmament protest in front of
Parliament that was attended by several hundred people, the Canadian Committee
for the Control of Radiation Hazards “delivered a massive petition to the govern-
ment” with over 100,000 signatures against the spread of nuclear weapons, which was
personally delivered to the Prime Minister.87 Crucially, while there may have been
neutralist elements within these organizations, they coalesced around a single issue:
preventing Canada from acquiring nuclear weapons.
81See Harkness’s account: LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
82DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 25 April 1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 2 May 1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 4 May
1961; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 25 January 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 2 October 1962; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, 3
October 1962; Maloney, 2007, pp.229-230, 243-244, 276. Green insisted that the technical agreements
for each weapon system needed to be drafted in advance of the onset of negotiations, along with the
general agreement covering the more basic elements of the nuclear sharing arrangement. According
to Harkness, “This was essentially a delaying tactic, as we did not have the full information on which
a detailed [technical] agreement would have to be based” (LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear
Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963).
83LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961.
84Ibid.; LAC, CC, 22826, 23 August 1961; LAC, CC, 22829, 25 August 1961.
85McMahon 2009 p.xiv
86Ibid.
87Ibid., p.125. McMahon estimates of the total number of signatures ranged from 140,000 to
180,000. The protest was discussed in Cabinet, where it was noted that representatives from all three
anti-nuclear organizations would be in attendance (LAC, CC, 22982, 6 October 1961). McMahon
(2009, p.128) notes that while it “was the only time that cabinet really discussed a meeting with
anti-nuclear activists. . . the ministers’ overarching concern was whether there were any communist
influences within the organization.”
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Finally, the government’s main opponent, the Liberal Party, appealed to anti-
nuclear sentiment.88 Under Lester Pearson, the Liberal Party took on an anti-nuclear
platform, opposing nuclear acquisition in Parliament and aligning itself with the dis-
armament movement more broadly.89 However, despite their anti-nuclear stance,
Pearson and the Liberals were supporters of NATO and NORAD, advocating con-
ventional support for these alliances.
On the other hand, there was considerable support for nuclear acquisition within
Canada. In Cabinet, the main proponent of nuclear acquisition was the Minister of
Defence, Douglas Harkness, who replaced George Pearkes in October 1960, just as
Green’s anti-nuclear push was taking shape.90 Both Harkness and other Ministers
highlighted the international and domestic costs of not fulfilling their nuclear com-
mitments. For example, one Minister noted that not acquiring the CF-101 would
undermine the credibility of NORAD and the American deterrent:
Having these interceptors in Canada might well prevent an attack on
Canada and the U.S. through an otherwise unprotected corridor. If the
U.S.S.R. thought there was a [gap] in North America’s armour, they might
be tempted to launch another “Pearl Harbour.”91
Polls showed that a plurality or majority of Canadians consistently supported nuclear
acquisition, leading to fears of audience costs if Canada reneged on these commit-
ments. These polls were discussed several times in Cabinet and were taken as strong
indicators of public opinion. As stated in one Cabinet meeting in August 1961. Min-
isters highlighted that they would come under criticism if they did not fulfill their
nuclear commitments.92 First, for appearing incompetent for buying such expensive
weapons systems then refusing to arm them with the weapons that were required
to make them effective. Second, for jeopardising Canadian security by not having
effective weapons.
Outside of Canada, the United States was a key proponent of nuclear acquisition.
During the Berlin Crisis, Kennedy personally wrote a message to Diefenbaker, which




90For Harkness’s account of the Diefenbaker government’s vacillation on the nuclear issue during
his time as Minister of National Defence, see LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis,
19-27 August 1963.
91LAC, CC, 30378, 16 July 1960.
92LAC, CC, 19311, 15 January 1960; LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960; LAC, CC, 22829, 25
August 1961.
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There is, however, an aspect of our continental defense which, for reasons
which we both understand, is imperfect. This is the lack of orderly ar-
rangements for insuring that the RCAF as well as the USAF should be
possessed of nuclear weapons to respond to any attack across the Pole. . .
I recognize that this is not an easy matter for you, but I do believe that we
cannot achieve a successful negotiating position on Germany and Berlin
until we have taken every reasonable step to strengthen our military se-
curity.93
Thus, Diefenbaker experienced pressure from three sources. Domestically, he faced
the need to accommodate both pro- and anti- nuclear members of his coalition. In-
ternationally, the United States was attempting to push Canada to accept its nuclear
commitments.
4.3.2 Diefenbaker’s Straddle Strategy
Thus, Diefenbaker, faced with these two opposing elements in his coalition, was wary
of alienating either faction.94 Aiming to maximize his popularity, smooth over con-
flicts within his Cabinet, and keep the United States on side, Diefenbaker adopted a
straddle strategy that sought to delay firm decision making and obfuscate his govern-
ment’s position.95 Initially, Diefenbaker was more aligned with the pro-acquisition
camp. However, he made no active attempts to formulate a consensus within Cabinet
or the public at large. This only served to retrench divisions. As time went on, the
Prime Minister became increasingly opposed to nuclear acquisition. In particular, he
began to oppose the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime.
Throughout, Diefenbaker was intent on maintaining his ambiguity and was equally
reluctant to fully cast off or confront both the pro- and anti- nuclear elements of his
coalition, regardless of his shifting personal position on the issue.
Diefenbaker initially seemed more aligned with the Ministers that supported nu-
clear acquisition. For example, on January 12th 1960, the Prime Minister opened
a discussion on nuclear acquisition by stating that the “government had agreed in
principle to the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada” and expressed confidence that
the Americans would accept a joint control arrangement .96 Over a year later, during
the Berlin Crisis, the Prime Minister also expressed support for acquisition and called
93FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961.
94Bothwell, 2007, p.163; McKercher, 2016, p.89.
95Ibid.
96LAC, CC, 19283, 12 January 1960.
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for an end to the delay to negotiations.97 However, even when Diefenbaker expressed
support for nuclear sharing, he did not force Cabinet to come to a decision. As Prime
Minister, Diefenbaker needed to “call the consensus” in Cabinet in order to come to
policy decisions that could then be implemented.98 Under the principle of Cabinet
solidarity, once the Cabinet came to a decision or the consensus was called, all mem-
bers of Cabinet must support it or resign as Minister.99 While Cabinet engaged in
many debates about the issue, a final decision was continuously deferred.
These delays became increasingly frustrating to Harkness and other pro-nuclear
members of Cabinet.100 The Prime Minister attempted to keep these Ministers on side
by insinuating that he was ultimately in agreement with them. According to Hark-
ness’s account, early into his tenure as Defence Minister, Diefenbaker reassured him
that he was essentially aligned with Harkness’s position against Green, but thought
that they should support the Secretary for the time being, as the nuclear weapons
systems had not yet been delivered:
He [Diefenbaker] agreed that chances of a meaningful disarmament agree-
ment were remote and that we must secure the nuclear ammunition for
the weapons we had ordered. However, as these were not yet in the hands
of our troops there was no need for the agreement to be signed immedi-
ately and Howard Green should not be embarrassed in his disarmament
efforts by entering into the agreement immediately.101
While this strategy did little to force consensus, it allowed Diefenbaker to keep his
Cabinet together for as long as he could delay a decision.
Diefenbaker reassured the Americans that he would eventually acquire nuclear
weapons, also leading them to believe that he was really aligned with the pro-
acquisition elements of his coalition. For example, the Prime Minister told Kennedy
in May 1961, after negotiating the removal of any formal requirement of a nuclear
role for the CF-101s, that Diefenbaker would attempt to sway public opinion towards
nuclear acceptance:
The Prime Minister said that he intended to speak across Canada this
summer and fall on the issue and thought he could gain public support
97LAC, CC, 22746, 24 July 1961.
98White, 2005, pp.54, 67.
99d’Ombrain, 2004, p.335; LAC, CC, 15971, 21 June 1957.
100LAC, MG32, B19, Vol.57, The Nuclear Arms Crisis, 19-27 August 1963.
101Ibid.; Harkness in Stursberg, 1976, p.25.
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for the acceptance of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil as part of Canada’s
defenses.102
In August 1961, Diefenbaker provided further reassurance that “he would take the
necessary steps within the Canadian Government to initiate the discussions.”103 How-
ever, this concerted campaign never materialized. As late as March 8th 1962, Diefen-
baker told the Ambassador to Canada Livingston T. Merchant that he “confidently
expects to proceed forthwith on negotiations looking at least to initialing texts as
finally agreed” within the next two weeks.104 According to Merchant, Diefenbaker
“discounted [the] significance of such pacifist or quasi-pacifist organizations such as
Voice of Women. . . He said that he had told them Canada had defense responsi-
bilities which it could not shirk.”105 Merchant, who noted that Diefenbaker could
always come up with some excuse to stall once again, expressed surprise and encour-
agement at Diefenbaker’s disparagement of the disarmament movement, despite the
Prime Minister’s “customary sensitivity to any evidence of adverse public opinion.”106
Even as negotiations were not forthcoming after this episode, the Americans still felt
assured that the Prime Minister was on their side.107
After 1960, Diefenbaker continuously hedged his position in public, moving away
from a pro-acquisition stance to one that was more ambiguous. He repeatedly told
the public that “no decision” had been made on acquisition for Canadian forces, but
that the government would obtain nuclear weapons “when and if” it was necessary.108
He insisted that joint control would be a central feature of any nuclear sharing ar-
rangement, but implied that the Americans were resistant to this arrangement. For
example, when questioned in Parliament about joint control on February 26th 1962,
Diefenbaker asserted that, under the current law of the United States, “joint con-
trol is impossible,” seemingly laying the responsibility for delay at the Americans’
doorstep.109 The Prime Minister and other officials also implied that negotiations
102JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-
5/63, 17 May 1961.
103FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.426, 3 August 1961, ft. 1.
104JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/62-3/62, 8 March 1962.
105Ibid.
106Ibid.
107See also JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 4/62-5/15/62, 13 April 1962. In this memoran-
dum, the March 8th conversation is mentioned again, noted as a recent instance where Diefenbaker
“privately indicated a willingness to have an agreement negotiated and ready for the time when the
Government’s decision could be announced.”
108Diefenbaker in Simpson, 2001, p.112; See also: DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP,
98/15-4, (No Date)b.
109DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a.
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were ongoing, when, in fact, they had not really begun, obscuring the fact that the
Canadians were actively delaying following through on their commitments.110
Contradictions in Diefenbaker’s stance served his straddle strategy. For example,
Diefenbaker aligned himself with his pro-nuclear Ministers by airing his scepticism
about the disarmament movement, telling Cabinet:
On the one hand, there were the oft expressed views about disarmament.
He personally did not have much hope for success in this field. . . While
disarmament was a laudable purpose he was afraid of the Conservative
party being dubbed the disarmament party.111
However, Diefenbaker would later use the supposed progress on disarmament as an
excuse to stall negotiations, signalling his support for the anti-nuclear faction. His
rhetoric to Cabinet on its prospects for success also changed as time went on. On
February 20th 1961, the day after Diefenbaker received reassurance on joint control
by Kennedy, Cabinet convened to discuss this meeting.112 Kennedy had removed a
crucial stumbling block to restarting negotiations, yet Diefenbaker still insisted to
Cabinet that he could not come to a decision. This was due to the progress on
disarmament: “so long as serious disarmament negotiations continued, Canada did
not propose to determine whether or not to accept nuclear weapons for the Bomarc
bases or for the Canadian interceptors.”113 Similar points were repeated to Parliament
and the public throughout this period as a justification for why no decision had been
taken on the nuclear issue.114
By 1962, Diefenbaker’s position increasingly aligned with the anti-nuclear per-
spective. Diefenbaker made public statements that the government does “not intend
to have nuclear arms in Canada in time of peace.”115 However, he would still not
state categorically that he would refuse nuclear arms for Canadian forces. This left
his government’s nuclear policy ultimately unclear. Indeed, Diefenbaker never aban-
doned the pro-nuclear position entirely. According to Harkness, “Right up to a week
or so before I resigned [in January 1963], Mr Diefenbaker was still assuring me that
eventually we would get these warheads for these weapon systems, but the time wasn’t
right.”116 This applied to Diefenbaker’s public statements as well. On February 24th
110Ibid.; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b
111LAC, CC, 20550, 6 December 1960.
112LAC, CC, 22136, 21 February 1961.
113Ibid.
114DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)a; DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
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1962, when asked about the prospects of Canada acquiring nuclear weapons, Diefen-
baker stated: “Should war come, are we going to arm Canadians with bows and
arrows?”117 The Prime Minister went further, highlighting that nuclear arms were
needed because Bomarc and the CF-101s were “more effective with nuclear weapons”
and that in the event of war “we must have available the necessary instruments.”118
This statement was still ambiguous: Diefenbaker was evasive about the prospect of
peacetime storage of these weapons, erroneously insinuating that these weapons could
be quickly transferred to Canada if necessary.119 The fact that the CF-101 intercep-
tors were referenced here is especially important, as Diefenbaker had taken specific
care to delink the acquisition of CF-101s and the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet,
he publicly made the connection in this statement.
4.3.3 Explaining the Straddle Strategy
Given Diefenbaker’s deep concern with his popularity and electoral prospects, it may
seem odd that he did not throw more support behind what polls had clearly indicated
to be the majority view. While Cabinet members dismissed the validity of polling
in general, McMahon argues that Diefenbaker’s fixation on the domestic dangers of
acquisition was a political calculation: the anti-nuclear movement was a minority,
but vocal.120 If anti-nuclear groups could turn nuclear sharing into a major political
issue, it might cause a shift in public sentiment.121 Indeed, several times in Cabi-
net, Diefenbaker expressed concern that merely entering into negotiations with the
United States would be interpreted by the public as nuclear acquisition, leading to
backlash.122 Furthermore, Pearson was directly appealing to anti-nuclear sentiment.
By the summer of 1960, the Liberals had overtaken the Conservatives in the polls
“and remained ahead thereafter.”123 With such a clear contrast between the Liberal
and Conservative position, Diefenbaker was wary of making moves that would play
into that divide and potentially decrease the Conservatives’ popularity.124
Polling indicates that there were a substantial minority that opposed acquisition
117DHH, CP, 98/15-4, (No Date)b.
118Ibid.
119Ibid. Diefenbaker “added he had read a recent report that nuclear warheads could be made
available in half an hour to an hour, and indicated there was some credence in this report.”
120McMahon, 2009.
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123Bothwell, 2007, p.163.
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as well as individuals who were unaware of the issue.125 For example, a poll taken
in September 1961 showed that about 67% of Canadians that had some awareness of
the nuclear issue supported nuclear acquisition, while 33% were opposed.126 However,
only 61% of total respondents had “heard or read anything about the question of
arming Canada’s forces with nuclear weapons,” while 39% had not.127 While the
number of undecideds steadily decreased over time, the issue settled into about a
60/40 split, with about 60 percent of Canadians supporting nuclear acquisition and
40 percent opposing.128
Furthermore, aspects of the anti-nuclear movement also appealed to Diefenbaker’s
populist streak. According to Pierre Sévigny, the associate Minister of Defence,
Diefenbaker believed that this coalition represented the “grass roots” of Canadian
society: “Diefenbaker started saying [after receiving anti-nuclear letters], ‘The grass
roots don’t want nuclear weapons, the grass roots are against this.’ ”129 Diefenbaker’s
populist desire to connect with the average Canadian explains his skepticism of polling
and his embrace of letters that he received from Canadians decrying the prospect of
nuclear sharing.130 Indeed, the Prime Minister emphasized that the letters he re-
ceived did “not appear to represent an organized campaign,” underscoring his view
that anti-nuclear sentiment represented more of an organic groundswell than an or-
ganized campaign.131 Diefenbaker expressed a similar sentiment to Kennedy during
the Presidential visit to Canada on May 17th 1961, when Diefenbaker asked for re-
prieve on the requirement to arm the CF-101 with nuclear weapons. In justifying his
stance, Diefenbaker emphasized that ‘ordinary Canadians’ seem to be against nuclear
acquisition by highlighting the volume of critical letters he has received, from not just
“Communists and Leftwingers,” but also “professors” and “mothers and wives.”132
Diefenbaker was not interested in appealing to more radical members of the anti-
nuclear movement that may have supported the wholesale withdrawal of Canada
125According to McMahon (2009, pp.130-131, 176), Diefenbaker overestimated both those that
rejected nuclear sharing and those that were undecided. By the end of 1961, a majority of Canadians
were pro-acquisition, even when accounting for undecideds. At the end of November 1961, Harkness
cites a Gallup poll that showed that 61% were pro-acquisition, 31% opposed, and 8% undecided, a
dramatic shift from the September 1961 poll (LAC, CC, 23164, 30 November 1961)
126Gallup Canada Inc., September 1961.
127Ibid.
128Gallup Canada Inc., November 1962; LAC, CC, 23164, 30 November 1961.
129Sévigny in Stursberg, 1976, p.25.
130McMahon, 2009, pp.175-176.
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from its alliances or rejected the fundamental narratives of the Cold War. ‘Ordinary
Canadians’ opposed nuclear weapons, but still wanted Canada to be a good ally of
the Western Alliance against the Soviet Union.
Diefenbaker’s straddle strategy was a way of maximizing domestic support and
avoiding audience costs. By delaying a decision, Canada was not reneging on its nu-
clear commitments, nor was it fulfilling them. This allowed Diefenbaker to retain both
pro- and anti-nuclear elements of his coalition. It was the single-issue nature of the
anti-nuclear coalition that Diefenbaker wanted to appeal to that created this contra-
diction. The main thrust of the anti-nuclear message focused on the nuclear weapons
themselves, rather than questioning alliance membership. Indeed, anti-nuclear elites
like Green and Pearson supported Canada’s membership in these alliances and did
not oppose increases to its conventional commitments. However, Diefenbaker could
only hold together this coalition through inaction for so long.
4.4 Reneging: From Consensus-Building to a Na-
tionalist Campaign
4.4.1 The Standby Approach: Inability to Act Unilaterally
In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the nuclear issue back to the fore-
front of Canadian foreign and defence policy. The Cuban Missile crisis emphasized
the danger of the Cold War for Canadians, increasing the domestic pressure on the
government to fulfill its defence commitments to its allies.133 Canada’s delay in pub-
licly declaring its full support for the United States during the crisis also increased
pressure on the government to show its commitment to its allies.134 Polls demon-
strated that a solid majority of Canadians supported acquisition.135 Even the most
skeptical members of Cabinet were shocked into action by the crisis. According to
McMahon, “even Green now believed that national security required an agreement
covering nuclear weapons.”136 Diefenbaker’s tactic of delay was now untenable and a
definitive solution to the nuclear issue needed to be found.137 The delivery systems
in Europe and Canada were now operational, awaiting nuclear arms in order to be
fully effective. A decision had to be made.
133McMahon, 2009, p.151.
134Bothwell, 2007, p.169.
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The Prime Minister was more cross-pressured than ever. On the one hand, there
were clear international and domestic pressures to fulfill Canada’s nuclear obliga-
tions and to be seen as a ‘good ally.’138 On the other hand, after the lackluster
results of the 1962 election, the Conservatives were now a minority government, leav-
ing Diefenbaker with even less room to maneuver. The other parties in Parliament
were against nuclear acquisition and the anti-nuclear movement was still campaigning
against these weapons. Moreover, the pro- and anti- nuclear factions within Cabinet
were entrenched in their positions, with little obvious common ground between them.
For Diefenbaker and certain members of the Cabinet, the Cuban Missile Crisis
demonstrated American recklessness and Canada’s need to protect its sovereignty.
Diefenbaker was briefed on the situation only two hours before Kennedy’s public
address about the Crisis.139 According to McMahon, “Diefenbaker was upset that he
had not been genuinely consulted, and he convinced himself that Kennedy’s decision
to send a retired ambassador to deliver such an important message was a personal
insult.”140 During the Crisis, there was a feeling among some Ministers in Cabinet
that Canada was being “stampeded” into decisions by the actions of the American
government.141 To Diefenbaker, this had wider implications for the prospects of joint
control for nuclear sharing: the Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to indicate that Canadian
interests would not be taken into account in an emergency.142 Worse, Canada would
not even be consulted.143
Facing increasing and contrasting pressures, Diefenbaker tried to devise a solution
that would allow him to maintain control over his Cabinet, satisfying both the pro-
and anti- nuclear elements of his coalition. By 1962, Diefenbaker began to favour
‘standby arrangement’ for nuclear weapons.144 Under a standby framework, Canada
would agree to nuclear sharing in principle, but would not have nuclear weapons on
Canadian soil in peacetime. The nuclear weapons would be on ‘standby’ in American
custody, located elsewhere, until a time of emergency or war, when they would be
138Bothwell, 2007, p.169; Stevenson, 2014, p.9; Stursberg, 1976, pp.14-16.
139JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 22 October 1962; McMahon, 2009, p.148.
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as well as a personal message from the president.”
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transferred to Canadian personnel for delivery.145 A similar proposal called the ‘miss-
ing essential part approach’ was also explored by the Canadians at this time, whereby
a key part of the nuclear weapon would be stored outside of Canada in peacetime.146
This kind of proposal had already been considered and rejected: it was “imprac-
tical,” and unlikely to be accepted by the Americans according to Canadian military
assessments.147 Nevertheless, the standby proposal was the only political solution
for Diefenbaker’s anti-nuclear coalition.148 The government could claim that it tech-
nically fulfilled its nuclear sharing commitments, while also asserting that they had
prevented Canada from joining the ‘nuclear club.’149 Anti-nuclear members of Cabi-
net, such as Green, were satisfied with this. Pro-nuclear Ministers like Harkness were
supportive of opening negotiations with the Americans under these terms. They saw
it as a means of breaking the years of stasis that had prevented Canada from fulfill-
ing its commitments.150 In the face of a clear stance from the Canadian government,
the Americans considered a standby-type arrangement for the nuclear weapons on
Canadian soil, despite their own reservations on its viability.151 Like the pro-nuclear
Minister in Canada, the Americans were anxious to get the government to the nego-
tiating table and were reluctant to immediately rebuff any potential solution to this
impasse.
To successfully execute this strategy, Canada needed American agreement. While
Diefenbaker had already indicated publicly that a standby-type arrangement was
feasible, he still needed ratification from the United States.152 Canadian officials were
constrained in even conceiving of the technical solution to their political predicament.
Given the imbalance in expertise on nuclear weapons, the Americans would determine
whether it was feasible to store nuclear weapons outside of Canada and only transfer
them to the Canadians in a crisis.153
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In addition, Diefenbaker was reluctant to further tie his hands domestically beyond
the vague promise of no nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in peacetime. In fact, he
insisted that the talks remain secret.154 Diefenbaker and other members of Cabinet
were still concerned that even entering negotiations on this issue would be interpreted
as an acceptance of nuclear acquisition and create anti-nuclear backlash.155
4.4.2 No Credible Threat of Withdrawal: Stalled Negotia-
tions
The Canadians had two main sources of bargaining power. Firstly, they insisted that
the European arrangement would only be finalized after the arrangement for NORAD
had been agreed.156 By the end of November, Canadian and American officials agreed
on a nuclear sharing arrangement for Canadian forces in Europe, which was similar
to that of other NATO allies.157 However, this agreement would not move forward
until a solution could be found for the weapons systems on Canadian soil, providing
an incentive for the Americans to be flexible and open to concessions.158
Secondly, Canadian negotiators emphasized the constraints of their anti-nuclear
coalition. In Putnam’s terms, they highlighted the narrowness of their win-set, where
they could only satisfy their coalition by ensuring that nuclear weapons were not
brought onto Canadian soil. As a telegram sent to the American Embassy in Ottawa
from Secretary of State Dean Rusk on November 19th 1962 put it:
[During negotiations with the Canadians, American officials] would point
out that standby weapons on U.S. soil for Canadian forces North America
appear impractical but we are ready to discuss and explore possibility in
hope arriving at some mutually acceptable arrangement. . . In light [of]. . .
Diefenbaker’s statement to RCAF Association November 16 that there
would be no immediate acquisition of nuclear weapons for home defense
forces and no storing nuclear weapons in Canada, we are inclined to believe
Canadians unlikely go at this stage beyond what they have proposed.159
NSF, Box 18, Canada General 10/62-1/63, 28 December 1962; Stevenson, 2014, pp.13-17.
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[emphasis added]
Thus, the Americans understood that the Canadians, after years of delay, were finally
taking a firm stance. Given their domestic constraints, they saw very little room for
flexibility.
In an embassy telegram to the Secretary of State, the American Ambassador
to Canada, William Walton Butterworth, revealed that the Americans recognized
Diefenbaker’s insistence on the standby and missing part approaches as the latest
iteration of his straddle strategy:
A “missing part” approach must appear to [Diefenbaker’s] government the
most promising method resolving its problem because its adoption under
bilateral agreement would enable it to say commitments met and adequate
defense assured without doing violation Diefenbaker’s basic public position
no nuclear arms except in case emergency.160
The telegram goes on to state that any partial agreement would remove the “political
pressures” on the Diefenbaker government, making them even less likely to agree to
nuclear storage on Canadian soil in the future:
As situation stands today alternative facing USG is whether to accept a
partial solution or live with continuation of the status quo in the hope
that the present trend of events in Canada may ultimately force this or a
successor government to accept full storage.161
Thus, the Americans recognized that Diefenbaker was domestically constrained and
that his win-set was narrow. They recognized that there were potential risks to
refusing this offer, which was acknowledged as a “partial solution,” as it would quickly
resolve the nuclear issue for Canada’s forces in NATO.162
This diagnosis did not result in the Americans accepting the Canadian offer. But-
terworth believed that Diefenbaker did not actually have the political support to
walk away from negotiations without a deal or to renege on Canada’s commitments
unilaterally.163 Indeed, he believed that pro-nuclear domestic pressures would push
Diefenbaker into a position more favourable to the United States.164 The American
Ambassador counselled that the best approach would be to wait on a final decision
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given the political climate in Canada. He noted that in the “next ten days there are
two events which may throw some light on” the best course of action for the United
States.165 Despite concerns about the workability of the standby approach, Butter-
worth cautioned that negotiators should remain cooperative “as protection against
[the] contingency [that] Diefenbaker may blame USG [for the] failure [to] reach so-
lution [to the] nuclear problem.”166 Thus, Butterworth wanted to keep negotiations
going not because of his worries about anti-nuclear backlash, but his fear of stoking
Diefenbaker’s anti-American streak.
Pressure to retain Canada’s commitments on Diefenbaker emanated from both
outside and inside the government, further undermining Diefenbaker’s bargaining
power. Butterworth noted that Pearson would give a statement on January 12th that
“may clarify” his and the Liberals’ position on nuclear acquisition. The Conservative
party conference beginning January 17th could also reveal a change in Diefenbaker’s
stance, as there was a “growing grass roots demand within [the Conservative] party
for more coherent defense policy.”167 In fact, an earlier telegram sent on January 2nd
from Butterworth to the Secretary of State noted that a “usually reliable press source”
informed the Embassy that both Pearson and Diefenbaker would “advocate [for the]
immediate conclusion [of a] bilateral GOC/USG agreement providing for acceptance
Nuclear [sic] weapons by Canadian forces “if and when necessary. . . Source says part
of Pearson’s motivation this decision is his certainty GOC will make similar decision
in annual meeting Progressive Conservative Association.” ”168 American officials had
suspected for several months that Diefenbaker was facing increasing criticism within
his own party over the nuclear issue and would be under pressure to not further
exacerbate relations with the Americans.169
The government’s decision to not accept ‘a partial solution’ is related to their be-
lief that Diefenbaker did not have a credible nationalist coalition that would allow for
him to totally abandon Canada’s nuclear commitments and walk away from negotia-
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tions. American officials had worried about the potential of anti-American Canadian
nationalism for years and had monitored the domestic situation in Canada closely.
One telegram from Ambassador Merchant to the Secretary of State in 1961 noted
that “resistance to American influence becomes fuzzily connected in some quarters
with. . . anti-nuclear sentiments.”170 Despite this, Merchant concluded that most of
Canada had a favourable view of the United States and especially President Kennedy,
remaining “highly susceptible and sympathetic to American influence.”171 In March
1962, the Department of State produced “Guidelines for Policy and Operations” for
Canada. It highlighted the “ever present nationalist sensitivity” in Canada that
should guide relations with them; essentially, while overall relations were good, the
United States should work to not inflame nationalist sentiments by not appearing
to infringe on Canadian sovereignty.172 On the nuclear sharing issue, this report
identifies it as the “major defense problem at the present time.”173 It cautions that
the United States should “avoid heavy-handed pressure, which would probably be
counter-productive, and we should realize that some time might be required for the
Canadian government to take this step.”174 The United States saw nationalist and
anti-American sentiment in Canada in much the same terms as Diefenbaker saw anti-
nuclear sentiment: as having the potential to become a major issue if they were not
careful. However, the pressure to restructure would soon become irresistible and
would have a major impact on the fate of Canada’s nuclear sharing commitments.
4.4.3 Vulnerability to Restructuring: The Downfall of Diefen-
baker’s Government
As suggested in the previous section, an important aspect of Diefenbaker’s coalition’s
lack of leverage was its vulnerability to restructuring or foreign influence. The Prime
Minister was still attempting to reassure members of his Cabinet and the public that
he could satisfy the anti-nuclear movement while remaining a good ally. This careful
balancing act could only be maintained as long as allies were willing to put up with it.
Any suggestion from Canada’s allies that it was reneging on its commitments would
shatter this façade and open Diefenbaker up to domestic audience costs. By January
1963, two key events amounted to foreign restructuring of Canada’s nuclear stance:
first, a retired NATO General and then, the US State Department unambiguously
170JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 4/61-5/14/61, 12 April 1961.
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asserted that Canada would be reneging on its commitments to NATO and NORAD
if it did not acquire nuclear weapons soon.
These events had two simultaneous effects – or in Putnam’s terms, reverberations
– that both helped and undermined the Americans’ ultimate goal. Firstly, the for-
eign pressure on the Canadian government to accept its commitments was at least
partially responsible for Pearson and the Liberals’ change in position. This pressure
directly led to the downfall of the Diefenbaker government, setting the stage for full
nuclear acquisition. Secondly, these foreign intrusions into Canadian affairs pushed
Diefenbaker to galvanize nationalist sentiment against the United States and towards
reneging on Canada’s nuclear commitments.
On January 3rd 1963, General Norstad, who retired as SACEUR, made a state-
ment to Canadian press while visiting Ottawa. In response to questioning on the
nuclear issue by the Canadian press, Norstad stated that Canada had made a com-
mitment to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in NATO, but had not followed
through.175 If Canada continued to delay a decision, it would effectively be reneging
on its commitments to its allies.176 This statement represents the first incidence of
public foreign pressure on Diefenbaker’s government to accept nuclear weapons from
an allied source.177 According to Bothwell, “Norstad’s comments created a storm
in Canada. . . [although] not the storm that Diefenbaker expected, or wanted.”178 It
pulled Diefenbaker towards a more nationalist stance. Green similarly saw this inci-
dent in nationalist terms: “I thought he had a lot of nerve to come here to Canada
and try to tell the Canadian government what it should do.”179 However, for oth-
ers, Norstad’s statement cemented the reality that Canada was losing standing and
rapport with its closest allies.180
On January 12th, Opposition leader Pearson gave a speech that shifted the Lib-
eral Party’s position on nuclear sharing to a pro-acquisition stance. The increasing
pressure from Canada’s allies – both public and private – to accept its commitments
was a central feature of this decision.181 The timing of his announcement soon af-
175Stevenson, 2014, p.19.
176McKercher, 2016, p.182. “When a reporter next asked “that if Canada does not accept nuclear
weapons for these aeroplanes [does] that [mean] she is not actually fulfilling her NATO commit-
ments?” Norstad responded, “I believe that’s right.” ”
177Bothwell, 2007, p.172; McMahon, 2009, p.159; Stevenson, 2014, p.19. The force of Norstad’s
comments were further amplified by the chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshall
Frank Miller, who agreed with Norstad’s statements.
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ter Norstad’s remarks and the rhetoric that Pearson used in justifying his change of
stance played up the importance of the reputational costs of reneging. The rationale
behind Pearson’s change in stance is discussed further in the next chapter.
Pearson’s about-face created political pressure on Diefenbaker to distinguish him-
self from the opposition and draw support from the anti-nuclear groups that felt alien-
ated by Pearson’s decision.182 In addition, if Diefenbaker accepted nuclear weapons
now, it would appear as if he was simply following the lead of the opposition after
years of delay.183 Despite these constraints the Prime Minister could have used this
opportunity to decisively negotiate a nuclear sharing arrangement with the United
States.184 Indeed, Harkness had thought that the Prime Minister would react this
way; after all, the main source of opposition in Parliament had been removed.185
Diefenbaker responded to the growing domestic and international pressures on the
nuclear issue with a lengthy speech in Parliament on January 25th, which did little
to ease the confusion around conservative nuclear policy.186 The Prime Minister took
the opportunity to ridicule Pearson’s lack of consistency, while also affirming that his
own policy on nuclear weapons had never changed. He implied that technological
and strategic changes made nuclear acquisition less of a necessity for allied defence.
Diefenbaker also insinuated that the recent meeting at Nassau may have obviated
the need for nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in Europe. At the same time,
Diefenbaker revealed that secret negotiations with the Americans had been underway
for several months to work out a nuclear sharing arrangement. The substance of
the speech did little to clarify the government’s nuclear policy. While the Canadian
papers reported that the speech indicated that Diefenbaker would be reneging on
Canada’s nuclear commitments, Harkness understood it to affirm a more pro-nuclear
stance and a commitment to continue negotiations.187
American officials viewed this speech as Diefenbaker laying the ground to back
out of Canada’s nuclear commitments.188 According to a memorandum from the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Under Secretary of State on
January 29th:
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In his remarks, Diefenbaker beclouded the whole issue of nuclear weapons
for Canadian forces with misleading references to Nassau, to NATO, to
multilateral nuclear forces, to NORAD, and to “not enlarging the nuclear
family”. His purpose was to stop if possible, and at least to slow down,
the momentum towards a clarification of Canadian defense policy which
began as a popular movement after the Cuban crisis, and which reached
a high point in Liberal leader Pearson’s speech earlier this month.189
Believing that the majority of the Canadian public was essentially aligned with the
American position, State Department officials recommended that the department ap-
peal directly to the Canadian people: “The Embassy in Ottawa believes that prompt
action should be taken by us to clarify the record and to sweep away the confusion
which Diefenbaker’s statement can cause in Canadian minds.”190 Reacting quickly,
under Secretary of State Ball approved a press release, which was made public on
January 30th, entitled, “United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear
Weapons.”191 The press release was a strong and explicit refutation of Diefenbaker’s
statement and a clear case of an attempt to restructure Canada’s negotiating position.
It laid out in stark terms the extent of Canada’s nuclear commitment, highlighting
that each of the four weapons systems purchased by the government needed nuclear
weapons to achieve “their full potential effectiveness.”192 The Americans laid the
deadlock in negotiations firmly on Diefenbaker’s doorstep: “the Canadian Govern-
ment has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute
effectively to North American defense.”193 It also directly refuted the claim that
there had been any change to Canada’s nuclear obligations as a result of the Nassau
meeting.194 Finally, the press release directly confronted the main anti-nuclear de-
tractors, highlighting the fact that Canadian nuclear acquisition would “would not
involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the “nuclear
club.” ”195 It also affirmed the principle of jointed control. Essentially, this state-
ment was directly and publicly confronting the Prime Minister, implying that he had
189FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.443, 29 January 1963.
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been misleading the public about the nuclear issue.196 It also revealed in no uncertain
terms that the Americans viewed anything short of nuclear acquisition as reneging, as
they stated that Canada had made a clear commitment to both NORAD and NATO.
The Americans attempted to restructure the Canadian position not only because
of their frustration with Diefenbaker’s delay tactics and misleading statements, but
also because they did not believe that he actually had a credible nationalist coalition
behind him. In fact, they believed that international criticism for reneging would
result in heavy domestic audience costs, as the public was invested in Canada up-
holding its commitments to its allies. A telegram sent from the American Embassy
to the State Department provides insight into the rationale behind the press release:
In effect we have now forced issue and outcome depends on basic com-
mon sense of Canadian electorate. Our faith in their good judgment is
based on our reading that public has been way ahead of political lead-
ership of all parties. Moreover Embassy had benefit recent grass roots
assessment. . . which independently reached same conclusion with greater
emphasis on importance attached by public to Canada honoring its com-
mitments. Public reaction to current developments (Embtel 987 and Tousi
34) supports this assessment. In short we think Canadian public is with
us, even though some liberal politicians have been afraid we have handed
Diefenbaker an issue he can use against them and US. We think Cana-
dians will no longer accept irresponsible nonsense which political leaders
all parties, but particularly progressive-conservatives under Diefenbaker,
have got away with for several years.197
Essentially, the Americans hoped that by directly appealing to the Canadian public,
they could alter Canadian policy on nuclear weapons: a classic example of Putnam’s
‘restructuring.’
The State Department’s press release was the final push for Diefenbaker towards
a nationalist appeal for reneging. The Prime Minister had considered running a more
nationalist and anti-American campaign in the 1962 election, but had ultimately been
196Bothwell (2007, p.173) summarizes the press release in similar terms: “In effect, the State
Department was calling Diefenbaker a liar.”
197FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol.XIII, Doc.445, 3 February 1963. It also seems that the State Department
intended to use this press release to influence Canadian policy not only through appealing to the
Canadian public at large, but also by putting pressure on Pearson and the Liberals. According to
the same telegram: “Let us also face fact that we are forcing Pearson to go faster and further than
he desires in the direction we favor.”
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dissuaded from doing so.198 After the press release, Diefenbaker was delighted with
the potential electoral implications of the American response: “ “We’ve got our issue
now,” Diefenbaker gloated to his finance minister, Donald Fleming.”199 This overt
meddling in Canadian affairs was the event Diefenbaker had been waiting for, one
that could galvanize a nationalist coalition and allow him to regain his majority.
Diefenbaker wanted to go to the polls running an anti-American campaign.200
While even the opposition condemned the State Department’s intrusion into Cana-
dian politics, the substance of Diefenbaker’s nuclear policy came under further scrut-
iny.201 During a Parliamentary debate on this matter, Pearson emphasized Diefen-
baker’s lack of a clear policy of policy on nuclear acquisition.202 While some members
of the Kennedy administration – including Kennedy himself – were not pleased with
the heavy-handed actions of the State Department, they ultimately believed that the
Canadian public was on their side.203 According to a telegram from the American
Embassy in Canada to the Department of State, the Americans did not believe a na-
tionalist coalition would coalesce around this issue, even if Diefenbaker campaigned
on it:
In any event Diefenbaker can be counted on to mount his campaign on
anti-US platform and had earlier last month launched “made in Canada”
slogan at National Party Convention. However, we are persuaded such a
campaign would not have the success some observers predict. Not only is
this not 1911, when “no trade or truck with the Yankees” was slogan which
won an election, but it is not even 1957, when Diefenbaker first came to
power on wave of anti-US jingoism. World has changed and Canadian
people know it. . . we are convinced anti-Americanism could not now effect
a Canadian Government.204
Diefenbaker’s straddle strategy meant that the pro-acquisition elements within his
Cabinet and in the public were alive and well – and coming to bear on the beleaguered
198JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General Rostow Memorandum 5/16/61 and related materials 5/61-
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government. Almost half of the Cabinet supported nuclear acquisition and were firmly
against taking on an anti-American tone in a new election campaign.205
Despite unintentionally increasing Diefenbaker’s zeal towards nationalism and
reneging, the American’s restructuring effort ultimately had the desired effect of set-
ting in motion a change in Canada’s bargaining position. It precipitated the collapse
of Diefenbaker’s government. For Harkness, the Americans’ rebuke was the last straw.
He had already considered resigning after Diefenbaker’s speech on January 25th; how-
ever the State Department’s stark statement that Canada was reneging on its alliance
commitments could not be ignored.206 With no solution to the nuclear deadlock forth-
coming, Harkness resigned from Cabinet on February 3rd, citing his frustration with
Diefenbaker’s nuclear policy and highlighting the importance of maintaining a strong
defence relationship with the United States.207 In a CBC interview on February 4th,
Harkness explained that Canada had made “definite and implicit” commitment to
acquire nuclear weapons.208 He also claimed that the current government was reneg-
ing on these obligations if they continued to delay nuclear acquisition, and that he
was confident that the “great majority of [the] Conservative Party feel as I do.”209
On February 5th, the Prime Minister lost a motion of confidence. This launched
Canada into an election where its nuclear policy and relationship with the United
States would be a major focus of the campaign.
Shortly after the collapse of Diefenbaker’s government, two more pro-nuclear mem-
bers of Diefenbaker’s Cabinet resigned: The Associate Minister of Defence Sevigny
and the Minister of Trade George Hees. In their letters of resignation, both men cited
concerns about Diefenbaker’s nuclear policy and his support of an anti-American cam-
paign.210 According to Sevigny’s letter of resignation, “Any so-called pro-Canadian
policy based on this event [the State Department press release] can only be interpreted
as anti-Americanism and manufactured electoral propaganda.”211 These resignations
underscore the double-edged nature of the American restructuring effort. They both
alienated Diefenbaker from the pro-nuclear factions in his coalition, pushing him far-
ther down the path towards nationalism and reneging. At the same time, they also
undermined the Prime Minister’s leadership, paving the way for a new government
with a more compliant approach to nuclear sharing.
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4.4.4 A Nationalist Campaign
During the 1963 election campaign, the nuclear issue was explicitly tied to the themes
of Canadian nationalism, sovereignty, and independence from the United States. Un-
like the previous election in 1962, the question of nuclear acquisition and reneging were
key campaign issues. While the remaining pro-nuclear and pro-American elements
of Diefenbaker’s Cabinet and coalition prevented him from acting on his most anti-
American impulses, Diefenbaker still ran a nationalist campaign, emphasizing ‘pro-
Canadianism.’212 The campaign endorsed the importance of Canadian sovereignty. It
framed the American attempts to influence their policies as direct affronts to Canada’s
national pride. Foregrounding the attempt to influence Canada’s nuclear policy was
a central component of this strategy.213
Diefenbaker drew upon multiple arguments to bolster support for reneging on
Canada’s nuclear commitments. Firstly, he claimed Canada had never made a firm
commitment to store nuclear weapons on its soil or to engage in nuclear sharing.214 He
suggested that the commitment to NATO could be renegotiated during the next Min-
isterial meeting in May.215 Secondly, that the weapons – at least the ones that would
be stationed in Canada – were not effective: the age of the bomber was ending, giving
way to intercontinental missiles, which could not be intercepted with BOMARCs or
the CF-101.216 This claim was reinforced a week before Canada went to the polls,
when the American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave testimony in the
US House Appropriations Committee “in which he admitted that the BOMARC in-
stallations were largely meant to “draw fire” away from important sites rather than
provide protection.”217 Both of these appeals tried to take the bite out of reneging,
perhaps in an effort to attract more moderate voters.
However, the nationalist element was at the heart of Diefenbaker’s campaign to
renege on Canada’s nuclear commitments. He tried to stir voter sympathies by play-
ing on their sense of national pride, as well as their fear of nuclear war and foreign
domination. During his nominating speech on March 2nd, Diefenbaker played on the
212Bothwell, 2007, p.174; JFK, NSF, Box 18, Canada General 2/1/63-2/14/63, 8 February 1963;
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sense of fear and outrage of the Canadian public: “[W]e shall not have Canada used as
a storage dump for nuclear weapons.”218 In Diefenbaker’s hands, McNamara’s state-
ment was not just about the efficacy of the BOMARC, but also took on nationalist
overtones, making it about the fundamental survival of Canada:
The Liberals party would have us put nuclear warheads on something
that is hardly worth scrapping. What’s it for? To attract the fire of
intercontinental missiles. Never, never, never, never has there been a
revelation equal to this. The whole bottom fell out of the Liberal program
today. The Liberal policy is to make Canada a decoy for intercontinental
missiles.219
These statements insinuated that the United States was not acting in Canada’s best
interests, and there could be dire consequences if Canada did not vigilantly guard its
independence in its security policy.
The importance of Canadian sovereignty in the nuclear matter was another key
theme. During his official opening campaign speech on March 4th, the nuclear issue
featured heavily. Diefenbaker proclaimed, “We want Canada to be in control on
Canadian soil.”220 Diefenbaker contrasted himself with Pearson, highlighting that he
had Canada’s best interest at heart, while his rival was catering to foreign powers:
“we make our policies in Canada, not generated by special pressures or even business
across the border.”221 He continued,
our responsibility for the security of Canada lies with Canadians, the
maintenance of our national sovereignty. We come before the Canadian
people and say, “We believe, as did [Canada’s first Prime Minister] Mac-
Donald that Canadians have the right to decide what is best for Canada.”
That’s our view. . . whether it is . . . defense, the economy, our culture, our
institutions and our social standards.
We are going to discharge that responsibility always in cooperation but
never from coercion. . . That’s the stand that this Government will take.222
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Thus, reneging was reframed as a reassertion of sovereignty: a means by which Canada
could take back control of its defence policy.
Meanwhile, the campaign tried to portray Diefenbaker as a beleaguered ‘man of
the people.’223 Green reinforced this in his own speeches, claiming that “no Canadian
Prime Minister had ever been subject to such vicious and unfair attacks. . . I don’t
think the people will stand for this sort of treatment.”224 Diefenbaker also drew upon
this theme in campaign speeches: “Last election I flew over Canada and saw the
people from above. This time I’m going to be with the people in the grass roots of
this nation.”225
Towards the end of the campaign, the nationalist rhetoric escalated when rumors
surfaced in Canadian newspapers that there was an “ace up Diefenbaker’s sleeve:” a
document that demonstrated that the United States was planning to ‘push’ Canada
– and Diefenbaker – to accept its nuclear weapons, using explicit threats of sanctions
if they did not comply.226 This memo – known as the ‘Push Memo’ – had in fact been
left behind during Kennedy’s official visit to Canada in May 1961, and eventually
made its way to Diefenbaker.227 Despite the salacious reports, the real memo was
quite benign. With the subject, ‘What we want from the Ottawa trip,’ it contained no
reference to the nuclear issue, nor any concrete threat of retaliation if the Canadians
did not take on the desired policies that were mentioned.228 The Prime Minister had
considered releasing this memo during the 1962 elections to run a more nationalist
campaign but was eventually dissuaded from doing so by the Americans.229
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The Americans suspected that Diefenbaker himself leaked the memo, despite his
denials and vague refutations of these reports.230 The Americans saw an advantage
to this approach: it allowed the Prime Minister to distance himself from the leaking,
while still benefiting from it, as it directly fed into the nationalist rhetoric in his
campaign. It also allowed Diefenbaker to avoid correcting some of the falsehoods that
were being circulated, which painted the United States in an extremely bad light. As
one American official hand wrote on a telegram on this matter, this strategy seemed
to be a “[p]retty clear use of the of the “push” document without “using” it!”231 The
President took a similar view.232 In his frustration, Kennedy considered intervening
in the Canadian election in a phone call on March 28th:
And it is just the question of what reaction it is having. If it is helping
Diefenbaker, we ought to think about knocking it down and the question
would be how. It ought to be just Canadian. We ought to get the actual
[document]. . . perhaps consider whether they ought to leak in Canada the
true version of what it said. . . Or maybe we just ought to shut up. That,
I don’t know.233
The President and his administration ultimately decided to take the latter approach:
to shut up.
4.4.5 The Restructuring Dilemma
As Diefenbaker’s anti-American and nationalist rhetoric escalated, the Americans ner-
vously watched from the sidelines.234 The American Embassy in Canada consistently
projected that the Conservatives would not be able to achieve a majority and that the
Canadian population was not responding to his anti-American campaign, but this did
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not fully ease American concerns. While officials were confident that most Canadians
were supportive of both nuclear acquisition and the United States, they still worried
that Diefenbaker might win the election or remain in power. In fact, the Secretary
of State asked the Canadian Embassy to “evaluate the constitutional” feasibility of
a scenario where the Conservatives would lose their plurality, but Diefenbaker would
not give up his Premiership.235
Despite these fears, the Americans rejected any further public attempts at re-
structuring. Most American officials agreed that the best course of action would be
to stay out of the campaign and not respond to the anti-American provocations. They
thought that this would end up playing into the hands of Diefenbaker and further
strengthen his campaign. As Ambassador Butterworth cautioned in one telegram to
the Secretary of State, American officials should be careful not to inadvertently help
Diefenbaker’s cause by appearing to put their thumb on the scale: “Embassy believes
it important that extreme care be used on our side to avoid any public or private
statement which would aid Diefenbaker and undercut our friends who are waging a
battle for a coherent defense policy.”236 According to a memorandum for McGeorge
Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, prepared by military advisor
L.J. Legere,237 “Our governing policy line continues to be avoidance of all association
with Canadian affairs, especially military affairs.”238 Legere ensured this policy was
being followed by being “in daily contact with the Canada Desk, where the watch-
word is ‘Remember January 30,’ ” referring to the date of the State Department’s
press release.239 This attitude continued even after the reports of the push memo,
which was viewed as a provocative attack against the American government. Accord-
ing to a memorandum to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense by Bundy
on April 1st, despite the likely increase in inflammatory and anti-American rhetoric,
the “President wishes to avoid the appearance of interference, even by responding to
what may appear to be untruthful, distorted, or unethical statements or actions.”240
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The Americans worried that restructuring would serve to strengthen Diefenbaker’s
nationalist appeals and therefore be counterproductive.
Negotiations between the US and Canada were still technically ongoing. The
Canadian government wanted to follow with the same hard line that no nuclear
weapons could be housed on Canadian soil; they pushed the United States to find a
solution to this impasse.241 However, even with the threat of a nationalist resurgence
hanging in the air, Diefenbaker was not able to achieve any leverage with the Amer-
icans. As Butterworth details in a telegram sent on February 26th, a compromise
solution with the Canadians was even less desirable at this time. It could ultimately
help Diefenbaker’s electoral chances and could have a hand-tying effect even in the
case of a Liberal victory:
With the liberal party finally adopting forthright policy nuclear storage in
Canada, we would strongly recommend no indication be made during pre-
election period of USG willingness to accept other than normal provisions
stockpile agreement. This not only because compromise would undercut
campaign position those favorably disposed but because a contrived solu-
tion at this juncture would prejudice the attainment of an operationally
satisfactory solution in post-election period if liberal party wins majority
or strong plurality.242
Ambassador Butterworth cautioned that the United States should essentially stall,
avoiding any “definitive decision” by delaying the response to the Canadian offer
and by asking for further information once a response was sent.243 Thus, while the
potential of Diefenbaker’s nationalist coalition was strong enough to curb further
American attempts at restructuring, it was not credible enough to translate into
bargaining power in negotiations.
4.4.6 Nationalist Appeals and Domestic Audience Costs
Among Presidential National Security documents on Canada, there was a series about
the 1963 election, entitled ‘The Voter Speaks,’ by Sam Lubell, published in the
241The continuation of negotiations was essential for the government to portray itself as still being
in good faith while also standing up to the Americans.
242JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 26 February 1963. Butterworth also
cautioned that if there was a Conservative and Social Credit coalition or a Liberal minority dependent
on the NDP, the United States government “may prefer an imperfect solution to none at all” for
nuclear sharing.
243JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 2/15/63-3/15/63, 26 February 1963.
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Toronto Star Syndicate. Lubell was an American political analyst, who utilized a
mixed-method technique to predict the outcome of elections that used polling results
to select geographical areas and demographic subsets for door-to-door interviews.244
He recorded his findings in a series on the Canadian election, which was published
from March 25th to April 7th and contained projections about the likely result of the
election. According to his own account, Lubell had no expertise on Canadian politics
and affairs, relying wholly on his interview subjects to gain a sense of Canadian politi-
cal dynamics and priorities.245 These reports represent a significant primary source of
historical Canadian attitudes on nuclear weapons, reneging, and nationalism. While
the generalizability of his findings should be interpreted with caution, Lubell con-
ducted interviews on many Canadian voters, providing a rich source of primary data
on what voters were thinking.
The nuclear question was a major electoral issue and had a substantive impact
on voting patterns. Diefenbaker’s embrace of nationalist reneging caused a shift of
Conservative voters to the Liberals. Lubell estimated that Diefenbaker’s reneging
rallying cry “seems to be costing the Prime Minister at least a fifth and perhaps a
fourth of his 1962 vote,” an election that was already considered a dismal result for
the Conservatives.”246 In fact, “no other campaign issue is causing anywhere as many
voter shifts as is the nuclear agitation.”247 He noted that if the Liberals did win the
election, it would be due to Diefenbaker’s mishandling of the nuclear issue.248 These
shifts were not just a reflection of Canadians desire to have nuclear weapons on their
soil. In fact, Lubell found that the nuclear issue became a proxy for how citizens felt
about the United States and its involvement in Canada.249
An interesting aspect of Lubell’s account is how some voters’ reasoning for aban-
doning the Conservatives overlaps with previous theories of the micro-foundations of
244JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963; Smothers, 1987.
245JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963. Interestingly, Lubell
notes with surprise the degree to which the United States featured in Canadian politics: “Like most
Americans, I have never thought that the United States has a “Canadian problem.” But for some
years to come, I suspect, Americans will have to learn to adjust to a restless, none-too satisfied
neighbor on our northern frontier.”
246JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
247Ibid.
248Ibid.
249Ibid. However, the nuclear issue and nationalist standoff with the United States were not the
primary issue of concern to most voters: rather, the economy and jobs were the number one issue
for most Canadians. On the other hand, one’s view of the United States certainly intersected with
these matters: with some believing that the Canadian economy was too reliant on the United States
to fully thrive, while others believed that a close and positive relationship with the United States
was crucial for Canada’s economic health (JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63,
27 March 1963).
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audience costs. Canadian voters shifted from Conservative to Liberal because they
were worried about the material and reputational costs of reneging: “I’ve never voted
Liberal but Diefenbaker is wrecking American relations with his nuclear arms pol-
icy.”250 As one woman argued, Diefenbaker “made such a fool of this country over
nuclear arms.”251 Another former Conservative voter noted, “Pearson is no cam-
paigner but he won’t wreck our relations with the rest of the world.”252 Some also
believe that reneging reflected Diefenbaker’s ineffective leadership and deficient per-
sonality. These included criticisms like: “He’s so irresponsible he makes me ashamed
I am a Canadian” and “He can’t make up his mind” and “He’s not a leader. He just
sits on the fence.”253
Nevertheless, there were voters that were receptive to the nationalist message. In
his March 29th release, Lubell notes that within the last ten days, there was “a fairly
dramatic shift in how many voters feel towards” Diefenbaker – or “Canada John”
as one voter referred to him.254 He finds a surge of support for the Prime Minister
because “He knows his own mind” and “No one tells him what to do” or “he won’t
be bossed around not even by the U.S.”255 Another voter demonstrated how Diefen-
baker’s nationalist campaign rhetoric resonated with some voters: “I don’t like to feel
we’re sitting ducks for the Yanks, just decoys.”256 Lubell shows that Diefenbaker’s
attempts to portray himself as a populist ‘man of the people’ did have a positive
effect on his image among some voters.257 Further, the Prime Minister’s claims that
the Bomarc was obsolete cast doubt on the utility and necessity of these weapons,
even among “strong Liberal supporters who criticize Mr. Diefenbaker” for his anti-
American rhetoric.258 These arguments were substantiated on April 3rd, after the
reporting McNamara’s testimony to a Congressional Committee that the BOMARC’s
had only limited military utility. This testimony, along with the rumors about the
250JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963.
251JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
252Ibid.
253JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963. The last quote is from
an individual that was still intending on voting for the Conservative Party but was hoping that
Diefenbaker would be impeached.
254JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
255Ibid.
256JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.
257JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963. According to one voter:
“I was going Liberal. . . But I saw a picture of Old John in front of a big crowd saying everybody is
against me but the people. He was standing so straight. He stands up for what he believes.”
258JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A,
Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 25 March 1963.
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push memo, seemed to provide external validation for Diefenbaker’s hostility towards
the United States, emphasis on Canadian sovereignty, and his anti-nuclear stance.
However, this crystallization of the message came too late to make up the losses
that his party had already endured. Regardless of the persuasive power of his nation-
alist appeals, much of his base was supportive of nuclear acquisition. Furthermore,
the collapse of support from the elite level also alienated Conservative voters. Ac-
cording to Lubell, Conservative “shifters” tended to “criticize Mr. Diefenbaker as “a
born squabbler” or “a one-man man” or “a dictator who can’t get along with any-
one.”259 According to Lubell a “frequently expressed criticism” that was lobbed at
the Prime Minister was, “When a man’s own cabinet ministers resign there must be
something wrong with him.”260 Diefenbaker’s failure to hold his coalition at the elite
level therefore affected his ability to garner a nationalist coalition at the mass level.
Thus, his original straddle strategy laid the groundwork for his failure to achieve a
nationalist coalition that would elect him and support reneging.
Another aspect that affected Diefenbaker’s support was voter confusion. Diefen-
baker’s inconsistent stance up until the election was not immediately clarified by his
new nationalist tone and rhetoric, leaving some voters unsure about what is actual
message was. In late March, Lubell reported that voters were split on how they
perceived Diefenbaker’s stance towards nuclear weapons: some believing he was pro-
acquisition, others believed he was against, and others were not sure.261 Some voters
complained that “the more I hear the more confused I get,” demonstrating that the
nuclear issue, after so many shifts in policy, was ill-suited for a rally-around-the-flag
appeal.262
In the end, Diefenbaker could not make up his lost support by picking up enough
dissatisfied anti-nuclear voters from the Liberal Party. The Liberals largely main-
tained their support or lost their staunch anti-nuclear voters to the leftist NDP,
which was also running an anti-nuclear and anti-American campaign.263 Diefenbaker
lost the 1963 election, paving the way for a Liberal minority government under Lester
Pearson.
259JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 29 March 1963.
260JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963.
261JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
262JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.
263JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 11 March 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A,
Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions in intra-alliance
negotiations and the potential of nationalist coalitions for reneging. The dramatic
shifts in Diefenbaker’s policy towards Canada’s nuclear alliance commitments were
related to changes to his domestic coalition. Diefenbaker initially intended to keep his
commitment to acquire nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. Between 1957 to 1960,
Diefenbaker went out of his way to signal to both domestic and international audiences
that he intended to fulfill these commitments through hand-tying and cost-sinking
mechanisms. However, beginning in 1960, Diefenbaker became wary of alienating
the growing anti-nuclear movement and tried to accommodate anti-nuclear sentiment
within his coalition. Worried about the negative political repercussions of both reneg-
ing and acquisition, the Prime Minister delayed a decision on Canada’s nuclear policy
and adopted an increasingly vague approach. The single-issue nature of Diefenbaker’s
coalition allowed for this straddle strategy: by delaying, Diefenbaker could keep nu-
clear weapons off Canadian soil, while still appearing as if he was maintaining alliance
solidarity and not breaking his commitments.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, domestic and international pressures for a resolu-
tion to the nuclear issue made it impossible to delay negotiations further. In a contin-
uation of Diefenbaker’s straddle strategy, Canadian negotiators pursued the standby
and missing part approach: a compromise solution that would allow Canada to claim
that it fulfilled its obligations while keeping nuclear weapons off their soil. However,
Canadian leverage was undermined by the anti-nuclear nature of Diefenbaker’s coali-
tion: its need for a consensus-based process and mutual agreement, its lack of credible
threat of withdrawal, and its vulnerability to restructuring. Essentially, both pro- and
anti-nuclear elements of this coalition had a stake in maintaining Canada’s status as
a ‘good ally’ and were vulnerable to claims that it was reneging on its commitments.
Ultimately, the State Department’s attempt to restructure Canada’s negotiating po-
sition through the publication of a press release led Diefenbaker to change strategies
and try to appeal to a nationalist coalition in support of reneging.
In one sense, this case affirms institutionalist logics of the costliness of reneging.
Diefenbaker paid the price for threatening to renege and appearing to be an unreliable
ally. This had direct consequences within his own Cabinet and then at the ballot
box. However, the way that events unfolded also suggests that there are differences
between anti-nuclear and nationalist coalitions. While American officials consistently
discounted nascent anti-nuclear sentiments, they worried about a potential nationalist
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coalition emerging as a threat to allied relations. While confident that most Canadians
had a positive view of the United States and President Kennedy, they were wary that
Diefenbaker could turn the nuclear issue into a nationalist one. However, the Prime
Minister refrained from doing so, until the 1963 election. Thus, Diefenbaker failed to
lay the foundations that could have increased his bargaining power when negotiations
finally began. Lubell’s public opinion data indicates that as Diefenbaker’s nationalist
message began to cohere, his electoral support increased, suggesting that some voters
were more willing to accept reneging on nationalist terms rather than anti-nuclear
ones. American officials were dissuaded from any further restructuring attempts,
worried that it would only strengthen Diefenbaker’s nationalist support.
Domestic considerations, rather than strategic factors, governed the changes in
Diefenbaker’s foreign policy outlook. The military argument in favour of nuclear
acquisition in general remained constant over time. Only when Diefenbaker saw nu-
clear sharing as a potential election issue that could be framed in nationalist terms,
did he cast doubts on the strategic necessity of nuclear sharing. The only weapons
system which was considered dubious in terms of military effectiveness was the Bo-
marc. While Diefenbaker claimed that this explained his reluctance to accept nuclear
weapons, it cannot explain the Prime Minister’s equal unwillingness to accept the
CF-101 interceptors.
In the end, this change in strategy came too late to save Diefenbaker from the
consequences of reneging. Diefenbaker miscalculated. His straddle strategy aimed to
keep his coalition together. Instead, it eventually alienated members of his Cabinet
and the Party at large, which triggered the fall of his government and resignation
of several of his Ministers. The inconsistency in his nuclear policy and inability to
hold together his Cabinet also alienated potential Conservative voters. Some viewed
the collapse of Diefenbaker’s Cabinet as a failure of leadership and character, taking
signals from the elite level on Diefenbaker’s handling of the nuclear issue. In these
circumstances, Diefenbaker could not form a nationalist coalition and lost the election.
5
Case Study 2: Lester B. Pearson
“As a Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept pledges with our allies and then
refuse to honour them. In acting thus we deceive ourselves, let our armed
forces down, and betray our allies. As I understand international affairs,
when you make and continue to accept commitments in any area, you carry
them out until they are changed by agreement.”
– Lester B. Pearson, Leader of the Liberal Party, January 12 19631
In Chapter 3, I argued that leaders with the support of anti-nuclear coalitions are
less likely to renege than those supported by nationalist coalitions. This is due to the
fact that anti-nuclear coalitions’ support for reneging is specific and limited. They
do not fundamentally question alliance membership. They care about the material
and reputational costs associated with reneging. Leaders with the support of these
coalitions are likely to suffer double-edged domestic audience costs for alliance de-
fection and therefore less likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt consensus-
based strategies, and more likely to fail in their reneging attempts. The previous
chapter demonstrated the weakness of these coalitions by showing that Diefenbaker’s
anti-nuclear coalition provided little leverage in negotiations with the Americans,
ultimately leading to reneging failure.
This chapter will address how the weakness of anti-nuclear coalitions may cause
leaders to not even attempt reneging. I will use the shifting nuclear policy of Lester
Pearson, leader of the Liberal Party (1958-1968) and then Prime Minister of Canada
(1963-1968) as a case study. From the late 1950s, Pearson and the Liberal party
opposed nuclear acquisition. However, despite Pearson’s anti-nuclear coalition and
his personal anti-nuclear beliefs, Pearson reversed his stance. The Liberal Party ran
1LAC, MG 32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
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on a pro-acquisition platform in the 1963 election and Pearson accepted a nuclear
sharing role for Canada within the first year of his tenure as Prime Minister.
The main puzzle that is explored here is therefore: Why did Pearson dramatically
reverse his position on nuclear sharing in 1963? Pearson and the Liberals had opposed
the government’s nuclear policy from the beginning of Diefenbaker’s tenure. Yet, on
January 12th 1963, Pearson gave a speech in Scarborough, Ontario that unambigu-
ously gave his – and the Liberal Party’s – support to nuclear acquisition. There are
two central elements to this puzzle: the substance and the timing of Pearson’s rever-
sal. Substantively, Pearson’s about-face is surprising due to his previous principled
anti-nuclear position and the Liberal Party’s long-held opposition to nuclear sharing.
Moreover, according to literature on reneging, Pearson should have felt that he had
a freer hand in reversing a previous administration’s policy than the Prime Minister
that had made the commitment in the first place.2 The timing of Pearson’s reversal
is also of note. Pearson maintained his anti-nuclear stance and nuclear sharing did
not feature as a central issue in the June 1962 elections. However, by November
1962, according to Pearson’s own account, he was reconsidering his position.3 This
timing corresponds to the hardening on Diefenbaker’s stance in opposition to nuclear
acquisition. Furthermore, Pearson took the initiative to announce his unambiguously
pro-nuclear stance before Diefenbaker had clarified his own policy. In doing so, Pear-
son left the possibility open for Diefenbaker to fulfill Canada’s nuclear commitments
and blame the Opposition for the delay. This chapter will not only examine why
Pearson changed his position so drastically, but also why he did so at that precise
moment in history.
This chapter argues that Pearson reversed his position on nuclear acquisition
because he was unwilling to suffer the high costs of reneging on Canada’s nuclear
commitments. Pearson built his coalition on the proposition that it was possible to
be wholeheartedly supportive of the Western Alliance, while specifically rejecting a
nuclear role for Canada. Beginning in the fall of 1962, Pearson realised that the
anti-nuclear coalition that supported that platform would not inoculate him from the
material, reputational, and domestic audience costs that Diefenbaker’s government
was suffering due to its own non-fulfillment of its nuclear commitments. Pearson
attempted to use the government’s increasingly hostile position towards the United
States and nuclear sharing to his electoral advantage, capitalizing on the domestic
2Pilster, Böhmelt, and Tago, 2015.
3LAC, MG 32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 9-11 January 1961; Pearson,
1975, pp.70-71.
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audience costs that Diefenbaker was suffering to gain more votes for the Liberal Party.
Pearson directly appealed to voters by focusing on the firmness of Canada’s commit-
ments. He argued that reneging would undermine national security and ruin Canada’s
reputation among its allies. He also promised anti-nuclear Liberal supporters that he
would try to renegotiate Canada’s nuclear role as soon as it was possible, emphasizing
a consensus-based approach in international negotiations.
This chapter explores several possible explanations for Pearson’s reversal, demon-
strating that all of them relate to his sensitivity to the costs of reneging, despite his
personal and political anti-nuclear stance. The timeline of events shows that there
were escalating pressures on Pearson to reverse his stance. These pressures should
have applied equally to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Yet,
the fears of the high costs of reneging came to bear down only on Pearson because he
was not trying to appeal to a nationalist coalition.
This chapter proceeds as follows. After providing a brief background on Pearson’s
political career, I describe the Liberals’ anti-nuclear coalition up to 1962, demon-
strating how they specifically rejected a nuclear role of Canada, while supporting its
participation in alliances more generally. The next section focuses on why Pearson
changed his position on nuclear acquisition when he did, showing that it was related
to his increased awareness of the material, reputational, and domestic audience costs
associated with reneging. The final section examines how Pearson managed to retain
most members of his anti-nuclear coalition, despite his drastic change in policy.
5.1 Background
Lester Pearson became the leader of the Liberal Party on the heels of the party’s
electoral defeat in 1957. The 1958 election was called soon after he took over party
leadership. According to his own account, Pearson was unprepared to lead this cam-
paign.4 The 1958 election was a humiliation for the Liberal Party, resulting in not
only the Liberals’ defeat, but also reduced their number of seats in Parliament to just
48 out of 265. Previously, the Liberals had been in a dominant political position and
had controlled government from 1935 to 1957.
In many respects, Pearson and Diefenbaker contrasted starkly in terms of back-
ground and leadership style. Unlike Diefenbaker, who thrived in the limelight of
campaigns, Pearson “could never really feel comfortable with those enormous two-
4Pearson, 1975, p.34.
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or three-hour political jamborees before five or ten thousand people.”5 Compared to
Diefenbaker, who had spent most of his career in the opposition benches, Pearson
had ample insider experience, serving as Secretary of State for External Affairs from
1948 to 1957. He also had an extensive experience as a diplomat and civil servant,
winning the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in ending the Suez Crisis, affirming his
reputation as someone highly adept in international affairs.6
5.1.1 Pearson’s Anti-Nuclear Coalition
Pearson and the Liberal party had firmly rejected a nuclear sharing role for Canada
before January 1963. This position was supported not only by the leader of the oppo-
sition, but also many influential Liberal Party officials, and by wider party member-
ship. While the majority of Canadians supported nuclear sharing, the Liberal party
had a strong anti-nuclear core at the elite and party level.7 By the spring of 1962,
Pearson and the Liberal party had firmly and publicly taken an anti-nuclear stance.
They argued that nuclear sharing would amount to an expansion of the nuclear club,
frustrate the prospects of disarmament, and that the nuclear weapons systems were
ineffective. At the same time, Pearson and the Liberals were unwavering in their sup-
port of the Western Alliance. Liberal officials took pains to clarify that their rejection
of a nuclear role was not a repudiation of NATO or NORAD. Thus, the coalition that
Pearson constructed was single-issue in nature.
Pearson himself represented the double-edged nature of single-issue anti-nuclear
beliefs: he took a principled stance against nuclear acquisition, while taking pains
to underscore his support for Canada’s alliance ties more generally.8 Pearson was
morally opposed to the horrors of nuclear war, even stating in an interview that
he would “rather be red than dead.”9 According to Judy LaMarsh, a Liberal MP




7See Kent, 1988, p.187.
8Pearson adopted a more nationalist tone in his early criticisms of nuclear sharing. While Pearson
still rejected nuclear acquisition, he argued that if Canada did accept nuclear weapons, it should be
under sole Canadian control and custody, rather than joint control. However, this line was dropped
over time and the Liberals focussed on a more firmly anti-nuclear rationale to justify their rejection
of nuclear sharing. See LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 10 March
1959; LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 2 July 1959; LAC, MG32 N2,
Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 20 January 1960; LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear
Weapons - Storage in Canada, 27 January 1960.
9Bothwell, 2007, p.172.
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This man had stood for peace throughout his whole lifetime. He repeated
over and over again that we must not permit the proliferation of atomic
weapons or their use. He had been as responsible as any in refusing to let
Canada make its own nuclear weapons. . . 10
As Pearson wrote in response to a member of the Voice of Women, Canada “should use
all of her influence in the councils of the world to bring about negotiations which will
prevent the holocaust of nuclear destruction.”11 In this letter, Pearson also applauded
the Voice of Women’s call for a ‘World Peace Year.’ However, he was careful to
highlight that Canada should oppose membership in the nuclear club “while playing
her full part in collective defence.”12
Pearson repeatedly clarified his position on Canada’s alliances, dissociating himself
and the Liberal Party from a neutralist stance.13 In November 1961, Pearson received
a letter from Mrs. F. L. Showler, a concerned citizen, who decried Pearson’s refusal to
automatically reject a request from the US or UK to base nuclear weapons in Canada
under American or British control. She believed that this was a “reversal of stand.”14
In his response, Pearson insisted that his “position in regard to the acquisition and use
of nuclear arms by Canada has not changed. . . Canada should not become a nuclear
power” and should not have custody or control over nuclear weapons.15 However,
while nuclear sharing was an unacceptable expansion of the nuclear club, nuclear
basing, where the nuclear weapons state retained control, was another matter. He
noted that he supported NATO, the “Western nuclear deterrent,” and rejected the
prospects of “unilateral disarmament.”16 Further, according to Pearson, Canada, as
10LaMarsh, 1969, p.28.
11LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, 806.2, 4 October 1961. In fact, Pearson’s wife was a member of the
Voice of Women, she cut ties with the group after her husband came out in support of nuclear
acquisition.
12Ibid.
13See LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, “Neutralism,” 2 February 1960, a memorandum by Pearson on his
views of neutralism: “I do not feel that Canada can be neutral in the “cold” war so long as one side
represents Communism as a form of government and the other free democracy. To be neutral would
be to make no distinction between them. However, while avoiding “neutralism” of this type, I think
that Canada should do everything she can to prevent the conflict of ideas developing into war and,
indeed, to remove eventually the control itself on terms which are honourable and security. I have
always believed also that security in the world of today requires working closely with our friends.
It is something we cannot achieve by ourselves. This means co-operation with those friends, not
neutrality or neutralism.” A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that this was used as
a template response to letters that inquired after Pearson’s position on neutralism (‘Keep for future
[illegible]’). See, for example, LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, Neutralism, June 1960.
14LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, File 806.2, 14 November 1961.
15LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50, File 806.2, 17 November 1961.
16Ibid.
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a member of NATO, was obligated to at least a consider a request for the use of her
territory as a base for nuclear weapons for the US or the UK. While he expressed
doubt about the strategic utility of nuclear basing in Canada and indicated that he
would likely reject this request, Pearson highlighted that if he was Prime Minister,
he would have to at least consider the request as a member of the Alliance: “Refusal
to give consideration would I think, seem that we should withdraw from the Alliance
completely and I am not in favour of that.”17 In this letter Pearson rejects both nuclear
sharing and withdrawing from NATO, drawing a clear distinction between the two:
“In short, I repeat that I am not willing to advocate a policy, either of Canada
becoming a nuclear power by acquiring nuclear weapons or of Canada withdrawing
from the NATO coalition by” refusing to even consider a nuclear basing request from
the US or the UK.18
During a TV interview in late March 1962, Pearson, still facing accusations of
having a “murky” defence policy, stated that the Liberal Party now rejected both
nuclear sharing and basing, equating nuclear forward deployment with the expansion
of the nuclear club:
I believe that we should have a defence policy which will not require
Canada to become a nuclear power in the sense of making, or using,
or securing, nuclear weapons for her forces and which would be under
national control. Now, that’s clear cut. . . we should not become a nuclear
power. We should not have a policy that requires us to be a nuclear power
by having our soil used as a nuclear base under the national control of
any other country”19
While his position on basing had changed, his support for Canada’s alliances had not.
Pearson also emphasized during the interview that Canada would still have to “do our
full part. . . in the collective Western defence effort.”20 Thus, the issue was not the
nature of the alliance but the means of supporting it, which could be done “through
conventional methods, rather than through nuclear methods.”21 This interview was
later transcribed and published as a press release by the Liberal Party.
17Ibid.
18Ibid. Pearson sent multiple letters with a similar response to other concerned Canadians that
objected to his perceived pro-nuclear shift in policy. For one example, see LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.50,
806.2, 7 December 1961.
19LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 28 March 1962.
20Ibid
21Ibid
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This anti-nuclear stance was supported by officials in the Liberal Party’s inner
circle. Many important Liberal MPs and advisors held firm anti-nuclear positions.22
While some opposed nuclear weapons on moral grounds, others doubted the strategic
necessity of nuclear acquisition. For example, Paul Hellyer, who would later become
Defence Minister in Pearson’s government, argued that nuclear weapons had little
military utility and that defence dollars were best spent on conventional weaponry.23
Similar to Pearson, Hellyer was equally opposed to Canada taking on a non-aligned
position, stating in the House of Commons in January 1961, “We cannot be neutralist.
To be neutralist is to be nothing.”24
This anti-nuclear position was also reflected in official Liberal policy and among
the wider membership. During the National Liberal Rally in January 1961, which was
intended to formulate the Liberal platform for the next election, the Liberal Party
rejected nuclear sharing, even under joint control, asserting that it would amount to
an extension of the nuclear club.25 In a defence policy paper, the Liberals argued
that if Canada accepted nuclear weapons for its forces, it would undermine its own
disarmament goals:
Canada cannot deny nuclear weapons to other nations and at the same
time arm her own forces with them. A new Liberal government there-
fore would not acquire, manufacture or use such weapons either under
Canadian control or under joint U.S.-Canadian control.26
This document specifically highlights that a new Liberal government would renege
on its nuclear and conventional interceptor role NORAD, while retaining other con-
ventional commitments:
Under a new Liberal government Canada will withdraw from NORAD
insofar as its present interceptor role is concerned. Liberal policy would,
however, provide for an appropriate Canadian contribution to continental
defence in co-operation with the U.S.A. The Canadian role in such defence
should be that of detection, identification and warning. We would stop
using our defence resources on interceptor fighter squadrons or on Bomarc
missiles.27
22Kent, 1988, p.188; McMahon, 2009, p.159.
23LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, (No Date); LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 25 September 1962.
24LAC, MG26 N2, Vol.88, Neutralism, 31 January 1961.
25LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 9-11 January 1961.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
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Indeed, according to Kent, “At the National Rally the predominant sentiment has
been strongly against acceptance of any nuclear role for Canada.”28 However, consis-
tent with other clarifications of Liberal policy towards nuclear sharing, this defence
policy paper also highlighted the importance of NATO and its strategic relationship
with the United States. It accepted the principle of nuclear sharing only under the
multilateral control of NATO, rejecting a bilateral system of nuclear sharing.
The Liberals’ opposition to nuclear sharing did not abate after the June 1962
election. Less than two months before he would try to convince Pearson to accept
nuclear sharing, Hellyer wrote an op-ed on September 25th 1962 entitled, “The Case
Against Atomic Weapons: False Security and No Real Defence.”29 In this article,
Hellyer argued that both the BOMARCs and the nuclear strike role for the Air
Division in Europe had little military utility and outlined his practical concerns with
the weapons systems that Canada had committed to acquiring. While he advocated
that the nuclear question should be decided on the basis of strategic, rather than
moral, considerations, he also noted the dangers of nuclear proliferation: “A good
case can be made for limiting control [of nuclear weapons] and thereby limiting the
number of fingers on the trigger.”30 In addition, Pearson had also affirmed his stance
late into 1962. According to Tom Kent, an advisor to Pearson:
As late as November 12, 1962, he circulated to caucus the model letter
that he was using in replying to correspondence about the nuclear issue,
which said: “May I assure you that I do not believe that Canada should
accept nuclear arms under national control by herself or by the United
States. On the contrary, I have consistently argued that the nuclear club
should not be extended.”31
Nevertheless, just two months later, the Liberal Party would support the acquisition
of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces and the retention of all four nuclear weapons
systems.
28Kent, 1988, p.187.
29LAC, MG32 B33, Vol.75, 21, 25 September 1962.
30Ibid.
31Kent, 1988, pp.187-188
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5.2 Why did Pearson Support Nuclear Acquisition
in January 1963?
This section will examine various explanations for why Pearson reversed his anti-
nuclear position and supported acquisition in January 1963. I will argue that Pear-
son’s about-face was related to his increasing awareness and sensitivity to the costs
of reneging. Beginning in the fall of 1962, Pearson began to grasp that Diefenbaker’s
inability to fulfill Canada’s nuclear commitments were undermining Canada’s reputa-
tion abroad as well as Diefenbaker’s popularity at home. By witnessing the mounting
reputational and audience costs of reneging, Pearson realised that he could avoid al-
liance instability, diplomatic turmoil, and provide himself with a path to the Prime
Minister’s office by supporting nuclear acquisition. Pearson’s personal opposition to
nuclear sharing, as well as the anti-nuclear coalition that he had constructed were not
strong enough in the face of such pressures.
I examine four different explanations for Pearson’s reversal. First, I explore the
argument that Pearson’s about-face was related to an increase in Canada’s level
of commitment, due to the arrival of the nuclear delivery systems by the fall of
1962. Second, I examine whether the Cuban Missile Crisis augmented Pearson’s
evaluation of the strategic necessity of nuclear acquisition. Third, I examine whether
the international costs of reneging changed Pearson’s mind. I focus on two key events
that affected Pearson’s calculations of international costs: Hellyer’s report on the
November 1962 NATO conference and General Norstad’s statement in early January
1963. Lastly, the effect of domestic audience costs is explored. I focus on the polling
data that Pearson received after November 1962, which revealed the support for
keeping Canada’s nuclear commitments and the Conservatives growing unpopularity.
All these factors reveal that there were escalating pressures on Pearson to change
his stance on reneging. However, the latter two explanations, which focus on Pearson’s
increasing awareness of the international and domestic costs of reneging, provide
the most insight into the direct causes of Pearson’s decision-making. The first two
explanations, on their own, do not explain why Pearson reversed his stance. In reading
this section, one could conclude that Pearson’s reversal was over-determined, that
in the face of such pressures any politician would have supported nuclear sharing.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these were the very conditions that led
Diefenbaker on the opposite path, in support of reneging on these commitments. The
key for understanding this divergent behaviour is the coalition that they identified
with and believed would carry them to win the 1963 election. While Diefenbaker
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appealed to a more inward-facing, nationalistic coalition, Pearson had constructed a
more outward-looking coalition that strongly valued alliance membership.
5.2.1 Increased Level of Commitment
One explanation of Pearson’s reversal is that the level of commitment had changed by
January 1963: the delivery vehicles had become operational by 1962. This explanation
for the sudden reversal in Liberal policy was offered by Pearson in an interview a few
weeks after the Scarborough speech, where he first established his support for nuclear
acquisition.32 One interviewer pushed Pearson on why he only recently reversed his
position on whether the CF-104s should be nuclear armed, in “direct contrast to the
position you took a year ago.”33 Pearson responded by highlighting that the context
had changed. Before, Canada had only given a promise to take on a nuclear strike
role. Now, Canada had acquired the CF-104s that could only be effective with nuclear
weapons, meaning that they were more firmly committed to their nuclear role:
. . . Perhaps you think there is a contrast, but the fact remains that until
the equipment was delivered to the squadrons, it was possible to change
that role, to change that commitment to something else. . . Once the planes
were delivered to the squadrons, and that began last November I believe,
then it was up to use to ensure that the men who had those planes were
able to discharge the role that had been entrusted to them until that role
was changed.34
Thus, the level of commitment of Canada substantially increased only after November
1962.
The substance of this argument is repeated in a Liberal document on defence
policy from 1963.35 It argues that while it was possible to withdraw from Canada’s
32LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.
33Ibid.
34Ibid. Parts of this transcript were adapted with handwritten notations, which do not change
the substance of the transcription. I have quoted the text here with the handwritten adjustments.
35LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, (No Date). Although this
document does not have a date listed, it is clearly from 1963: it references the Norstad statement
and discusses the change in the Liberals’ nuclear policy. The document is also unsigned and entitled
‘For Val Sears – Re: Defence Policy.” Val Sears was a Canadian journalist for the Toronto Star.
The document repeats many of the same points of the Scarborough speech, providing a justification
for Pearson’s and the Liberals’ change in policy. The first-person language and the content indicate
that Pearson was possibly the author of the document or at least it was intended to be his voice
coming through. The information provided on the document, combined with its informal nature
suggests that it may have been notes for a speech, but this is unclear.
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commitments a year ago when they were softer, it was now impossible to renege,
because the commitments “are now fixed and firm.”36 The document specifically
mentions the completion of the Bomarc bases and the fact that the “missiles [are]
now there” as well as the delivery of the CF-104s.37
This argument mirrors my claims about how tying hands and sinking costs can
increase levels of commitment. In Chapter 2, I argued that making promises was a
weaker form of commitment than partially fulfilling commitments. Partially fulfilled
commitments involve both hand-tying as well as cost-sinking, increasing the strength
of the commitment and therefore the costs of reneging. The claims made in the
Liberal defence document above therefore have theoretical grounding. It is possible
that the incentives to maintain a commitment made by a previous administration only
become binding on a new administration only once they achieve partial fulfillment.
This rationale could explain the timing of Pearson’s reversal and why he only became
sensitive to the costs of reneging in the latter half of 1962.
However, it is unlikely that the change in the level of commitment was the only or
direct cause of Pearson’s policy shift. Firstly, most of the weapon systems had started
to be delivered by the end of 1961. By the end of October 1961, Pearson made a
statement regarding the delivery of the first Bomarc to Canada, calling it “the day
of decision” for the Diefenbaker government.38 He also decries the lack of decision on
the other nuclear weapons systems, highlighting the fact that the situation was not
tenable:
until some decision is taken about war-heads these weapons – and perhaps
some others such as the Honest John and the U.S. Jets we are getting –
are useless as a straw against a tank. At the moment they are weapons
without any ammunition.39 [Emphasis in original]
Thus, Pearson knew of the delivery of the Bomarc to Canada at least by 1961 and
was aware that the other weapons systems would soon face a similar predicament.
Secondly, regardless of his awareness of the delivery of specific weapons systems,
Canada’s commitments were clearly ‘fixed and firm’ even before their arrival to the
military: the government had spent millions of dollars on the procurement of these
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 28 October 1961. This state-
ment also revealed that Pearson was aware that the government had ordered the Bomarc B missile,
which “is designed for nuclear war-heads only.” See also Cabinet discussions of the delivery of
Bomarc Missiles, CC, 23130, 21 November 1961.
39LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 28 October 1961.
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weapons systems, sinking considerable costs. Lastly, focusing only on the increasing
level of Canada’s commitment over time does not explain why these pressures did not
affect Diefenbaker’s calculations in a similar way. The costs of reneging should have
been just as high – if not higher – for Diefenbaker after Canada had partially fulfilled
its nuclear commitments. The escalating level of commitment by the fall of 1962
merely exacerbated the problem of reneging for Pearson. The fact that the nuclear
weapons systems were delivered by then did not in itself cause Pearson to change his
position.
5.2.2 Increased Strategic Threat
Another explanation that will be rejected is a purely strategic one: that Pearson
began to warm to nuclear acquisition after the level of threat (or his perception of it)
changed after October 1962, when the world came to the brink of nuclear war. In his
memoirs, Pearson cites the Cuban Missile Crisis as one of the two main events that
caused him to change his mind on nuclear acquisition.40 In his memoirs published
many years later, Pearson highlighted how the Crisis made him fully appreciate the
military necessity of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces:
Even when our bases were put on alert, we discovered that we were im-
potent to use them since we had failed to make arrangements to acquire
nuclear warheads for our defence systems; there was no warhead possible
for the Bomarc except for the atomic one, and without nuclear-tipped
rockets the Voodoo lost much of its effectiveness as an interceptor.41
Thus, it was only after the Cuban Missile Crisis that Pearson fully appreciated the
need for Canada to have nuclear weapons to ensure that it was prepared to fight in
a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union.
However, a purely strategic interpretation of the link between the Crisis and Pear-
son’s nuclear acceptance misses another significant mechanism. For Pearson, the
Cuban Missile Crisis put into stark relief the domestic and international costs of
reneging, especially the degree to which Canada’s reputation was declining among its
allies. According to Pearson’s interpretation of these events, Diefenbaker’s govern-
ment’s refusal during the crisis to put Canada’s bases on alert for two days, coupled
with its history of foot-dragging on its nuclear commitments, “appears to have shocked
40Pearson, 1975, pp.69-70.
41Ibid., p.70.
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some people across the border into the belief that Canada was an unreliable ally.”42
Canada’s inability to act during the Cuban Missile Crisis was not just a practical
security concern, but also a reputational one. Furthermore, Pearson noted in his
memoir that the public had a similar interpretation of these events, alluding to the
potential domestic audience costs associated with reneging: “Many Canadians were
indignant that we could not effectively carry out our defence commitments in a crisis
of this kind.”43 Pearson would attempt to capitalize on this sentiment by changing
his position.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was significant in changing Pearson’s mind, but not
solely for strategic reasons. The Crisis did raise the perception of international threat,
thus validating the military need for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it revealed
the extent of the growing tensions between the United States and Canada under
Diefenbaker. For Pearson, Canada’s inability to live up to its commitments during a
crisis revealed the extent to which reneging could lead to international reputational
costs and domestic audience costs.
5.2.3 Reputational and Material Costs
Building on the lessons of the Cuban Missile crisis, two more events cemented Pear-
son’s notion that Canada would suffer unacceptable reputational costs if it reneged
on its nuclear commitments: Paul Hellyer’s visit to a NATO conference in Novem-
ber 1962 and General Norstad’s statement in January 1963.44 Paul Hellyer was an
influential MP for the Liberal Party and would later become the Minister of De-
fence in Pearson’s government.45 As demonstrated in the previous section, he was a
staunch critic of the military utility of the nuclear weapons slated for Canadian use.
In November 1962, Hellyer attended a NATO Parliamentarians’ meeting in Paris,
where he received a stark warning about Canada’s position within the alliance if it
continued to shirk its commitments. According to McMahon,
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Depending on the version, it is unclear which of these two events had a greater impact on
Pearson’s decision-making. According to Pearson’s (1975, p.71) account, it was the former, as he
claims that he had firmly made up his mind to support acquisition by Christmas 1962. McMahon
(2009, p.157), on the other hand, puts more stock into General Norstad’s statement: “Pearson
may not have been immediately responsive to Hellyer’s suggestion [to support acquisition], but his
attitude began to change during the first week of January.” McMahon (2009 p.156) still acknowledges
that Hellyer “had played a significant role in changing Pearson’s attitude,” while finding evidence
that Pearson did not necessarily make up his mind until mid-January.
45In his memoirs, Pearson (1975, p.70) refers to Paul Hellyer as “our defence critic.”
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Hellyer was struck by how Canada’s position within the alliance had
changed within the seven years since he last attended a NATO confer-
ence. . . [He learned that] the NATO council was losing patience with the
Canadian government and had even talked about passing a resolution
expressing its concern.46
Hellyer also observed that the Diefenbaker government’s inability to properly equip
its forces in Europe was having a serious effect on morale, whereby “pilots were so
ashamed they avoided bars frequented by their NATO colleagues.”47 While Hellyer
was still unconvinced of the strategic merits of acquiring nuclear arms, he now firmly
believed that Canada needed to live up to its nuclear commitments due to his new
awareness of the unacceptable reputational costs that Canada was suffering.48 As
McMahon succinctly summarizes, “For Hellyer, it was a matter of honor and obliga-
tion more than nuclear strategy.”49 However, Hellyer still needed to convince Pearson
to shift Liberal policy towards nuclear acceptance.
According to Pearson, Hellyer’s information was a decisive factor in changing his
mind.50 In his memoirs, Pearson notes that “our men were fed up. . . [and s]o were our
allies.”51 According to Kent, Pearson was also swayed by his sense of commitment and
obligations; in other words, his sensitivity to reputational costs. As Kent describes
Pearson’s motivations, “Mike [Lester Pearson] took the position he did because he
was utterly dedicated to the co-operation of the Western nations as a group; he could
not bear the thought of Canada failing to carry out an agreement with them.”52
Pearson’s awareness of the high reputational costs to Canada was reinforced on
January 3rd, when General Norstad provided a statement that left no doubt that the
Alliance saw Canada as shirking on its commitments by refusing to arm its forces
with nuclear weapons. This event provided further confirmation to Hellyer’s report.
It demonstrated that Canada’s refusal to accept nuclear weapons was not just caus-
ing a rift with the United States, but also with NATO.53 Indeed, Pearson referred
to Norstad’s statement when he announced his new pro-acquisition stand. He high-
lighted that Norstad had made it clear that Canada was not living up to any of its
46McMahon, 2009, p.156. The NATO council ultimately decided to “postpone the motion.” See
also Hellyer, 1990, p.25
47Hellyer, 1990, p.24.
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commitments: “If there were any doubt about those facts, that doubt was removed
the other day by a man who should know, General Norstad.”54
Pearson drew upon the importance of Canada’s reputation among its allies when
justifying his change of stance to the public. In the Scarborough speech, in which
he reversed his position on nuclear acquisition, he noted that Canada’s positive rep-
utation abroad was built upon its reliability and its steadfastness in keeping its com-
mitments: “If we had not done so in the past, Canada would not have achieved a
position of respect and influence in the world.”55 The reputational costs of reneg-
ing were also a key theme in the election. Pearson accused Diefenbaker of having
“betrayed our allies and jeopardized the good name of Canada” by reneging on its
commitments.56 He also highlighted that Canada needed to fulfill its obligations in
order to have influence within its alliances and on the world stage more broadly.57
In the same speech, Pearson also emphasized the importance of NATO and al-
liances for Canada’s national security, implying the heavy material costs that could
result from reneging and the weakening of the alliance.58 Canada needed to rely on
its allies for security, and this implied that it should fulfill its obligations.59 During a
speech to the National Council meeting in February 1963, Pearson again highlighted
the importance of collective action for Canada’s national defence. He also noted the
dangers of nationalist reneging that threatened alliance solidarity. Pearson strongly
connected reneging with undermining the credibility of the alliance and by extension,
Canada’s security:
Any party which advocates policies that would weaken and divide that
coalition [the Atlantic alliance], that would bring about the withdrawal
from it, or even weaken Canada’s position within it by refusing to fulfil
pledges or honour commitments that have been taken; any part that would
do this directly or indirectly is not only weakening Canada’s security, it is
undermining the collective action of free countries to preserve the peace
and promote progress in the world.60
54LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
55Ibid.
56LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 11 February 1963.
57Ibid.
58LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
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Thus, Pearson highlighted the costs of reneging in order to justify his support for
acquisition. This provides some evidence that his growing awareness of these ma-
terial and reputation costs were foundational for his nuclear acceptance. Whether
these speeches represent a sincere belief or was merely expedient political rhetoric are
explored in the next section.
5.2.4 Domestic Audience Costs
During the key time period between November 1962 and January 1963, Pearson also
became increasingly aware of the domestic audience costs of reneging that were under-
mining support for the Conservative Party. Gallup polls in November and December
revealed that not only did a majority of Canadians support nuclear acquisition, but
also that the Liberals were leading against their Conservative counterparts “47 per-
cent to 32 percent.”61 These, along with previous polling that indicated Canadian
support for nuclear sharing, bolstered Hellyer’s claim that the “great majority of
Canadian people. . . would want their country to fulfil its obligations,” despite the
Liberals previous anti-nuclear stance.62
Pearson and his advisors also received an electoral study on two key provinces
for the Liberal party: Ontario and Quebec. According to McMahon, this report was
likely more decisive than the Gallup polls, even though it was only received by Liberal
Party offices just two days before the Scarborough speech.63 The study highlighted
the importance of the nuclear issue to the electorate, claiming that “nuclear weapons
were now the number one concern for Canadians” when the issue had “not even
registered” in the previous poll that had been conducted in September 1962.64 The
report also revealed that the support for nuclear acquisition was overwhelmingly high
in Ontario at 70 percent and that “Ontario was crucial to a Liberal victory in the
next election.”65 The Liberal party could therefore gain from Diefenbaker’s and the
61McMahon, 2009, p.160; The Gallup poll data from November 1962 shows a strong majority of
about 60 percent in favour of nuclear acquisition; however, the Liberal’s lead over the Conservatives




64Ibid., p.160. This finding appears to be corroborated by other polling. According to a Gallup
poll taken in June 1962, when asked what the greatest problem Canada is currently facing, only
3.6 percent mentioned responses related to nuclear war (Gallup Canada Inc., June 1962). In March
1963, responding to the same question, 15.4 percent of respondents mentioned the nuclear arms
situation/nuclear war (Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963).
65McMahon, 2009, p.160.
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Conservatives’ decision to support reneging. A change in policy on nuclear acquisition
could be the key to winning the next election.66
Pearson was also aware of the tensions within the Conservative Party on this
issue.67 His public acceptance of nuclear sharing could exacerbate these tensions
and maximize audience costs. According to Pearson, “As their [the Conservatives]
disunity increased, so [did] our [the Liberals] excitement and our energy mounted.
We had them on the ropes and would not let them escape.”68 If this was indeed a
desired effect of this speech, it was successful, as Pearson notes that the “impact of
my Scarborough speech on the government benches. . . was obvious and helped widen
the division within the Tory government.”69
The question of whether Pearson changed his mind due to concerns over Canada’s
reputation and alliance solidarity or due to his desire to topple the government is
subject to debate among commentators and academics. Initially, Pearson denied that
polling had any bearing on his decision making. In an interview on January 29th,
Pearson claimed that the December Gallup poll showing a majority of Canadians
favoured nuclear acquisition “had nothing whatever to do with my statement. . . I
didn’t even know what the Gallup Poll results were.”70 Kent reinforces this narrative
that Pearson changed his position out of principle rather than political expedience,
even arguing that his about-face actually hurt him in the election, preventing a Liberal
majority.71 However, in Pearson’s memoirs, his previous repudiation of the impact
of polling and domestic calculations softens somewhat. While Pearson claims in his
memoirs that the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hellyer’s report were the primary catalysts
for the change, he also indicates that the domestic context had some impact:
The fact it was obvious the government was split on the issue, and this
would soon be revealed; the fact that the Gallup poll showed the majority
of Canadians believed that the decision should be the one I had come to
– these factors certainly did not inhibit me.72
In another interview, years after the nuclear affair, Pearson remarked that this mo-
ment was “when I really became a politician.”73
66Ibid., p.161.
67Pearson, 1975, pp.71, 74.
68Ibid., p.74.
69Ibid., pp.71-72.
70LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.
71Kent, 1988, p.192.
72Pearson, 1975, p.71.
73Pearson in Bothwell, 2007, p.172.
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Even the most cynical interpretation of Pearson’s motives – that he did not truly
care about the reputational and material costs of reneging and only about supplant-
ing Diefenbaker as Prime Minister – still substantiates the importance of the costs of
reneging in his calculations. Pearson’s statements on the importance of keeping com-
mitments and Canada’s reputation abroad, ‘genuine’ or not, were clearly meant to
appeal to Canadian voters. This reveals that Pearson, like many IR theorists, believed
that most Canadians saw a link between reneging and Canada’s international reputa-
tion and material wellbeing and cared about alliance solidarity. Indeed, according to
the American pollster Sam Lubell’s interviews of Canadian voters, many individuals
justified their support for Pearson along these lines, which will be discussed further
below.
This is an important factor for understanding an important aspect of the puzzle
– why Diefenbaker attempted to renege in 1963, and Pearson did not: they were
appealing to different segments of the Canadian population. Diefenbaker believed
that he could win a substantial number of voters by drawing upon and amplifying
Canadians’ nationalist sentiments by using the United States as a foil. For Diefen-
baker, the increasing pressure from the United States after the Cuban Missile Crisis
only provided further fuel for a grievance-based, nationalist campaign. On the other
hand, Pearson believed that most Canadians would reject nationalism and reneging,
believing that the costs would be too high. As he stated in a speech in February
1963:
Today no country, certainly not Canada, can live unto itself, either po-
litically or economically. The world is too small and the dangers are too
great for narrow and inward-looking nationalism. . . A Liberal government
will not try to prove that we are for “Canada First” by getting into trou-
ble with our friends. We will not try to show how broad our Canadian
shoulders are by going around with a big chip on them. 74
Pearson believed that Canadians would favour a more cooperative approach with the
United States and respond positively to an ‘outward-looking’ campaign on defence.
Therefore, the increasing public dissatisfaction of the United States and Canada’s
allies also provided the grounding and justification for the Liberals’ campaign. Thus,
the same series of events and pressures pushed these two political leaders in opposite
directions.
74LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 11 February 1963.
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5.3 The Weakness of Anti-Nuclear Coalitions
From the outset, Pearson’s anti-nuclear stance had been qualified by his support for
and identification with the Western alliance. While Pearson had built a coalition
that was anti-nuclear, it was also outward-looking and pro-NATO. Ultimately, with
the growing pressure on Canada to fulfill its commitments, Pearson would have to
abandon his anti-nuclear position, running the risk of alienating this coalition.
Pearson’s campaign attempted to both retain anti-nuclear voters as well as appeal
to those that were pro-acquisition or did not have a strong opinion on the nuclear
issue. While the strongest nuclear activists abandoned the Liberal party in 1963,
Pearson’s campaign rhetoric attempted to keep some anti-nuclear voters on board,
without calling for unilateral reneging.75 In his Scarborough speech, Pearson tried to
burnish his and the Liberals’ anti-nuclear credentials, reminding the audience that
they had originally opposed nuclear weapons, but that the current position was unsus-
tainable.76 He also made the pledge that his government would immediately review
Canada’s defence policy and would negotiate out of these nuclear commitments as
soon as possible, but with the support of Canada’s allies.77 Thus, Pearson, attempt-
ing to appeal to anti-nuclear voters, favoured a consensus-based approach to ending
Canada’s nuclear commitments. He also reassured potentially skeptical voters that
Canada would be able to prevent the use of these weapons through joint control:
“In such an agreement, a U.S. finger would be on the trigger; but a Canadian fin-
ger would be on the safety catch.”78 In contrast to his previous position on nuclear
sharing, Pearson claimed that nuclear sharing would not amount to the expansion of
nuclear powers or the “nuclear club,” highlighting that other NATO allies functioned
as nuclear hosts through a similar bilateral arrangement.79
Many of Pearson’s appeals in 1963 echo theories of the importance of alliance com-
mitments and international reputation among domestic audiences. As demonstrated
in the previous section, the potential reputational and material costs of reneging were
key parts of Pearson’s justification of his change in stance. In his Scarborough speech,
the idea that a country, rather than a government, makes binding commitments was
75McMahon, 2009, pp.161-162.
76LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963. Pearson also
noted that he did not view this matter as a “moral question,” about the inherent morality of nuclear
weapons. As Pearson had always supported NATO, a nuclear alliance, this implied an acceptance
of the nuclear deterrent and the general existence of nuclear weapons.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.
79LAC, MG32 N2, Vol.114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 29 January 1963.
5. CASE STUDY 2: LESTER B. PEARSON 141
used in order to shore up Canada’s obligations.80 Like institutionalist scholars, Pear-
son highlighted the importance of reliability, especially in the context of government
changeover:
These are not treaties, however, merely between governments. The obli-
gations they involve are between nations. . . In dealing with our friends,
we must assume that a change of government would not normally mean
a sudden and unilateral renunciation of the treaty obligations they have
undertaken. Our friends have the same right to assume that the commit-
ments of Canada are the commitments of the nation; that they would not
automatically disappear with a change of government.81
As such, this issue was framed as a matter of basic foreign policy, where partisan
politics have no place.82
Did these arguments prevent a collapse of the anti-nuclear coalition? Canada’s
anti-nuclear activist groups abandoned the Liberal Party after the Scarborough
speech.83 According to McMahon, anti-nuclear activists felt “horrified,” “aban-
doned,” and betrayed, and “moved quickly to denounce Pearson. . . [and] turned to
embrace Diefenbaker.”84 Anti-nuclear figures with close ties to the Liberal Party also
made their objections known. Most notably, the future Liberal leader and Prime Min-
ister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, rebuked Pearson as the “unfrocked priest of peace.”85
Before Pearson’s pro-acquisition statement, Trudeau “had been expected to run under
the Liberal banner;” instead, he threw his support behind the NDP.86
At the elite level, most prominent Liberals decided to keep ranks despite their
personal feelings on the nuclear issue. As Pearson’s advisor Tom Kent notes, Kent
“tried to console a good many unhappy Liberals. A few of them left the party, most
decided to stay.”87 As for Kent himself, he accepted the decision and would not resign
from the party, even though he was “appalled” with Pearson’s pro-nuclear stance:
While I disagreed with Mike [Lester Pearson], I understood and respected
the motives that led him to his conclusion. He had always worked so hard
80LAC, MG32 N2, Vol 114, Nuclear Weapons - Storage in Canada, 12 January 1963.
81Ibid.
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for collective decision making in the international community. He just
could not bear the thought of Canada as a renegade, not doing what it
had undertaken, by a collective process, to do.88
Walter Gordon, another prominent member of the Liberal party had said that Pear-
son’s about-face “was very upsetting to me.”89 Yet, he ran as a Liberal and joined
Pearson’s Cabinet as the Minister of Finance in 1963. Other Liberal politicians, like
Hellyer, were convinced by the reputational and domestic political merits of support-
ing acquisition. Likewise, the Liberal Party membership was supportive of Pearson’s
new pro-acquisition policy.90
As for voters at large, it appears that this strategy was effective in retaining some
Liberal supporters, while attracting disaffected conservative voters. According to the
political analysist Sam Lubell, the retention of Liberal supporters was not necessarily
due to their the popularity of nuclear weapons themselves, but rather the importance
of keeping commitments: “Often staunch Liberal supporters talk of the need “to
honor our commitments” with the mournfully manful tones of someone who is willing
to take it on the chin for a bad bargain.”91 This analysis indicates that Liberal voters
were more persuaded by the perils of reneging rather than the inherent merits of
nuclear arms. In fact, Lubell predicted that it would be politically impossible for any
government to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles, given the controversy
over their utility that had been generated throughout the campaign, concluding that
“the whole nuclear issue will have to be re-negotiated after the election.”92 According
to Lubell’s analysis, the Conservatives were bleeding voters to the Liberals at a much
higher rate than Liberal voters to the Conservatives.93 Lubell found that “only 5%
of the Liberals appear to be shifting their ballots because they disagree with Lester
Pearson’s stand that Canada should “honor our commitments and accept the war-
heads.”94 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Conservative-to-Liberal shifters
overwhelmingly cited their concerns about American relations as one of the central
reasons for abandoning the Conservative Party.95 Overall, Lubell finds that the shift
88Ibid.
89Gordon in Bothwell 2007, p.413 ft.54. According to Hellyer’s (1990, p.26) account, “Walter
Gordon told me he was “pretty irritated and damn nearly resigned.” See also Kent, 1988, p.192.
90McMahon, 2009, p.161; According to Hellyer (1990, p.26), “the vast majority of Liberals were
as pleased as they were surprised, and quite comfortable with their leader’s common-sense stand.”
91JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963b.
92JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 8 April 1963.
93JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
94Ibid.
95Ibid.; JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 2 April 1963.
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from Liberal to Conservative was not all that significant, with some Liberal voters
deciding to favour the anti-nuclear NDP instead.96
Gallup polling from March 1963 supports Lubell’s claim that Tories were losing
more voters than the Liberals. Table A below shows responses regarding preferred po-
litical party by previous voting behaviour, which gives some indication of the relative
amount of vote switching that occurred for each party.97 Only about 71% of those
that voted Conservative in 1962 continued to prefer the Conservative Party by March
1963; however, about 85% of previous Liberal voters still preferred the Liberal Party.
These statistics indicate a greater degree of voter retention among the Liberals than
the Conservatives, as Lubell finds. Furthermore, about 15% of previous Conservative
voters were switching their support to the Liberals, while only about 3% of previous
Liberal voters now preferred the Conservatives. Only about 5% of former Liberal
voters now preferred the more staunchly anti-nuclear NDP, indicating that there was
only a relatively small abandonment of the Liberal party on anti-nuclear grounds.
Voted For Last Federal Election
Present Preferred Progressive Social Labor
Political Party Conservative Liberal NDP Credit Progressive Total
Progressive Conservative 70.9 2.7 4.5 4.4 40.0 34.3
Liberal 14.8 84.6 18.0 10.2 0.0 39.5
NDP 2.9 4.9 68.5 3.6 40.0 9.2
Social Credit 10.3 7.4 9.0 81.0 20.0 16.3
Labor Progressive 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6
Other 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N= 622 488 111 137 5 1,363
Source: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1963. Gallup Poll, March 1963, #301 [Canada].
[public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc. [distributor].
Table 5.1: Results from Gallup Polling in March 1963. Present Preferred Political
Party by Voting Behaviour in the Last Election.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter showed how leaders with anti-nuclear coalitions may still be deterred
from reneging due the international and domestic costs associated with defection. It
explored the puzzle of why Pearson decided to support nuclear acquisition in January
1963, despite his and the Liberal Party’s previous opposition to nuclear sharing. I
argued that both Pearson’s personal anti-nuclear beliefs as well as the anti-nuclear
96JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 3/16/63-3/31/63, 26 March 1963.
97Gallup Canada Inc., March 1963.
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coalition that supported him were not strong enough to overcome the pressures to
maintain Canada’s commitments. He decided to favour nuclear sharing as he became
increasingly aware of the international and domestic costs associated with reneging.
Thus, his about-face on nuclear weapons largely aligns with institutionalist theories
on why leaders avoid reneging on alliance commitments, affirming the importance of
a state’s reputation for reliability for domestic audiences.
The first section demonstrated the single-issue nature of Pearson’s and his coali-
tion’s opposition to Canada’s nuclear commitments. While Pearson and the Liberals
opposed nuclear sharing on moral and strategic grounds, they consistently tempered
this opposition by emphasizing their broad-based support of NATO and the Western
Alliance. The second section examined the various reasons for Pearson’s change in
policy. Ultimately, as Pearson became more aware of the reputational, material, and
domestic audience costs of reneging beginning in the fall of 1962, his stance on nuclear
acquisition changed. The final section evaluates Pearson’s attempts to maintain his
coalition and attract voters to win the 1963 election on a pro-nuclear platform.
In the end, for both the Conservatives and the Liberals, this election was fought
less on the grounds of how individual voters felt about nuclear weapons and more
about how Canadians felt about reneging and their relations with the United States.
Both Pearson and Diefenbaker saw incentives to win the election by framing the
nuclear debate in these terms. In the end, Pearson won a minority government. The
Liberal Party and their voters prioritized general aspects of alliance policy – such as
retaining the country’s standing and reputation – over more specific policy preferences
– avoiding nuclear acquisition.
In this sense, Pearson’s support of nuclear sharing is similar to modern European
leaders that still retain nuclear weapons on their soil. While anti-nuclear sentiment
has been widespread in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium since the end of
the Cold War, so is support for NATO.98 Like Pearson, leaders in these countries
decided to prioritize good relations with their allies and a more cooperative approach
to defence by retaining these commitments, rather than risk the costs of reneging.99
These cases seem to validate institutionalist arguments about alliance reliability and
the reasons leaders keep commitments. The next chapter will show that this weakness
on reneging is not a feature of all domestic coalitions. Trudeau’s experience with
98Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014; Foradori, 2012, 2013; Franceschini and Müller, 2013; Koster,
2013; Lunn, 2012; Sauer, 2013; von Hlatky, 2014.
99Ibid.
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reneging on Canada’s NATO commitments will show that constructing a nationalist
coalition provides a pathway to reneging success.
6
Case Study 3: Pierre Elliott
Trudeau and NATO
“We should be protecting our internal security, defending our three seas,
and then considering other possible international commitments. It was not
logical or rational to not protect that which was ours.”1
– Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, March 29 1969
“The Canadians had decided to change their role [in NATO] . . . Unless they
contribute constructively to the alliance, they would withdraw. Canada un-
derstood the importance of consultation, but its basic position was ‘non-
negotiable.’ ”2
– Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp, June 25 1969
The previous chapters have highlighted two pathways for reneging failure, both
of which demonstrate the costs and risks associated with reneging. Those cases have
shown that the material, reputational, and audience costs that were presented in
Chapter 2 influence a leader’s calculus on whether to attempt to renege and the
likelihood of success. Leaders that ignore the drawbacks of reneging risk political
exile. Those that account for these costs have powerful incentives to back down or
seek consensus-based solutions in order to be seen as reliable allies and competent
leaders by potential voters.
How then, do some leaders successfully renege without incurring domestic audi-
ence costs? This chapter will explore a case of a reneging attempt that succeeded.
Between 1968 and 1969, the newly elected Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau,
1LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
2FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.
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embarked on a strategy to form a nationalist coalition. This coalition contained offi-
cials who were highly skeptical of the level of Canada’s contribution to NATO, seeing
it as out of sync with the national interest. Some Ministers even advocated for full
withdrawal from the alliance. Trudeau’s nationalist coalition supported reneging on
Canada’s nuclear role in NATO as well as substantial reductions to its conventional
commitments. Trudeau’s government took steps to tie their hands domestically and
publicly committed themselves to reductions before negotiations at the international
level, which also strengthened their bargaining position. The nationalist character
of Trudeau’s coalition prevented the United States from attempting to restructure
Canada’s win-set, as this could have backfired and been condemned as undue foreign
interference in Canadian affairs.
I first consider the possibility that the risks of material, reputational, and audience
costs of reneging were somehow lower for this case or that the Trudeau government
was somehow unaware of the potential costs of reneging. I reject this explanation.
Documents show that officials within the Trudeau administration were deeply con-
cerned with the implications of reneging on both nuclear and conventional commit-
ments within NATO. They vocally opposed any substantial reductions to its NATO
commitments for fears of the negative material and reputational effects that would
be brought by appearing to be an unreliable ally. In addition, both the Nixon ad-
ministration and NATO officials opposed these reductions and initially attempted to
stop the Canadian government from reneging.
There was also potential for domestic audience costs. Most Canadians had favour-
able views of NATO and supported Canada’s role in the alliance.3 Like Diefenbaker,
Trudeau faced a sharply divided Cabinet: some Ministers opposed deep or unilateral
cuts to Canada’s commitment to NATO, while a substantial minority in Cabinet were
skeptical of NATO and advocated for substantial reductions, full military withdrawal,
or even neutrality. Unlike Diefenbaker’s government, both the Minister of National
Defence, Léo Cadieux, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp,
strongly supported maintaining the status quo. This should have strengthened the
hand of officials that opposed reneging. A crisis in Cabinet that led to the resigna-
tion of either of these Ministers could have been very damaging to Trudeau and his
government.4
3According to an October 1968 Gallup poll, about 71% of respondents who have heard or read
anything about NATO supported maintaining Canadian troops in Europe, while about 25% believed
they should be called back (Gallup Canada Inc., October 1968).
4According to Paul Martin, a Liberal politician and leader of the Senate under Trudeau, “I don’t
think the cuts would have ever taken place if Cadieux had kept fighting and not thrown in the towel
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Yet, Trudeau managed to avoid domestic audience costs after he reneged. While
both Cadieux and Sharp considered resigning over the issue of NATO over the course
of these internal debates, Trudeau managed to keep them in the fold and even co-opt
their support for widespread cuts to their commitments.5 Trudeau retained support
at the mass level as well. According to one Gallup poll in July 1969, about 64% of
Canadians approved of Trudeau’s reductions to NATO.6 Indeed, Trudeau’s reneging
did not engulf him or his administration in the same political quagmire as Diefenbaker.
Trudeau remained Prime Minister until 1979 and from 1980 to 1984.
The puzzle at the heart of this chapter is: Why did Trudeau attempt to renege
on these commitments despite the potential costs? How did Trudeau succeed in
reneging and in avoiding domestic punishment, while Diefenbaker had failed? Why
were Trudeau’s threats of withdrawal credible, despite widespread elite and public
support for NATO?
Trudeau was an early critic of Canada’s participation in nuclear sharing. As
an anti-nuclear proponent, Trudeau was disgusted by Pearson’s acceptance of nuclear
weapons in 1963 and only came into the Liberal fold several years later. That Trudeau
would set out to remove nuclear weapons from Canadian soil as Prime Minister was
therefore, at least partially, a product of his anti-nuclear beliefs. However, Trudeau
wanted to inject new thinking into Canada’s defence policies and concepts.7 Despite
the completion of a defence review just a year before under Pearson, Trudeau commis-
sioned his own review of Canada’s defence and foreign policy soon after taking office.
Believing Canada to be overextended in the international sphere, Trudeau advocated
for a refocusing on distinctly national aspects of security and called for new ways of
thinking about defence.8 Revising and reducing Canada’s role in NATO fit within
these nationalist priorities.
This chapter will show that Trudeau, unlike Diefenbaker, embarked on a coherent
strategy to gain nationalist support for reneging before negotiating at the international
level. At the elite level, Trudeau consistently empowered the NATO-skeptic group
within the Cabinet who articulated their support for reneging in nationalist terms.
He allowed for these members of Cabinet to participate in debates related to defence,
regardless of their portfolio. He also undercut the influence of powerful status quo
– but then there might have been a real schism in cabinet” (Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.65,
Interviewed on 10-11 February 1987).
5Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.133, Interview with Léo Cadieux on 9 December 1987;
Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.18.
6Gallup Canada Inc., July 1969.
7Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, pp.126-127.
8Ibid.
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supporting officials by rejecting their reports that uncritically supported maintain-
ing Canada’s level of alliance commitment and even commissioning his own report
that would advocate for widespread cuts to alliance commitments.9 At the public
level, Trudeau presented himself as a candidate that represented change for Cana-
dian policies, someone who would question status quo assumptions. He opened the
defence review process, allowing academics to participate and NATO-skeptic members
of Cabinet to publicly speak their mind.10
Ultimately, the government agreed to a compromise: staying in the alliance, but
with reductions to their commitments, which included reneging on their nuclear role.11
Trudeau’s effort to strengthen the hand of the NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet,
especially those who were pushing for Canada to leave the alliance, made it possi-
ble for reneging to be conceived as a ‘compromise’ or less extreme outcome. Thus,
Trudeau co-opted the status quo members of Cabinet and kept his government to-
gether, which inoculated him from the severe domestic audience costs that Diefen-
baker faced. Trudeau had the full agreement of Cabinet before he announced that
Canada would be embarking on a “planned and phased reduction” to its military
contribution to Europe.12 As a result, when negotiations began at the international
level, Trudeau and his government had publicly tied their hands to reneging.
While the Americans initially attempted to push back against Canadian reduc-
tions, both American and NATO negotiators eventually backed down and accepted
substantial reductions to Canada’s commitment. As with the status quo members of
Cabinet, this tolerance was related to their belief in the strength of the nationalist
NATO-skeptic wing within government. This made the Canadian threats to leave the
alliance if their terms were not accepted credible. By conceiving of these reductions as
part of a nationalist, rather than collectivist, policy, Trudeau was able to act unilat-
erally in setting the level of reductions and the agenda for executing them, weakening
the potential for genuine input from allies. The Americans were also wary of at-
tempting to restructure Canada’s position, worried that foreign interference would
only intensify demands for withdrawal.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a background and
overview of the events described in this chapter. It considers whether the outcome
9Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.5-6, 15-16; Halloran, 2006, pp.130-131, 137-138; LAC, CC,
4277, 19 July 1968.
10Fortmann and Larose, 2004.
11Halloran, 2006.
12DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
6. CASE STUDY 3: PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU AND NATO 150
of nuclear withdrawal was already determined by the time Trudeau came into of-
fice. The second section examines the incentives that Trudeau’s government faced to
maintain the status quo. Domestically, Trudeau faced substantial opposition at the
elite level to any major reduction to commitment, which emphasized the potential
costs of reneging. Internationally, both the American and NATO officials strongly
rejected any substantial cuts to Canada’s commitment. They initially pushed back
against Canadian proposals to reduce their commitment. The third section describes
how Trudeau successfully reneged on Canada’s nuclear commitments. At the do-
mestic level, Trudeau formed a nationalist coalition. He strengthened the hand of
the NATO-skeptics in his Cabinet and co-opted officials that supported the status
quo into accepting reneging on Canada’s nuclear role and other conventional com-
mitments. At the international level, officials in the United States’ government and
NATO were ultimately persuaded that they should accept Canadian reductions due
to the nationalist character of Trudeau’s coalition. I outline how this nationalist coali-
tion provided Canadian negotiators with three sources of bargaining power, which led
to a successful reneging attempt: a credible threat of withdrawal, an ability to act
unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.
6.1 Background and Timeline of Events
6.1.1 Decisions Predating the Trudeau Government
While most scholars argue that the Trudeau government was primarily responsible
for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from NATO, some have emphasized that the
seeds of withdrawal were planted by Prime Minister Pearson and that neglect had
reinforced an erosion of commitment.13 When nuclear weapons were first brought
into Canada, the government had only allocated funds for the maintenance of these
weapons until 1968 and estimated that they would require replacement in the late
1960s or early 1970s.14 In 1967, the Pearson government revisited this issue and
13In a memoir written by Trudeau and his advisor Ivan Head, they argue that the matter of force
reductions in Europe “was insignificant compared with the major decision to retire from the nuclear
strike role,” implying that not only was Trudeau a key driver of this decision, but also that his
primary goal in restructuring Canada’s commitment to NATO was to secure nuclear withdrawal
(Head and Trudeau, 1995, p.85). For other scholars that support the argument that Trudeau was
largely responsible for Canadian withdrawal, see Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.3-35; Lennox,
2009, p.66; Paul, 2000, p.63; Trudgen, 2009, pp.52-54.
14DHH, RP, 3178, August 1963; DHH, RP, 2099, 30 September 1963. The run-down of the nuclear
weapons systems was also discussed in Cabinet, with particular emphasis on the Air Division (LAC,
CC, 23709, 9 May 1963; LAC, CC, 25005, 25 March 1964). Interestingly, Defence Minister Hellyer
projected that the nuclear role Brigade would outlast that of the air division. However, the nuclear
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decided not to procure or plan for any replacements for the nuclear delivery systems,
essentially allowing them to be worn down over time.15 In fact, it was suggested in
a telegram from the American Embassy in Canada to the Department of State in
July 1969, that Trudeau’s decision to “de-emphasize” Canada’s role in NATO and
withdraw troops was in part related to “built-in neglect (long pre-dating Trudeau) of
any constructive or farsighted capital equipment plan for military establishment.”16
While this was only one of six factors that were suggested in this telegram, it sill raises
an interesting question: To what extent does path dependency explain the trajectory
of Canadian nuclear sharing policy?17
While these factors created a critical juncture for nuclear decision-making in the
late 1960s that facilitated reneging, the path dependency argument is not a satisfac-
tory explanation for reneging. Firstly, explanation that emphasizes inertia does not
account for the extent to which the decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from Cana-
dian command was a hard-fought and contested decision, both within the Canadian
government and without, which is demonstrated below. Second, a path dependency
or inertia explanation implies that withdrawal should occur when the weapons sys-
tems are obsolete. Outcomes should follow the path of least resistance, making them
more likely to ride out the usable life of these weapons even if their military value has
diminished due to the lessening or changing of the nature of international threats.
However, the nuclear weapons stationed in Europe were withdrawn before the end
of their useful life, according to the government’s own assessments of their nuclear
weapons systems.18
Finally, Pearson would not have withdrawn nuclear weapons in the same time
role of the Brigade ended up being phased out first, with the Honest Johns phased out in 1970, and
the nuclear strike role of the Air Division lasting until 1972.
15Bothwell (2007, p.269) notes that Pearson’s decision to not replace aging equipment had a role
in nuclear withdrawal: “Essentially the government had decided to terminate Canada’s nuclear role
in NATO, by ensuring that Canadian forces were incapable of performing it.” DHH, RP, 2100, 23
March 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 29 June 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 21 July 1967.
16FRUS 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
17In fact, this is a plausible explanation for why Prime Minister Diefenbaker failed in his attempt
to renege on his commitment to bring nuclear weapons into Canada in the early 1960s: the decision
had been announced publicly and the nuclear weapons systems had been purchased and installed.
While inertia could explain withdrawal under Trudeau, the institutional momentum towards nu-
clear sharing could have been the one of the more decisive determinants of Diefenbaker’s failure to
effectively back out of his nuclear commitments. This hypothesis implies that the withdrawal of
nuclear weapons from Canada was largely predetermined, and that the Trudeau government would
only have a minimal impact.
18See, for example, DHH, RP, 2100, 23 March 1967; DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968; DHH, RP,
2105, February 1969. The Defence Policy review projected that the CF-104s could be in service in
a nuclear role until at least 1978.
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frame as Trudeau. In 1967, when Pearson was discussing Canada’s contribution to
NATO for 1968-1972, he asserted that “the present Canadian contribution consti-
tuted ‘the minimum price for club membership.”19 His administration recognised
that withdrawal may be possible in the future, but emphasized the need for the sup-
port of allies and shunned unilateral actions. According to a paper prepared by the
Department of External Affairs, “[A] drastic unilateral reduction of our contribution
either in Europe or North America would negate the principle of collective security
and would likely to affect adversely our relations with the West European countries
and the United States and would reduce the general effectiveness of Canadian foreign
policy.”20 Thus, the timing and mode of withdrawal may have been very different
under different political leadership.21
6.1.2 The Defence Review
Trudeau took office on April 20th 1968, replacing Lester Pearson as leader of the
Liberal Party and Prime Minister of Canada, quickly called an election. On June
25th 1968, Trudeau and the Liberals had a majority in Parliament. The Prime Minis-
ter’s popularity was on the upswing. As Bothwell and Granatstein note, the Liberal
Party “had not won a majority since 1953, and thereafter they gazed at Trudeau
respectfully.”22 Among some groups, the favourable opinion of Canada’s new leader
was so intense that it was referred to as ‘Trudeaumania.’ Domestically, among his
supporters, Trudeau was seen as a young, energetic, and non-conformist leader, who
would enact progressive policies. On the international stage, Trudeau was iconoclas-
tic, calling for a “break with the past” and a review of Canada’s defence and foreign
policy.23 This review would analyse “the fundamentals of Canadian foreign policy to
see whether there are ways in which we can serve more effectively Canada’s current
interests, objectives and priorities.”24 There was a general climate for change in how
Canada conducted itself on the international stage, with the Conservatives calling for
their own review during the 1968 election.25
19LAC, CC, 29624, 12 September 1967.
20DHH, RP, 2103, 22 March 1968.
21Indeed, Léo Cadieux had run for Liberal Party leadership alongside Trudeau in 1968. If Cadieux
had won, Canada’s contribution to NATO would have likely remained unchanged, given his strong
opposition to Trudeau’s effort to restructure Canada’s alliance commitment.
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Trudeau ordered a “comprehensive” review of Canada’s defence policy on May
15th 1968.26After internal and public debate on the nature of Canada’s defence policy
and role in NATO, the Defence Review was finalized and debated in Cabinet on
March 29th and 30th 1969. The Cabinet agreed that Canada will remain in NATO
but diminish its level of military commitments to the Alliance. On April 3rd, Trudeau
announced this decision, calling for “a planned and phased reduction of the size of
the [Canadian] forces in Europe.”27 However, the specifics of this reduction were not
detailed at this time. Canada finalised its proposal for its reduced commitment to
NATO in late May 1969, beginning the international stage of negotiations. Trudeau’s
proposal envisioned substantial reductions: lowering the number of Canadian forces in
Europe from 10,000 to 3,500 and eliminating Canada’s nuclear role. NATO returned
their counter-proposal to Canada on August 3rd, which called for the retention of
Canada’s nuclear strike role and 6,500 troops. Canadians responded with a revised
offer on August 15th. On August 27th, NATO accepted the proposed reductions to
Canada’s NATO forces and roles, including the halving of their troops to 5,000 and
the elimination of their nuclear role by 1972.
6.2 The Incentives to Maintain the Status Quo
This section demonstrates that there was considerable domestic and international op-
position to reneging on Canada’s nuclear commitments to NATO. Therefore, reneging
in this case was not overdetermined, nor was it a foregone conclusion. Officials in the
Canadian government, the Nixon administration, and NATO command opposed and
attempted to resist Trudeau’s effort to reduce Canada’s military role in the Alliance.
According to the institutionalist model of alliance reliability, statesmen should be
reluctant to renege due to fears of specific negative consequences that would arise
from their actions. In my conceptual chapter, I laid out three broad categories of
costs: reputational costs, material costs, and domestic audience costs. This section
will demonstrate that many political elites in Canada did not support major reduc-
tions or complete withdrawal from NATO due to their worries about incurring these
costs. Most members of Trudeau’s cabinet did not support drastic reductions to their
alliance commitments and in favour of maintaining the status quo, at least in the
short term.28 Thus, the structure of incentives that encourages political elites to keep
their commitments still applied in this case, despite the outcome of reneging.
26Ibid., p.126.
27DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
28Bothwell, 2007, p.288.
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This section is divided into three parts. The first part explores the nature of the
support for the status quo in Canada, focusing on officials’ fears of the international
and domestic costs of reneging. The second part explores the United States’ status quo
position. It shows that the Americans initially did not expect the defence review to
produce any major changes to Canada’s role in NATO. Once the extent of reductions
became known to the Nixon administration, American officials emphatically rejected
them. Similarly, the third part demonstrates that NATO attempted to convince
Canada to maintain its commitment to the Alliance to the greatest extent possible,
including retaining its nuclear role.
6.2.1 Canadian Officials’ Status Quo Position
Within Canada, there was broad and influential support for the status quo at the elite
level. The majority of the cabinet supported alignment with NATO and rejected total
withdrawal.29 Chiefly among these Ministers were the Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, and the Minister of National Defence, Léo Cadieux. At every
step of the process, these Ministers tried to reign in Trudeau’s unilateralist tendencies,
dissuade his support for the nationalist coalition of ministers, and prevent major
reductions to Canada’s commitments. Sharp and Cadieux were supported by other
officials within their departments and the military. The Liberal caucus “members
were overwhelmingly in favour of continued participation in NATO.”30 Status quo
officials viewed reneging and unilateral reductions as something that should clearly
be avoided. However, it is important to note that this group was not opposed to
changing Canada’s role in NATO and even reductions to its commitments over a
more gradual timeframe and with consultation with Canada’s allies. While Canada
could reduce its role, it should try to minimize the amount of friction with allies to
the greatest extent possible, so it would not be seen as shirking on its commitments.
Heavy reductions to NATO were specifically labelled as reneging by officials to
highlight the negative features of this course of action on at least one occasion. On
April 23rd 1968, soon after Trudeau called for the Defence Review, the Department
of National Defence Estimates Review Committee discussed a new role for Canada’s
NATO forces. It envisioned a more modest reduction of forces over a longer time-
frame.31 According to the Director of General Force Objectives, W.K. Carr, this
29Bothwell, 2007, p.288.
30LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
31HH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968. Part of this plan involved the withdrawal from Canada’s nuclear
role by 1974/75, if allies were amenable to the new structure.
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gradual plan was appealing because it “did not see Canada reneging on its interna-
tional commitments.”32 Reneging, or even the perception that Canada was reneging
on its commitments, should be avoided.
Status quo oriented officials specifically complained about the rapid and unilat-
eral nature of the reductions that they were forced to contemplate because Trudeau’s
defence review. ‘Unilateralism,’ like reneging, took on a negative connotation. These
officials believed that Canada should not be considering such reductions to their com-
mitments unless they had the explicit support from allies. They were very concerned
with whether the Canadian’s government rationale for reductions would be accepted
by NATO. For example, a Department of Defence memorandum to Cabinet on April
30th 1968, which discussed issues related to inflation and the defence budget, cau-
tioned against a unilateralist approach to Canadian defence policy and highlighted
the importance of allied reaction to wide-scale reductions:
. . . in terms of standards of measurement applied by NATO members,
Canada’s defence expenditures are relatively low.33 It is difficult to see
how Canada could convince its NATO allies that it is essential on eco-
nomic or financial grounds to eliminate Canada’s contribution to the Eu-
ropean integrated NATO forces. Withdrawal, without Canada’s case on
the grounds being accepted by its allies, would be tantamount to Canada
taking a unilateral decision in favour of significantly reduced defence ef-
forts regardless of the consensus of its partners as to the defence needs of
the Alliance.”34
32Ibid.
33Status quo officials highlighted the weak case that Canada had for reneging that would make it
even more likely to garner a negative allied response. Canada’s contribution was already among the
lowest amongst NATO and that allies would therefore not see further reductions as valid. According
to the memorandum: “As a percentage of Gross National Product, which though imperfect, is
the standard of comparison most widely accepted in NATO, Canada’s defence expenditures have
declined not only absolutely but relatively in comparison with those of most of its allies. Measured
according to the common NATO definition, Canada’s defence expenditures dropped from the fourth
highest level in NATO (after the United States, Britain and France) in the peak years of the 1950s
to the fourth lowest level in NATO, exceeding only those of Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg,
in 1967” (DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968).
34DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968. This sentiment was repeated on July 2nd 1968, in an early draft of
the Defence Policy Review document. It argued that if the withdrawal of military forces from NATO
“was undertaken unilaterally and for reasons, such as the need to economize, which its allies would
not consider valid, Canada’s action would affect both NATO and European security relations with the
allies” (DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968). Elsewhere in this document, it highlights that Canada’s formal
and informal obligations could not be unilaterally renounced: “Some of these commitments are of
a legally binding nature embodied in formal government-to-government agreement which cannot be
unilaterally renounced. Others are of a more informal nature but include a moral obligation to
consult with allies before they are substantially altered. In these circumstances, any modification in
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Supporters of the status quo advocated for a more consensus-based approach to al-
liance policy, arguing that if the reductions took place in a different context, they
would be more warmly received by their allies.35 Status quo oriented officials also
highlighted that allies would be more likely to accept withdrawal if it coincided with
the end of the useful life of the weapons systems involved.36 For these reasons, if ma-
jor reductions were necessary, they should not occur immediately, but several years
in the future.
The status quo objections to rapid and unilateral withdrawals are effectively sum-
marized by the Minister of External Affairs Sharp during a Cabinet debate on April
1st 1969:
[H]e had no objection to a phased reduction of Canadian forces in Europe
so long as any reduction was brought about under the umbrella of the
balanced force reduction theories of NATO and were made in the light of,
and dependent upon, prevailing international circumstances. Mr Sharp
cautioned that he believed it unwise and difficult to defend a policy state-
ment which evidenced a unilateral decision to reduce the size of forces in
Europe without qualifications to the extent that he recommended.37
Thus, these officials would only support reductions if they were not too drastic, if the
allied support was obtained, and if Canada would adopt a consensus-based approach
to intra-alliance negotiations.
6.2.1.1 Reputational Costs
Those that supported the status quo emphasized that reneging on alliance commit-
ments would have a negative impact on Canada’s status, prestige, and influence. As
early as April 22nd 1968, officials within the Canadian government worried about the
reputational implications of a reduction to their military role. The Deputy Minister of
Canada’s defence policy and the commitments which flow from them should be planned far enough
in advance to allow for orderly adjustments to be made in consultations with Canada’s allies” (DHH,
RP, 2101, 2 July 1968).
35DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968. As stated in the July 2nd draft of the Defence Policy Review, “If
the withdrawal [of all Canadian forces from NATO] had the agreement of Canada’s allies – because
a peace settlement in Germany had been reached; or because it formed part of an agreement with
the Russians for mutual reduction of the external forces in Europe; or because Canadian troops were
needed elsewhere for an important undertaking such as a peacekeeping operation in Vietnam – the
[negative] impact might be negligible.”
36DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968; DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
37LAC, CC, 2870, 1 April 1969.
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National Defence, E.B. Armstrong, and the Under-Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs, Marcel Cadieux, argued that a drastic reduction to their defence expenditures38
would affect Canada’s standing within NATO:
[Armstrong] suggested that there was a point [of defence expenditures]
below which they could not drop and have Canada regarded as a serious
ally. He wondered if Canada had now reached this stage. Mr. Cadieux
said he was inclined to agree. There had been some quiet questioning as
to where Canada was going in NATO.39
The idea that Canada needed to make a certain minimum level of contribution to be
considered a “serious ally” was also repeated in a meeting the next day.40
Other officials worried that reneging would reduce Canada’s influence on the world
stage more generally. According to these officials Canada’s main vehicle of interna-
tional influence was its membership in multilateral alliances, if it reduced its com-
mitments or withdrew outright, Canada would not be able to exercise this power.
According to the Canadian Vice Chief of Defence Staff, alliance membership and
international influence were tightly connected:
in order for Canada to have access to world councils to present its ideas and
be listen to, Canada must demonstrate that it was accepting a military
responsibility. Canada’s relations with the Unites States would deteriorate
and its influence would be reduced if, for example, Canadian land and air
forces were pulled out of NATO and only those maritime forces required
for sovereignty purposes were provided. Canadian relations with Europe
would be similarly affected.41
In the April 30th memorandum to Cabinet on the defence review, the Minister of
Defence highlighted that substantial reductions to its alliance commitments would
damage relations with both the Europeans and the Americans, warning that the US
“would be hostile to our withdrawal.”42 He also noted that Canada’s multilateral
influence in Europe would be weakened as a result of reneging: “Whether or not
38This conversation concerns Canada’s overall defence expenditures, which were under strain from
budgetary cuts to defence, and not reductions to specific defence commitments. However, the worry
that Canada could not reduce its defence contribution to NATO any more to NATO without drawing
serious questions still applies to Canada’s direct contributions to NATO.
39DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.
40DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968.
41Ibid.
42DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968.
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our allies would be prepared to have us continue in NATO, we should be effectively
excluded from the councils of Europe in the formative period when European settle-
ment, the shape of which is important to us, is being worked out.”43 The importance
of NATO for Canada’s influence over European policy was reiterated in a similar
way in the July 2nd draft of the Defence Review: “Canada has no institutional link
with Europe other than the NATO connection, and loses its influence in the councils
which are shaping Europe’s future.”44 These worries about Canada’s loss of repu-
tation within NATO were repeated during the major debate within Cabinet on the
Defence Review in March 1969. According to the Leader of the Government in the
Senate, Paul Martin, Canada’s influence and power on the world stage would suffer
if they disengaged from NATO:
Senator Martin said that Canada’s influence in NATO was considerable. . .
Canada’s relations with other governments would undeniably suffer in the
event of withdrawal; especially our relations with the United States. . .
Legally, within the terms of the treaty, Canada could decide to make no
military contribution, but we would not have any influence.45
Thus, status quo officials articulated a clear understanding of the potential reputa-
tional costs of reneging and withdrawal. They believed that defecting on alliance
commitments would not only affect Canada’s standing within NATO, but could also
affect its relations and influence with allies beyond the military sphere.
6.2.1.2 Material Costs
The status quo officials within the Canadian government worried about the material
costs of reneging on their commitments to NATO. Their concerns over material costs
can be divided into two main categories: strategic and economic. At the more abstract
level, Canadian officials worried that reneging would increase international instability
and weaken the Western Alliance relative to the Warsaw Pact. Others had more
specific strategic concerns: that substantial Canadian defections would lead to the
unravelling of the alliance or would lead to their ejection from NATO. The negative
material effects that concerned these officials were not limited to the strategic realm.
Many worried that reneging on their commitments to NATO or exiting the alliance
would lead to negative repercussions on the trade relationship between Canada and
its allies.
43Ibid.
44DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
45LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
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A common theme among those supporting the status quo was the risk of increased
instability as a result of substantial Canadian reductions to its military commitments.
While NATO primarily defended Europe, it was still the most likely location of conflict
and even general war. Weakening NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact therefore carried
the risk of increased tensions and insecurity for Canada: “NATO was thus of direct
benefit to Canada since trouble in Europe would involve Canada.”46 This point
was highlighted by the Secretary of State for External Affairs during the debate in
Cabinet at the end of March 1969: “In fact, Europe was the only place where a nuclear
confrontation could escalate from a local conflict to destroy Canada,” meaning that
“[i]t was in Canada’s own interest to be there [in Europe] to play a vital role.”47
The likely effect of increased tensions was especially important to consider since
a decision to reduce Canada’s contribution would create pressures and knock-on ef-
fects for other members of the Alliance. During a Department of National Defence
estimates and review committee meeting on April 22nd , Mr. Cadieux, the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, drew a stark connection between the impor-
tance of Europe for Canada’s national security and the likelihood that Canada would
incite a chain reaction of military reductions among its allies:
From a U.S. point of view, withdrawal of Canadian forces in Europe could
lead to pressure in the U.S. to run down its forces. This would create
difficulties for the U.S. partnership with Western Europe which it was
in Canada’s security interest to preserve. When talking about Canada’s
membership in and contribution to NATO one was in fact talking about
prospects for peace in Europe and consequently about Canada’s security
and indirectly Canadian independence and even national unity.48
The concern that Canadian actions would inspire further reductions to the Alliance
repeated itself throughout the discussions on Canada’s role in NATO. In the April 30th
memorandum to Cabinet, the Minister of Defence describes the potential damaging
consequences to NATO of a unilateral withdrawal or reduction by Canada, implying
that this could result in a domino effect of withdrawal:
unilateral action by Canada without an alliance consensus as to defence
reductions might set in motion a chain of reductions by other members
of the Alliance, all of whom face severe budgetary pressures which could
46DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.
47LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
48DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968.
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seriously weaken the organization in the year 1969, when legal withdrawal
from the Treaty becomes possible.49
The Minister went on to detail the severe security implications of such a chain reac-
tion:
This in turn could:
(a) endanger the security system which has preserved stability in Eu-
rope in spite of two crises over Berlin, revolt in Eastern Europe and
countless wars on other continents;
(b) jeopardize recent improvements in East-West Relations;
(c) erode the framework which now contains German nationalism and
risk a recurrence of German militarism;
(d) influence adversely the German approach to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty
(e) weaken the confidence in support being forthcoming from North
America, which is still essential to European security; and
(f) undermine Western negotiating position on balanced force reductions
in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact and thus prejudice the
achievement of an orderly drawing down of the massive confrontation
of military force in Europe.50
In the July 2nd draft of the defence review, this potential chain reaction was noted
again. The draft report emphasized that reneging could create pressures for the
United States to reduce its own commitments to NATO, which, in turn could encour-
age Germany to develop an independent nuclear arsenal to make up this shortfall:
A Canadian decision to withdraw forces could have a disrupting effect in
Europe. All NATO governments face budgetary pressures, and a decision
to reduce Canadian forces in Europe and in effect to reject the principle
of collective defence could have a multiplier effect. The US administra-
tion is concerned that such Canadian action, taken on the grounds such
as that Canada had the need to economize and that the Europeans were
49DHH, RP, 2101, 30 April 1968.
50Ibid.
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now wealthy enough to provide for their own defence, might generate ir-
resistible Congressional pressure in favour of substantial US withdrawals
from Europe. In this situation, Germany might be left to provide a dan-
gerously large share of Europe’s ground forces, and might face strength-
ened domestic pressure to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The Russians
would be less interested in working toward a compromise settlement of
the German problem or in agreeing to mutual force reductions.51
Essentially, the withdrawal or major reduction of Canadian forces could contribute
to the “destruction of the credibility of NATO.”52
Status quo officials were especially worried that reductions to its bilateral and
multilateral commitments would lead to punishment, particularly by the Americans.
In a meeting on April 23rd 1968, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff described Canada’s
dependence on the US for the provision of its own security: it relied on the US not only
through defensive alliances, but also for equipment and intelligence.53 This reliance
on the US for the provision “of its own sovereignty defence requirements” meant that
“Canada must pay the price for this help or risk the chance of it being denied.”54
The sentiment that Canada would essentially be ‘free-riding’ if it reduced its forces
in NATO was repeated by Senator Paul Martin during Cabinet discussions on the
Defence Review: “This government should not take advantage of the NATO security
system without discharging responsibility for its maintenance.”55
The negative economic repercussions that would result from reneging were another
key theme in these documents and discussions. The July 2nd draft of the Defence
Policy Review specified the negative economic impact for Canada if they adopted
neutrality and pulled out of its alliances with the United States:
Our defence cooperation with the U.S.A. had helped materially in reach-
ing economic arrangements with the U.S. Government which are of great
material importance to Canada and which we would forfeit if we adopted a
neural policy. Two examples are: the overland exemption for Canadian oil
exports to the U.S.A., and the Canada-U.S.A. defence production sharing
arrangements. Termination of the latter would have a major impact on
51DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
52LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969. Spoken by the Leader of the Senate, Paul Martin.
53DHH, RP, 2103, 23 April 1968.
54Ibid.
55LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
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our defence industries which involve sales of some $600 million. In addi-
tion we could not automatically expect the U.S.A. to be disposed to enter
new areas of economic cooperation similar to the auto parts agreement;
nor could we count on the U.S.A. to be as forthcoming in making special
arraignments with Canada in the financial field.56
Although this passage relates to the impacts of an extreme scenario - Canada be-
coming a neutral power, it still reflects the potential economic vulnerabilities that
Canada faced if its relationship with the United States deteriorated as a result of
Canada reneging on its commitments. Indeed, this document highlights this point:
“Canada’s position as a major exporter of primary and manufactured products, and
its need for large imports of development capital, make it dependent to a consider-
able degree on the good will of the United States and Western Europe (including
Britain.)”57 By reducing its military role in Europe, Canada risked having a re-
duced economic relationship with European countries, which in turn could increase
its dependence on the United States.
The economic costs of reneging were again brought up during Cabinet discussions
on Canada’s role in NATO. Sharp highlighted the negative repercussions that could
be expected from the United States if Canada tried to withdraw its troops from
Europe:
In this context, Cabinet Ministers should not under-estimate Canada’s in-
fluence in contributing to [international] stability. If the Canadian govern-
ment was found to undercut that position, reaction in the United States
would be profound. We expect to be treated in a special commercial
sense in wheat negotiations, oil transactions, and in the exchange of de-
fence information. The government should not necessarily expect that
such special treatment to continue.58
While Sharp expected that less extreme reductions would “gain tacit approval” he
warned that such action should be “made in consultation with our allies as part of
the NATO policy of balanced force reductions.”59 Thus, unilateralist reneging was
rejected by status quo officials because of their fears of high material costs.
56DHH, RP, 2101, 2 July 1968.
57Ibid.
58LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
59Ibid.
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6.2.1.3 Domestic Audience Costs
Status quo defenders in the Canadian government seemed less concerned – or at least
less vocally concerned – with domestic audience costs compared to the potential in-
ternational costs that they associated with reneging. Occasionally, officials would
mention that they thought that the blowback from defecting on Canada’s commit-
ments would have negative consequences for Canadian “national unity.”60 Other
members of the government worried that drastic reductions to Canadian forces in
Europe would have a negative effect on morale of Canadian troops.61
Interestingly, despite the support for NATO within the Liberal caucus and public
at large, officials did not vocalize fears that reneging on their commitments would lead
to negative electoral consequences. The lack of fear is perhaps related to the fact that
Trudeau was just elected to office and therefore unlikely to experience direct electoral
consequences for reneging. However, Trudeau still could have experienced domestic
audience costs in the form of lowered approval of him and his administration. Indeed,
this could have been a concern considering the positive view of NATO within the
public at large.62
There was also a risk of domestic fallout from alienating the United States. While
at this time, anti-American sentiments were on the upswing due to the opposition
to the Vietnam war and the United States’ Cold War adventurism, this was not
necessarily the view of the entirety of the public. According to Bothwell, polling
showed that most Canadians had a favourable view of the United States and the
current state of Canadian foreign policy:
Polls taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s showed that a majority of
Canadians had positive views of the United States and Americans. Fifty-
eight percent told interviewers that the United States was Canada’s “best
friend.”63
To avoid domestic audience costs, a nationalist coalition needed to be carefully con-
structed, especially given the support for the status quo at the elite level.
Trudeau was concerned with the potential negative fallout if he pushed status quo
Ministers too far and they resigned from Cabinet.64 Keeping his government together
would inoculate Trudeau from the domestic audience costs associated with reneging
60DHH, RP, 2101, 22 April 1968; DHH, RP, 2104, 28 February 1969.
61LAC, CC, 2870, 1 April 1969; DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969.
62Gallup Canada Inc., October 1968.
63Bothwell, 2007, p.285.
64Ibid., p.288.
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that Diefenbaker had suffered after the collapse of his Cabinet. Co-opting supporters
of the status quo within his Cabinet – especially the Ministers of National Defence
and External Affairs – was an important element of Trudeau’s strategy and will be
discussed further below.
In summary, Canadian officials were aware of the potential costs of reneging.
Officials that were against drastic and unilateral reductions to NATO commitments
justified their stance with extensive references to the reputational and material costs
of reneging. While the potential domestic costs of reneging were not emphasized,
they were still present in this case.
6.2.2 The United States’ Status Quo Position
American officials were aware of and interested in the defence review. They took a
specific interest in the review’s implications for Canada’s role in NATO. These officials
hoped to influence Canadian decision-making towards maintaining its commitments.
A series of messages sent in early February 1969 from the Department of State and
the American embassy in Ottawa discuss a potential meeting between the President
and Prime Minister. They reveal that the American ambassador to Canada, Harold
Linder, thought that there were “advantages” to remaining ambiguous about the rea-
sons behind a delay to an official meeting between Nixon and Trudeau.65 Within
Canada, there were questions as to whether the lack of American initiative in arrang-
ing this meeting indicated discontent over some aspect of Trudeau’s policy. Linder
specifically highlights NATO as a potential policy area that the Americans would like
to influence: “There may be some advantages in permitting Canadians to speculate
that absence of arrangement for Canadian-US meeting is attributable to some US
dissatisfaction with GOC China policy or questioning of their role in NATO [sic].”66
Thus, this message demonstrates the Americans’ desire to dissuade the Canadians
from reducing or questioning their role in NATO.
The timing that was suggested for this meeting also demonstrates that the Amer-
icans hoped to influence Canadian policy. While Linder saw benefits to delay, he
ultimately recommended that a firm response to the Canadian be drafted due to “the
closeness and importance of US-Canadian relations,” in order to provide the Cana-
dians with reassurance.67 An official visit to the US by Prime Minister Trudeau was
65RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 7 February 1969.
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
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considered and approved soon after Linder’s message.68 The Department of State
wanted the meeting to occur in late March in order to maximize US influence over
Canadian decision-making on the soon-to-be-completed defence review. According
to a telegram sent from the US Secretary of State William Rogers, “We believe visit
should precede completion GOC foreign policy review order provide Canadian officials
with opportunity learning first hand US thinking on international issues and permit
them consult in advance of final decisions.”69 President Nixon approved March 24-25
as the date for his meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau, in line with the Secretary’s
recommendation.70
A week before the meeting, an advance copy of a research memorandum on the
Canadian foreign and defence policy reviews was sent to Secretary Rogers. The
memorandum was prepared by Thomas L. Hughes from the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research and outlined the rationale and expected conclusions of the Canadian
defence and foreign policy review.71 This document reveals that American officials
projected that the Canadians would not greatly reduce their forces in Europe and
that withdrawal from NATO was an extremely unlikely option. This expectation is
clearly laid out in the abstract of the memorandum:
Few radical policy changes are expected to emerge from the defense review.
Private statements by government officials and public announcements by
Cabinet ministers suggest that Canada will hold steady to its present
course. Ottawa will probably choose to maintain perhaps somewhat re-
duced but at least minimal forces in Europe and to continue its NORAD
membership — just recently renewed for five years.72
This memorandum was particularly firm on the notion that Canada would not with-
draw from NATO. It argues that while options like neutrality or total withdrawal had
been considered by the Canadian government, they were ultimately “rejected as too
68Ibid. Linder’s message is sent on February 7th, the official visit is under consideration by
February 13th, and by February 18th a message is sent to the US Embassy in Ottawa inviting the
Prime Minister to Washington for an official visit. See RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 13
February 1969; RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 18 February 1969.
69RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 13 February 1969. While the message only refers to
the foreign policy review, it is plausible that they meant the defence review. The defence review
was set to be completed in late March, while the foreign policy review was not completed for several
years after this date. Regardless, it seems likely that the international issues that Secretary Rogers
refers to would include matters that were under discussion for the defence review.
70RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 18 February 1969.
71RN, NSC, Box 670; Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 17 March 1969.
72Ibid.
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expensive, not feasible, or undesirable.”73 Indeed, the “Trudeau Government seems
to be concluding that Canada’s membership in NATO and NORAD is a “bargain”
because it enables Canada to have its voice heard to an extent far greater than its
size and contributions would seem to warrant.”74 This report projected that Canada
may still have incentives to reduce its military role in NATO in the future due to the
military costs of maintaining forces and replacing obsolete equipment. Even then,
withdrawal will still be undesirable, as Canada would want to maintain political in-
fluence in NATO’s councils. Many of these points reflect those made by status quo
officials within the Canadian government.
This optimism about the Canadian position can be related to some ‘objective’ fac-
tors cited in the memorandum, such as the fact that the majority of Canadian officials
supported the status quo and that a Gallup poll indicated that “64% [of the Canadian
public] favoured Canada’s maintaining its forces in Europe”.75 The memorandum’s
incorrect projection of the course of the defence review may also be related to its
sources of information and how they weighed their relative importance. It seems that
the writer of this report relied heavily on both Minister Sharp and status quo oriented
Canadian officials as being representative of government policy as a whole. It also
underestimates Trudeau’s alignment with the NATO-skeptics. The report tends to
refer to both Trudeau and Sharp together, which creates the impression of alignment
over their defence policy. While the report states that Trudeau’s public position has
been ambiguous – at times supporting the status quo and other times supporting
NATO skepticism – the report also tends to highlight his pro-NATO statements and
actions.
During the Canadian official visit to Washington in March 1969, American officials
tried to influence Canada in favour of maintaining its commitment to NATO. While
a transcript of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the President is not
available, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on March 25th in preparation for a
meeting with the Prime Minister. This message indicates that Nixon may have tried
to dissuade Trudeau from making substantial reductions to NATO in this meeting:
In your private conversation you may wish to probe Trudeau further on




76On the previous day, Sharp informed Kissinger that the Defence Review would be finalized
shortly. According to the transcript of their conversation, while Sharp outlined some aspects of the
NATO skeptic position, he did not link this to Trudeau or express this concern, see RN, NSC, Box
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entourage have expressed concern that he is still flirting with reducing
Canada’s role in NATO; they believe some low key remarks by you in
private might be beneficial. In particular you may wish to say that
– your trip convinced you of the continued vitality of NATO;
– your examination of the common threat that still faces us has con-
vinced you of the continued need of the alliance;
– you consider full Canadian participation in NATO one of the al-
liance’s great strengths and mutually reinforcing with our own par-
ticipation;
—you are convinced that the era of negotiation we are entering re-
quires the maintenance of our joint strength and you envisage NATO
as playing a key role through consultation and mutual exchange of
information.77
Kissinger made similar remarks to Sharp during their meeting on March 24th, which
was recorded in memoranda of their conversation. Kissinger emphasised the impor-
tance of NATO, especially the importance of cohesion and maintaining force levels
after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia:
[The US] attached great importance to continuity and strength in NATO.
There had been obvious changes in attitude among the European members
of the alliance after Czechoslovakia. They no longer talked about troop
reductions but saw the need for effective NATO forces. At the least, the
qualitative performance of the troops could be improved.78
When the discussion turned to the Canadian foreign policy and defence reviews,
Kissinger again emphasized the importance of NATO and conventional improvements
to the alliance in light of Czechoslovakia, arguing that NATO’s “conventional forces
were not now strong enough to carry out the role assigned to them.”79 Thus, in these
meetings, American officials signalled that they would oppose significant reductions
to Canada’s commitment to NATO.
Despite American predictions about the defence review and their efforts to influ-
ence its outcome, the Canadians still opted for substantial reductions to their NATO
670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969b.
77FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.92, 25 March 1969.
78RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969a.
79RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969b.
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commitments. Minister Cadieux specified Canada’s plans for these cuts to the US
Secretary of Defence Laird on May 26 1969. Canada proposed a reduction of forces
from 10,000 to 3,500, the complete withdrawal of Canada’s mechanized brigade, in-
cluding the nuclear-armed Honest John, and the removal of all nuclear strike aircraft
by 1972.80 This would amount to Canada reneging on its nuclear role in NATO.
According to a telegram from the US mission at NATO to the State Department,
which recounted the meeting, Laird reacted extremely negatively to this proposal:
Secretary Laird expressed surprise that cut was so deep and disappoint-
ment that it was described as non-negotiable when there should be NATO
consultation; warned that Canadian action might be “disastrous” by con-
tagion within the alliance; and criticized making a security decision for the
reasons of domestic popularity. . . When Cadieux asked SECDEF [Laird]
to say frankly what he thought of Canadian plan, Secretary said, “I think
it’s a mistake.”81
From this interaction, Americans clearly signalled their opposition to Canada’s pro-
posed defection on their commitments. According to the US NATO cable, which
“was seen and approved” by Secretary Laird, they advised that the US should “resist
Cadieux’s natural tendency to put as positive a face on GOC action. . . and to en-
courage European allies to be voluble in their protestations.”82 The Americans were
therefore initially open to taking a strong stance against the Canadians to pressure
them into maintaining their commitments to the greatest extent possible.
The State Department called the for a meeting between the American Ambas-
sador to Canada and Sharp to convey the United States’ displeasure and surprise.83
While it is unclear whether this meeting took place,84 this State Department telegram
reveals both the extent to which and the rationale behind the American opposition
to Canadian reductions from NATO:
80RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 26 May 1969.
81Ibid.
82Ibid. See also RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 27 May 1969.
83RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 26 May 1969. This telegram also recommended calling
in the Canadian Ambassador to the United States to object to the reductions, see also RN, NSC,
Box 670; Vol.1 2 of 2, 28 May 1969.
84Advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt appealed directly to Henry Kissinger to soften the tone of the
message conveyed to the Canadians and to prevent the calling in of the Canadian Ambassador, see
RN, NSC, Box 670; Vol.1 2 of 2, 28 May 1969. According to a hand-written note on this document,
Kissinger “discussed [this] with [under-Secretary] Richardson on May 29.” However, it is unclear
whether Sonnenfeldt was successful. I could not locate a record of what action (if any) the Americans
took, see also FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969.
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Ambassador should seek immediate appointment with Sharp and make a
parallel presentation along following lines:
(a) We are deeply concerned85 at the size of the proposed reductions in
Canada’s force commitments in Europe and by the speed with which
the GOC plans to carry them out. We are also disturbed at the GOC
characterization of the proposals as “non-negotiable.”
(b) From previous Canadian statements we had been led to believe that
the size and timing of the reductions were to be subject to genuine
consultation with the other members of the Alliance. We hope that
this will still prove to be the case.
(c) GOC needs no reminder of the broader security interests of Canada
and the United States in political and military stability in Western
Europe. Existing unsettled state of affairs scarcely seems an appro-
priate time for North American members of the alliance to reduce
their forces, hence their influence on events on other side of North
Atlantic. Particularly, there has been no change in either political or
military situation affecting East-West relations which would warrant
significant reductions at this time.
(d) Canadian actions will have an unravelling effect on Alliance as result
of sharp and sudden Canadian force reduction. In particular, effect
on ability of US and other Allies to maintain level of forces in Europe
cannot be ignored.
(e) Moreover, because of US interest and concern with the matter, we
feel “non-negotiable” aspect of proposals is not consistent with the
“new era of consultation” initiated at the time of Trudeau-Nixon
meeting.
(f) In light of foregoing, we would hope GOC will undertake to provide
for genuine consultation within the Alliance and that FOC will be
prepared to take into account Allied views in light of that consulta-
tion.86
Thus, the Americans initially reacted in the way that the status quo officials predicted.
It was deeply opposed to major reductions from NATO, viewing them as strategically
85Initial draft read “shocked.”
86RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 26 May 1969.
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unwarranted and destabilizing, potentially leading to an ‘unravelling’ of the Alliance.
In point c, the connection between alliance commitment and Canada’s international
influence is emphasized. Lastly, the Americans objected to the unilateral nature of
the process of reductions, calling for a more consensus-based approach.
The Nixon administration was also facing domestic pressure to cut their own
contributions to NATO.87 The Canadian reductions would only give more power to
these domestic forces and may create an irresistible momentum towards military
cuts. At this time, there was mounting Congressional pressure to withdraw forces
from Europe in light of the Vietnam war. During a joint-cabinet meeting with the
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mitchell Sharp, the American Secretary of State
warned that Canadian reductions “might suggest to some in the Congress that the
United States ought to pursue a policy along the same lines. The prospects of a
snowball were not encouraging here or elsewhere in the alliance.”88 American officials
hoped to stave off this pressure by undercutting the Canadian position.
6.2.3 NATO’s Status Quo Position
NATO’s position was aligned with the United States and was specifically opposed to
Canada withdrawing from its nuclear role.89 NATO command also rejected Canada’s
initial proposal for its reconfigured and reduced role. Communications between Cana-
dian and NATO officials reveal that NATO command believed that substantial reduc-
tions along the lines that Canada was proposing would severely weaken the alliance.
Like the Americans, they were also worried about a contagion or an unravelling effect
for the alliance.
Representatives from SHAPE consistently advocated for Canada to retain as many
commitments as possible. Importantly, they wanted Canada to keep its nuclear strike
role for its CF-104s, even if cuts were absolutely necessary. In an assessment of
the Canadian proposal sent to Cadieux in July 1969, SACEUR General Goodpaster
concluded that Canada should not follow through on its proposed reductions and
tried to encourage the Canadians to back down:
87FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.
88Ibid.
89Individual allied countries also objected to Canada’s proposed reductions. According to Granat-
stein and Bothwell (1990, p.28), after Cadieux revealed the details to its allies at a NATO meeting,
“The Belgians and the Dutch were deeply shaken, the Belgian defence minister actually bursting
into tears at the news.”
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SHAPE strongly recommends that Canadian authorities reconsider their
proposal with the objective of maintaining, as nearly as possible, their cur-
rent military strength, organizational structure and mission assignment in
Europe. SHAPE is prepared to participate in this reconsideration through
consultations with the Canadian authorities.90 [emphasis added]
More specifically, Goodpaster emphasized the importance of Canada’s nuclear role
within the larger context in the alliance. He highlighted that there was “no military
justification” for the kind of reductions that the Canadians were proposing, par-
ticularly in the Central Front, where Canadian forces were based: “SHAPE strongly
supports the retention of the present Canadian contribution in Europe. Current forces
are very thin in the central region resulting in marginal capability.”91 He emphasised
that Canada’s air force contribution was “among the most effective in Europe in
the [nuclear] strike and reconnaissance role respectively” and that the withdrawal of
Canada’s strike force would amount to a 11% reduction in the overall nuclear capabil-
ity of the Allied Forces in Central Europe. 92 A Canadian withdrawal from its nuclear
strike role “would have an adverse effect. . . on the credibility of the deterrent.”93
SHAPE produced a counterproposal on August 3rd, which tried to minimize the ex-
tent of Canada’s reductions and reinforce the view that any diminishment of Canada’s
role was detrimental from a military standpoint.94 They suggested that Canada retain
a substantially higher number of forces within Europe: “If reductions are mandatory
because of non-military factors, the SHAPE preferred alternative would be for forces
in Europe of a strength of 8300. . . as a minimum target.”95 However, SHAPE rep-
resentatives recognized that this figure was unlikely to gain much traction with the
Canadians, and noted that they would accept a force of 6500.96 It also emphasized
that Canada should retain its nuclear role: “[f]or the Air Force element a ‘meaning-
ful role’ should entail participation in the strategy of MC 14/3 i.e., it should have
both strike (nuclear) and attack (conventional) capability.”97 SHAPE envisioned that
90DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.
91Ibid. This assessment was directly at odds with what many NATO-skeptics in Cabinet were
arguing. As will be discussed below, the Prime Minister and other NATO-skeptic Canadian Ministers
argued that that there was no military value to the Canadian contribution, that it was a marginal
force, and a political token.
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94DHH, RP, 2530, 3 August 1969. It appears that this proposal was reviewed and endorsed by
the United States, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
95DHH, RP, 2530, 3 August 1969.
96Ibid.
97Ibid.
6. CASE STUDY 3: PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU AND NATO 172
Canada would retain two nuclear strike squadrons, according to their proposed force
breakdown.98
NATO justified their status quo position in a variety of ways, which reflected those
articulated by Canadian and American officials. They argued that the current Cana-
dian contribution had military value and any substantial withdrawals would weaken
the alliance as a whole. They also highlighted that such unilateral withdrawals were
outside of the framework of balanced mutual force reductions, a commitment that
had been reaffirmed in NATO on May 29th 1969.99 The precise timing of Canada’s
withdrawals from NATO was also particularly bad, as the US and the USSR were
“preparing for negotiations over reciprocal reductions in their military forces in Eu-
rope.”100 Finally, they worried that the Canadian withdrawal would have a domino
effect across the alliance “if other countries with tight budgets followed the Canadian
example.”101
In summary, Trudeau and his government faced considerable international pres-
sure to retain their commitments. There was a sizeable status quo faction within the
government that believed reneging would entail large material and reputational costs.
The strong opposition emanating from the United States and NATO seemed to sup-
port their concerns. How, then, did Trudeau manage to renege, while still managing
to keep his Cabinet together and avoid severe domestic audience costs?
6.3 Nationalist Coalitions and Reneging
Trudeau’s successful reneging strategy can be summarized as a two-step process, with
each step corresponding to each ‘level’ of the two-level game. First, Trudeau con-
structed a nationalist coalition at the domestic level. Next, he used this nationalist
coalition as leverage at the international level to gain allied acceptance and mitigate
the costs of reneging. As demonstrated in the section above, Trudeau faced both
domestic and international opposition to reneging. Trudeau took on each locus of
resistance sequentially. This strategy was the key to his success: by having Cabinet
agree to substantial reductions to its NATO commitments before initiating negotia-
tions with NATO, Trudeau ensured that his fiercest critics were co-opted. Because of
the convention of Cabinet solidarity within the Canadian political system, Ministers
were required to fall behind the government’s policy or resign, regardless of their
98Ibid.
99DHH, RP, 2530, 19 July 1969.
100Fortmann and Larose, 2004, p.538.
101DHH, RP, 2530, 28 August 1969.
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personal feelings. This strategy allowed Canadian negotiators to present a united
front, with a clear set of demands and a credible threat of withdrawal to their NATO
counterparts, clearing the path for reneging.
The first section concentrates on how Trudeau secured the support of a nationalist
coalition that favoured reneging and co-opted the status quo members of Cabinet.
While Trudeau’s popularity and status as Prime Minister skewed the balance of power
in Cabinet, Trudeau also behaved strategically to empower the nationalist members
of Cabinet that were skeptical of NATO. Ultimately, major reductions to Canada’s
role in NATO became a “compromise” solution between the status quo members of
Cabinet and those that wanted to completely withdraw from the Alliance.102 The next
section examines how Canada succeeded in securing these major reductions during its
international-level negotiations with NATO. It will show how Canadian negotiators
used the backing of this nationalist coalition to gain bargaining power through three
mechanisms related to the nature of the support for reductions: a credible threat of
withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to restructuring.
6.3.1 Domestic Level: Trudeau’s Formulation of a National-
ist Coalition
Trudeau’s nationalist domestic coalition did not represent an external force on the
Prime Minister that forced him to renege on Canada’s NATO commitments.103 Rather,
it was consolidated by Trudeau himself after he became Prime Minister in April 1968.
Trudeau was skeptical of Canada’s Cold War commitments, particularly its nuclear
role within NATO and NORAD.104 He had opposed nuclear acquisition to the extent
that he renounced the Liberal Party during the 1963 election and campaigned for the
New Democratic Party in support of their anti-nuclear platform.105 While he even-
tually joined the Liberal Party in 1965, Trudeau’s stance against nuclear weapons
had not abated. During a Cabinet debate on NORAD in 1967, Trudeau, then Min-
ister of Justice, expressed his wish that Canada’s nuclear commitments should be
re-examined.106 Trudeau also noted in his memoirs that during the defence review
process, he had prioritized the withdrawal of Canada’s nuclear role from NATO.107
102Halloran, 2006, p.125.
103However, Trudeau was not necessarily unique - there was a rising tide of skepticism about
Canada’s commitments, see Bothwell, 2007; Halloran, 2006.
104Bothwell, 2007, pp.278-280; Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.7-8.
105Bothwell, 2007, pp.280.
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However, Trudeau’s questioning of Canada’s alliance commitments went beyond
its nuclear role. He argued that Canada’s priorities needed to be reoriented. Specifi-
cally, they needed to be refocused towards the provision of national security, towards
North America and away from Europe. During a Cabinet debate on Canada’s role in
NATO, the Prime Minister mused,
[A]n observer would find it strange that Canadian troops were off con-
tributing to the defence of Europe to impress politically our friends while
leaving exposed our vast coastline, our territorial seas, and air space. . . the
policy was inverted. We should be protecting our internal security, de-
fending our three seas, and then considering other possible international
commitments. It was not logical or rational not to protect that which
was ours. . . Forces in situ, however, should first be in Canada to defend
Canadian interests.”108
Trudeau saw NATO as a primarily one-sided arrangement, where Canada was on
the losing end. Trudeau himself can be seen as representing the nationalist view
of Canada’s defence priorities, calling for widespread reductions to its international
commitments, with a particular interest in withdrawing from Canada’s nuclear role
in NATO.
There were several benefits Trudeau hoped to reap with this policy, aside from
a reassertion of Canadian sovereignty. More practically, these defence commitments
were expensive, and Canada’s budget was coming under increasing strain.109 Cuts to
military spending, while free-riding on the security benefits of the Western Alliance,
presented itself as a low-hanging fruit to save money without affecting the life of
everyday Canadians. In addition, among certain sectors of Canadian society there
was increasing skepticism towards the United States and its military adventurism,
especially in Vietnam.110 According to Fortmann and Larose, Trudeau was embedded
within an “emerging strategic counterculture,” in which academics questioned many
of the fundamental bases of Canadian defence policy, including its role in NATO
and close alignment with the United States.111 However, this was not necessarily the
majority view within Canada.112
108LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
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Soon after taking office, Trudeau ordered a review of Canada’s defence policy on
May 15th 1968.113 He also quickly called an election, which resulted in a landslide elec-
toral victory for the Liberals in June 1968. During the election, Trudeau promised to
re-examine Canada’s foreign and defence policy.114 The timing of the defence review
allowed Trudeau to capitalise on his electoral success and widespread popularity.115
Cabinet Ministers acknowledged Trudeau’s place at the top of the political order, ac-
cording to Bothwell: “Trudeau was in a strong position vis-à-vis his Cabinet. . . ‘We’re
here because he’s here,’ ministers said. Trudeau was not only prime minister: he was
party chieftain.”116 Thus, the 1968 election primed the Canadian public for change
and gave Trudeau the legitimacy to push for a reassessment of Canada’s alliance
commitments. However, the outcome of the review was still uncertain.
Although Trudeau’s Cabinet was divided on the issue of Canada’s commitment to
NATO, with a majority of Ministers being in the pro-NATO camp, Trudeau’s influ-
ence helped shift the balance of power in Cabinet towards those that were skeptical
of NATO. 117 This shift paved the way for the Cabinet to adopt a powerful position
vis-à-vis Canada’s reductions to its commitments to NATO. The newer members of
Cabinet, which were brought in by Trudeau, were some of the strongest supporters of
widespread reductions to Canada’s alliance commitments and even neutrality. Partic-
ularly vocal members of the ‘new guard’ included the Postmaster General Eric Kierans
and the President of the Privy Council Office Donald Macdonald, who both advocated
for total withdrawal from NATO. Other “known neutralists” included the Minister of
Forestry and Rural Development Jean Marchand and the Secretary of State Gérard
Pelletier.118 While these men were members of Cabinet before Trudeau’s election,
they also represented this ‘new guard’ of Liberal Ministers, as “Pearson had recruited
[them] along with Trudeau in 1965 to bolster federal representation from the province
of Quebec” and were considered among Trudeau’s closest friends and advisors within
Cabinet.119
These Ministers emphasized the importance of refocusing the government pri-
orities towards national security or other domestic interests. In the view of these
Ministers, NATO did not and could not fulfill these interests. Therefore, the govern-
ment needed to reassert control over or ‘renationalize’ its defence and foreign policy by
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substantially reducing its commitments to NATO or by leaving the alliance outright.
As the President of the Privy Council argued, “It was the Canadian interest that this
Cabinet should be interested in” rather than the interests of its European allies.120
Moreover, the Postmaster General highlighted that these commitments came at the
expense of domestic priorities:
In the Pearson years expensive international commitments were entered
into by Canada for acceptable reasons but possibly at the expense of
prior domestic responsibilities. . . this country had special economic and
social problems which must be faced. The domestic problems of housing,
regional disparity, and the position of the unorganized must be solved.
Canadian foreign policy was only of value if it was the product of a strong
and unified country.121
The Minister of Forestry and Rural Development also agreed that national unity and
domestic interests should be the main priorities of the government, and this justified
reneging on its commitments to NATO:
Canada was not a big power and was not a country which had been
welded together very well. This process should be the government’s first
preoccupation for if domestic unity could not be maintained, Canadian
foreign policy would be of no value. In this context it was his view that
Canadian troops should no longer remain in Europe.122
All these positions can be seen as elements of a nationalist point of view, as they
all believed what was best for Canada was concentrating on its national priorities or
forging an independent path from the alliance.
These Ministers also emphasized the reputational and material gains of reneging.
The Postmaster General argued that Canada could augment its status by divesting
from NATO:
If, through our initiatives, we could encourage understanding and toler-
ance then we as a Cabinet could be very powerful. We could indicate [to
allies] that we revere independence and respect the need for an increased
contribution to the under-developed countries of this world.123
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Another argument was that Canada could increase its status and influence in the
alliance through reneging, as reducing its forces may bring about a de-escalation to
the tensions in Europe.124 Other Ministers, including Trudeau, discounted the abil-
ity of Canada to influence Europe through alliance membership. The Minister of
National Health and Welfare, remarked that “it was almost pretentious. . . to assume
that we had great influence [in NATO].”125 Trudeau highlighted that freeing up de-
fence resources could lead to material gains, by reorienting Canada’s forces towards
less traditional security roles: “Could the forces be used to build highways, to solve
problems of pollution, as cadres for social development?”126 Others discounted the
magnitude of the material costs of reneging, arguing that Canada did not rely on
NATO for the provision of security.127
These NATO-skeptic members of Cabinet also provided strategic justifications for
withdrawing from the alliance. They argued that Canada’s contribution was basically
“marginal,” serving political rather than strategic purposes.128 However, these claims
were disputed by other members of Cabinet and officials within the Departments of
National Defence and External Affairs. In fact, it does not appear the outcome of the
reductions was carefully calibrated.129 According to Bothwell, after the reductions,
“The remaining troops, reduced in size and status, no longer had a clear role to play
in NATO defence.”130
Trudeau not only brought NATO-skeptic members into the Cabinet, but also al-
lowed them influence over the defence review process. Previously, Canada’s nuclear
and alliance policies were the domain of the Prime Minister, Minister of National
Defence, and Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs.131 Since both Defence Minister
Cadieux and Foreign Minister Sharp were among the strongest supporters of NATO
in Cabinet, this move was especially important for shifting Canadian policy towards
substantial withdrawals. Both the Defence Policy Review and the report of the Spe-
cial Task Force Europe (STAFEUR), which was tasked with re-examining Canada’s
military role in Europe, were debated by the entire Cabinet over two days at the end
124Ibid.; LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969.
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of March 1969, where all members were encouraged to give their opinions.132 During
the afternoon of the session on March 29th, the President of the Privy Council Office
was given the time to read a prepared statement, “which recommended that Canada
should notify its allies of its intention to discontinue membership in the NATO al-
liance.”133 This steered the debate in the direction of whether Canada should be a
member of NATO in the first place, with the extent and type of the commitments to
the alliance to be debated only after discussing this more fundamental question.
Trudeau also opened the defence review to the public in a way that amplified
critical voices and prevented the Canadian government from tying its hands to any
commitments to NATO. Early on in the review process, Trudeau warned Ministers
that they should not publicly insinuate that Canada intended to remain in NATO
or substantially keep their commitments.134 However, in January 1969, the Prime
Minister “cleared”135 a speech about the defence review made by Postmaster General
Kierans given during a by-election, which was highly critical of NATO and calling for
Canada’s full withdrawal from the Alliance:
Given the limitations imposed upon us by membership in NATO, and also
the scope for initiative that still remains, is that membership worthwhile,
is it the best choice that we can make?
I believe it is not worthwhile.
I believe that we can do better.136
Trudeau also called on individuals outside of the government to provide their opinions
on the future direction of Canadian defence policy. Specifically, the government
engaged with academics, many of whom had a dim view of nuclear weapons and Cold
War alliances.137 Having academics participate in the review was another means to
allow NATO-skeptic voices to have prominence during the process.
Trudeau persistently involved himself in the review process in order to ensure
that it would not flatly negate a neutralist policy or substantial military withdrawals.
When the first version of the defence review was submitted to Cabinet in July 1968,
supporting the current levels of military contribution to NATO, Trudeau and other
members of Cabinet flatly rejected the report and “insisted that the defense review
132LAC, CC, 2873, 29 March 1969; LAC, CC, 2872, 30 March 1969.
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team start all over again.”138 This version was thrown out because it did not ade-
quately consider policies that would fundamentally change the status quo, such as
neutrality or total military withdrawal. According to the co-chairman of STAFEUR,
this was part of the Prime Minister’s attempt to steer the outcome of the review
process towards a policy of reneging: “Trudeau made it perfectly plain that he hoped
our recommendation would be for a downgrading of Europe in the Canadian perspec-
tive, and a complete withdrawal of Canadian troops in Europe.”139 Indeed, according
to Halloran, these efforts were successful making some level of reductions all but in-
evitable: “The impossibility of maintaining Canada’s military contribution to NATO
at current levels had been brought home to them [status quo officials] early in the
review process.”140
Despite his persistent efforts to steer the defence review, Trudeau still worried
that the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs would not critically
examine the status quo or seriously consider the positive implications of complete
withdrawal from NATO. Indeed, both the Defence Policy Review and the STAFEUR
report would recommend alignment and the maintenance of Canada’s alliance com-
mitments.141 To counter an uncritically status quo position, Trudeau approved the
formation of ‘the Non-Group’ – a group of officials led and selected by Ivan Head,
which would prepare an alternate review of Canadian defence policy that could also
be considered by Cabinet.142 Neither Cadieux nor Sharp were aware of the existence
of an alternate report, until it arrived on their desks a day before the Cabinet meet-
ing on the Defence Review. Entitled “A Study of Defence Policy,” the report called
for drastic changes to Canada’s military structure, including the halving of Canada’s
armed forces (from 100,000 to 50,000) over ten years as well as the complete with-
drawal of Canada’s nuclear role from NATO.143 Interestingly, the paper did not call
for a complete withdrawal from NATO, but did advocate for major reductions to
these forces.144
Cadieux and Sharp were deeply troubled by Trudeau’s secret circumvention of
their authority. According to Bothwell, Cadieux threatened to resign, and implied
that Sharp would also have grounds to do so if this paper was introduced to Cabi-
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net.145 Trudeau agreed to withdraw the paper, recognizing that he had perhaps gone
too far in trying to steer Cabinet discussion towards reneging and faced potential
audience costs: “Cadieux’s explosion made Trudeau realise that he might face one
and possibly more resignations if he proceeded with the proposals advocated in the
mysterious paper.”146 However, the paper had already been circulated to the en-
tire Cabinet, making Trudeau’s preferences known, as the withdrawn paper “came
directly from the Prime Minister’s Office.”147
Thus, Canada’s reneging attempt was the result of a forced “compromise” between
officials that wanted to maintain the current level of commitment and those that
wanted to leave the alliance outright.148 By elevating the status of the nationalist
and NATO-skeptic voices both in and outside Cabinet, Trudeau made it clear that a
simple acceptance of the status quo was off the table, while full withdrawal from the
alliance was a credible possibility. For status quo members of Cabinet, the foundations
of the debate shifted: instead of trying to maintain a particular level of commitment,
status quo officials were now focused on minimizing reductions and not leaving the
alliance outright. As will be apparent at the international level of negotiations, it was
this credible threat of withdrawal that forced status quo officials to be co-opted into
accepting major reductions to Canada’s commitment to NATO, including reneging
on its nuclear sharing commitment.
In the end, the Cabinet agreed that Canada would remain in NATO, but with
substantial reductions to its nuclear and conventional commitments.149 On April 3rd
1969, Trudeau issued a statement on defence policy that announced, “The [Canadian
Government] intends, in consultations with [Canada’s] allies, to take early steps to
bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the [Canadian] forces
in Europe.”150 This result represented a compromise between the status quo and
neutralist members of Cabinet; however, Canada’s role in NATO was clearly to be
demoted.151 On May 20th 1969, Cabinet agreed to a broad array of proposed cuts
to Canada’s contribution to NATO, including the reduction of Canadian forces from
10100 to 3500 and the elimination of its nuclear role.152 The proposal for the new and
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reduced role for Canada was then communicated to NATO and the United States,
which represented the commencement of Level I negotiations.
6.3.2 International Level: Intra-Alliance Bargaining
Trudeau’s nationalist coalition at the domestic level translated into leverage at the
international level. As I explained in Chapter 3, nationalist coalitions provide ne-
gotiators with three sources of bargaining power that facilitate reneging: a credible
threat of withdrawal, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a low vulnerability to re-
structuring. This section will show how these allowed the Canadian government to
successfully renege on its nuclear role and reduce its conventional commitments to
NATO.
6.3.2.1 A Credible Threat of Withdrawal
The nature of the coalition that backed Trudeau in Cabinet and the co-option of
status quo officials had a crucial impact on Canadian bargaining power with NATO.
This nationalist coalition provided Canadian negotiators with a credible threat of
total withdrawal from the Alliance if allies did not accept major reductions. The
Canadian officials presented a united front, a clear set of demands, and a clear threat
to walk away if they were not met. Although the Cabinet debates were secret, their
allies knew the extent of the NATO-skepticism and tolerance for withdrawal within
Cabinet. In a joint Cabinet meeting in June 1969 with the US Secretary of State
William Rogers, Sharp noted that complete withdrawal from NATO was discussed
within Cabinet, and therefore was within the Canadians’ win-set if major reductions
were not accepted:
The Canadians had considered neutrality or an alliance with the United
States alone, but had rejected both possibilities. . . Unless they could con-
tribute constructively to the alliance, they would withdraw. Canada un-
derstood the importance of consultation, but its basic position was “non-
negotiable.” Canada had to have the right to decide on its role. Within
that context, it was prepared to discuss the timing of the cuts and, within
limits, the extent of the cuts.”153
The fact that one of the chief supporters of the status quo was the official issuing the
threat of withdrawal revealed to the Americans the power of the nationalist coalition
and underscored the support for reneging within Cabinet.
153FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.95, 25 June 1969.
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While the Americans initially bristled under the threat of withdrawal, the fear
that the Canadians would simply walk away if their demands were not met ulti-
mately forced NATO and the United States to be more flexible in terms of what it
would accept. On July 7th 1969, the American Ambassador to Canada Harold Linder
succinctly summarized the dangers of taking a hardline approach in negotiations, as
it could further strengthen the nationalists in Trudeau’s government:
Any effort by Allies or by [Secretary General of NATO Manilo] Brosio sim-
ply to tell GOC what it proposes to do is “unacceptable” will provoke little
more than resentment and could freeze earlier GOC proposal as maximum
offer. To do so would also run some risk of engendering sufficient resent-
ment to strengthen hand for long term future of those in Cabinet who
wish to remove Canadian military presence from Europe entirely.154
He argued that they could push back on certain elements of the Canadian proposal,
but ultimately, they would have to accept substantial reductions.155 Linder recom-
mended that the United States should support SHAPE’s counter proposal, but cau-
tioned that it was unlikely to be accepted and they should expect much less. While
SHAPE’s counter-proposal “assumes continuation Canadian nuclear strike role,” he
warned that “[r]etention of 104’s nuclear capability is probably negotiable for limited
and specified period of time.”156 It was more realistic to concentrate on augmenting
the number of Canadian troops stationed in Europe and other elements of Canada’s
conventional commitments to NATO.157
The Linder telegram had a substantial effect on American officials in softening
their approach to negotiations with the Canadians. Up until this point, Secretary of
Defence Laird and Secretary of State Rogers were advocating for a hardline stance
in order to dissuade the Canadians from reneging on their commitments. However,
on July 10th, in a joint departmental message to the US Mission at NATO, which
directly discusses US tactics and response to the Canadian proposal, there is a clear
shift. This telegram states that the Ambassador’s “careful analysis. . . has persuaded
us of the risks of a ‘hard line’ as distinguished from a compromise approach to the
Canadians”158 Instead of trying to get the Canadians to reverse course on reneging,
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in May 1969 (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969).
155FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
156Ibid.
157Ibid.
158RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 10 July 1969.
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the Americans now aimed “to limit damage.”159 The Americans supported the NATO
counterproposal that envisioned 6,500 troops, a retention of the nuclear role, and other
conventional commitments, but they were not very optimistic about the likelihood of
Canada’s acquiescence.
After receiving the counterproposal from NATO, the Canadians made several con-
cessions, including increasing the total number of military personnel that would re-
main in Europe from 2,500 to 5,000. However, the new proposal was still a substantial
reduction to Canada’s conventional commitments and firmly stated that they would
withdraw from their nuclear role by 1972. In a meeting on August 15th, the Canadian
Chief of Defence Staff General J.V. Allard warned the NATO Chief of Staff General
H.M. Wade that this proposal represented the Canadians’ final and maximum offer:
“If NATO does not consider the Canadian proposal worthwhile the CDS [Chief of
Defence Staff] would have no choice but to recommend the complete withdrawal of
the European-based forces to Canada.”160 At the end of the meeting, General Allard
“concluded his remarks with a further reminder that the Canadian government is not
prepared to negotiate the question further.”161 On August 27th, SACEUR sent a re-
sponse to the Canadian offer that the “revised organization. . . of approximately 5000
proposed 15 Aug welcome increase provides structure which will allow CF [Canadian
Forces] to continue to fulfill a meaningful but reduced role” and found the decision to
continue the strike role until 1972 “gratifying.”162 Through coercive threats to leave
the alliance outright, Canada was able to achieve allied acceptance of defection on
their conventional commitments and reneging on its nuclear role. These threats were
credible due to the nationalist nature of the coalition that backed reneging, which
had been pushing for further reductions and would accept full withdrawal.
6.3.2.2 Willingness to Act Unilaterally
From the outset, Canadian reductions to NATO were conceived as part of a larger
restructuring of Canadian defence priorities towards the national interest, with the
defence of Canadian territory and sovereignty as the first priority and the defence
of North America as the second priority.163 These reductions were conceived as part
of a review of Canada’s national policy, rather than as a part of NATO’s collective
159Ibid.
160DHH, RP, 2530, 28 August 1969.
161Ibid.
162DHH, RP, 2530, 27 August 1969. In this message, SHAPE requests that Canada reconsider
some of its conventional reductions, such as the configuration of the land forces and the number of
Canadian staff postings. These were again rejected by the Canadians.
163DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969.
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strategy. The decision to reduce Canada’s commitment to NATO was confirmed be-
fore intra-alliance negotiations had even begun. This unilateral approach to nuclear
withdrawal and conventional reductions substantially increased the Canadians’ bar-
gaining power, leaving allies with very limited time and space to negotiate and roll
back the decisions that the government had already made.
By the time Level I negotiations began, Trudeau’s government had tied their
hands domestically to the reduction of their NATO commitments, making backing
down extremely difficult. The decision to reduce Canada’s role in NATO had been
ratified by Cabinet, announced to the public, and debated within the house by the
end April. The public nature of Trudeau’s call to reassess Canadian defence policy
and the drawn-out process of the defence review “helped to create an expectation
of change.”164 This domestic hand-tying effect was recognized by the Americans.
Linder had cautioned that Trudeau made this decision with the “full support of most
influential members [of] his Cabinet” and that the government was very unlikely to
accept the “status quo or something close to it. . . which Trudeau has publicly ruled
out.”165
The Canadians’ unilateral approach and nationalist mindset made them far less
concerned with accommodating their allies, which increased their bargaining power.
During a Cabinet meeting on April 3rd, on the day of the release of the statement
announcing NATO force reductions, there was a discussion about whether the govern-
ment could do so without first consulting their allies.166 According to the minutes, “It
was pointed out that legally it was not a breach of the articles of the North Atlantic
Treaty for a member to announce a change in the assignment of forces before consult-
ing with other parties to the Treaty.”167 This reassurance was enough for Cabinet to
go forward.
The text of the April 3rd statement itself also served to strengthen the hand
of the Canadians in later negotiations with NATO over the precise nature of their
contribution to the Alliance. While promising reductions to domestic audiences, the
Canadian government made no firm commitment to gain the approval of its allies
for its future force structure. Instead, there was the assurance that allies would be
164Halloran, 2006, p.141.
165FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
166LAC, CC, 2844, 3 April 1969.
167Ibid. Unfortunately, there is no attribution for this quote, so it is unclear who made this
argument in Cabinet. This statement was in response to a point made by Sharp that the Canadian
ambassador to NATO had claimed that Canada was legally bound to consult with its Allies before
making a public announcement about reductions.
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“consulted.”168 This rhetorically softened Canada’s unilateral approach somewhat,
but at the same time, cemented that the key decision had already been made. In the
final draft of a statement to NATO’s Central Regional Group of Defence Ministers,
Cadieux welcomed “any suggestions you may have. . . as quickly as possible in order
that we can take them into account in coming to our final decisions.”169 Canada
would not slow down to ensure that allies would be accommodated. Furthermore,
it would not promise that their allies’ ‘suggestions’ would have any impact over the
final decisions.
By taking this unilateral approach, the Canadians did not have to rectify the
potential negative implications of their reductions on the strategic posture of the Al-
liance. According to Linder’s assessment, the “Canadian position is that any shortfall
in Canadian forces or contribution is Alliance problem and that European Allies have
greater obligation than GOC to improve defense on what after all is their territory.”170
This position allowed the Canadians to move the negotiations swiftly, concentrating
only on the new force posture, but not its overall implications for the Alliance.
Once negotiations had begun, the firmness of Canada’s pre-negotiation position
created institutional barriers to flexibility, especially regarding Canada’s nuclear role.
On April 3rd, in order to determine the precise nature of Canada’s new force structure
for Europe, Cabinet agreed to form an interdepartmental task force to come up with
the initial proposal for negotiations with NATO.171 When this proposal was presented
to and approved by Cabinet, Ministers also agreed that certain deviations from this
proposal would need to be submitted to Cabinet for reapproval.172 This was a partic-
ularly important source of bargaining power after SHAPE made its counterproposal,
which had to be sent to and discussed by Cabinet before any final decision was made.
On August 12th, in anticipation of a meeting between NATO and Canadian mil-
itary officials, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff attempted to get Cadieux’s ap-
proval for two main shifts to the Canadian proposal “as a firm basis for [further]
negotiation:” raising the total forces in Europe to 5,000 and the retention of the
nuclear strike role for two CF-104 squadrons.173 The Annex of this memo indicates
that the Prime Minister had specifically requested that Cabinet had the final say
over Canada’s nuclear role: “You will also no doubt recall that when we met the full
168DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
169DHH, RP, 2109, 20 May 1969.
170FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.96, 7 July 1969.
171LAC, CC, 2844, 3 April 1969.
172DHH, RP, 2108, 30 April 1969; LAC, CC, 3005, 15 May 1969.
173DHH, RP, 2530, 12 August 1969.
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Cabinet the PM indicated to the Minister [of Defence] that if NATO representatives
included the retention of the [nuclear] strike role this proposal would have to be re-
turned to Cabinet for decision.”174 In line with this arrangement, on August 13th, the
proposed adjustments to the Canadian bargaining position were brought to Cabinet.
The Prime Minister commented that the Defence Department’s “proposal appeared
to be to remain in the strike role,” which led to a discussion about the CF-104s.175
Rejecting the possibility that Canada’s nuclear role could be left ambiguous, Trudeau
“wanted it made very clear that Canada would be out of the strike role completely by
1972.”176 In the end, Cabinet agreed to increase to 5,000 forces, but remained firm
that the strike role would be withdrawn by 1972. Thus, the Canadian government’s
willingness to act unilaterally augmented their bargaining power and help ensure that
they would successfully renege on their nuclear commitments to NATO.
6.3.2.3 Low Vulnerability to Restructuring
The Americans were sensitive to the nationalist nature of Trudeau’s coalition, making
them reluctant to try to appeal directly to the Canadian population. This limited
their ability to restructure the Canadians’ win-set. On the 24th of April 1969, shortly
before a planned visit by SACEUR General Lemnitzer to Ottawa, the American
embassy in Canada sent a telegram to the Department of State that was forwarded
to the General.177 Although there is no clear directive contained within the message,
it makes a comparison between the current situation and a previous visit by one of
Lemnitzer’s predecessors, General Norstad, in 1963. It informed the reader that when
Norstad visited, Diefenbaker’s nuclear acquisition controversy was at its height, and
the General was asked to weigh in on the issue. Norstad affirmed that “Canada was
reneging on its commitments to its Allies” by refusing to accept nuclear sharing.178
According to the Embassy’s analysis, these comments intensified the controversy,
eventually “culminating in the fall of the Diefenbaker government.”179
The message highlights the potential danger of nationalist backlash if a similar
comment would be made about the current government’s plans to renege on its NATO
commitments. In particular, the telegram highlights an article written by Trudeau
on this affair:
174Ibid.
175DHH, CC, 3302, 13 August 1969.
176Ibid.
177FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.93, 24 April 1969.
178Ibid
179Ibid.
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Department [of State] should also be aware of article written in 1963
about General Norstad’s visit by then budding young political writer
named Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Following is direct quote: Quote Do you
think I dramatize it? How do you think politics work? Do you think Gen-
eral Norstad, former Supreme Commander Allied Forces in Europe, came
to Ottawa on January 3 as a tourist to tell the Canadian Government
publicly to respect its agreements? Do you think it’s by chance that Mr.
Pearson was able to rely on the authority of General Norstad in his speech
on January 12? Do you think the State Department inadvertently gave
newspapers the press release on January 30 which reinforced Mr. Pear-
son’s position and called Mr. Diefenbaker a liar? Do you think it’s by
accident that this communiqué gave the opposition leader the arguments
with which he larded his speech to Parliament on January 31? You think
it is coincidental that this led to events which ended in the fall of the
government on February 5? Unquote.180
This article reveals Trudeau’s belief that the 1963 statement was part of an or-
chestrated effort to undermine the sitting Canadian Prime Minister (Diefenbaker)
in favour of a more pliant alternative (Pearson). Although the telegram does not
make this point directly, it suggests that General Lemnitzer should be careful not to
undermine Trudeau in his visit, as this kind of criticism could lead to similar accusa-
tions of interference and conspiracy.181 This telegram reveals the Americans’ concerns
about both Trudeau nationalist proclivities and the nature of the coalition backing
him. It provides some insight into why the Americans were reluctant to publicly
criticize or call out the fact that the Canadians were reneging on their alliance com-
mitments: they were worried about a nationalist backlash that would further weaken
their negotiating position and move Canada even farther away from the status quo.
180Ibid.
181Ibid. In the telegram, it emphasizes that the Trudeau government can be seen as in a somewhat
vulnerable domestic position and that General Lemnitzer would be seen as an agent of the US,
rather than speaking for the interests of the alliance as a whole: “General Lemnitzer will arrive at
time when Trudeau government, while it has comfortable majority unlike Diefenbaker government
of 1963, is under opposition attack in Canada as consequence PriMin Trudeau’s April 3 announce-
ment of intention to remain in NATO but to reduce Canadian forces in Europe. Government today
is in fact in middle of two-day Parliamentary debate about that announcement. . . In questioning
General Lemnitzer Canadian newsmen will, of course, tend to regard him only as American General
and not as international servant and may seek to elicit from him statements critical of Trudeau gov-
ernment and at seeming variance with recent public comment by Secretary Rogers.”
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter directly addressed the central puzzle of my thesis: How and why do
leaders renege on their alliance commitments, despite the costs? I first demonstrated
that the Canadian government was aware that it faced considerable costs if they
reneged on their nuclear commitments to NATO. Records show that there were many
Canadian government officials that justified their status quo position by referring
to the likely reputational and material costs Canada would face if it withdrew from
NATO or substantially reduced its commitments to the Alliance. The Canadian
public supported NATO and prominent Cabinet ministers advocated for the status
quo, raising the possibility of domestic audience costs. Finally, both the United
States and NATO clearly indicated to the Canadian government that they opposed
any substantial reductions, with the United States initially considering pursuing a
hardline strategy against Canada to dissuade it from reneging. The first section
therefore demonstrated the considerable disincentives to renege at the time.
Trudeau was able to renege because he strategically formulated a nationalist do-
mestic coalition that supported extensive reductions to Canada’s NATO commit-
ments. The Prime Minister first strengthened the political power of NATO-skeptic
members of Cabinet, who supported Canada’s withdrawal from NATO on nation-
alist grounds. Trudeau’s influence over the process of the defence review ensured
that reneging could be framed as a compromise solution between the NATO-skeptic
members of Cabinet and those that supported the status quo. Trudeau retained the
support of his entire Cabinet and was able to provide Canadian negotiators with
a firm bargaining position before discussions began at the international level. Ul-
timately, Canada successfully negotiated out of its nuclear commitments because
its allies feared even greater reductions if they did not accept. Trudeau’s nationalist
coalition allowed the Canadian government to make credible threats of full withdrawal
from the alliance. The government’s willingness to act unilaterally and set firm poli-
cies before negotiation strengthened their bargaining power by tying their hands to
reductions and setting institutional barriers to the dilution of their proposal. Finally,
the nationalist character of Trudeau’s coalition discouraged restructuring attempts
by their allies.
These empirical findings support the importance of domestic coalition type for
reneging, whereas the realpolitik model does not provide an adequate explanation
for reneging success in this case. While officials favoring widespread defections used
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strategic justifications as well as nationalist ones, these were not decisive in negotia-
tions with status quo allies. Furthermore, these assessments of the marginal nature of
Canada’s contribution to NATO were disputed by the government’s own Departments
of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In the end, it was the threat of further withdrawals
and reductions, rather than a superior analysis of the level of international threat or
the military effectiveness of the weapons systems, that convinced status quo officials
within Canada, the United States, and NATO to accept Canada’s reneging on its
nuclear role and its reductions to its conventional commitment.
7
Case Study 4: Pierre Elliott
Trudeau and NORAD
“As long as the government still considered that there was a residual bomber
threat. . . there was justification for arming these interceptors with nuclear
weapons; conventional armament would be ineffective and arming Canadian
interceptors in this way would mean that bomber interception by nuclear
means would be performed by United States aircraft stationed south of the
border but making their interceptions over Canadian territory. . . ”1
– Paul Martin, Leader of the Government in the Senate, July 15 1971
7.1 Final Withdrawals: Bomarcs and CF-101s
This chapter analyses the final case of reneging: the total withdrawal of nuclear
weapons from Canadian soil and the ending of the Canadian nuclear anti-bomber
interception role in NORAD in 1984. The Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972,
in line with previous estimates of its date of obsolescence and coinciding with the
retirement of the Bomarcs on American soil. The Cabinet agreed to upgrade the CF-
101 interceptors in 1970. These interceptors retained their nuclear role in NORAD
until their retirement in 1984, when they were replaced by a conventional aircraft,
the CF-18.
I also examine why nuclear weapons were retained for the CF-101s in the early
1970s, which is important for understanding the timing of reneging. As with NATO,
the Cabinet was divided on whether to keep its nuclear role in NORAD. Trudeau and
1LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.
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several of the officials that had been critical of Canada’s NATO commitments advo-
cated for reneging on its NORAD nuclear commitments as well. The Prime Minister
was skeptical about the military value of retaining nuclear weapons for anti-bomber
interception. Like with Canada’s role in NATO, Trudeau called for a thorough and
critical review of the strategic necessity of this role.2 Despite the fact that Trudeau
never wavered in his doubts about the actual benefit of maintaining nuclear inter-
ceptors, the Canadian government decided to retain the nuclear role for an indefinite
period of time. In fact, the military importance of nuclear-armed interceptors was
highlighted in the 1971 White Paper on Defence.3
A close examination of this case demonstrates that there are multiple pathways to
reneging. There is no evidence nuclear withdrawal in 1984 was related to a nationalist
domestic coalition. The Realpolitik model provides the best explanation for nuclear
withdrawal in 1984. The bomber threat had greatly diminished by this time and the
CF-101s were obsolete by the time that they were replaced; indeed, the Americans
had retired their own F-101s in 1982.4 Furthermore, the Canadian government was
able to procure a suitable conventional alternative to replace them.5
However, domestic coalition type does help explain why Canada retained its nu-
clear role in NORAD in the early 1970s. This case will show that nationalist coalitions
are not easily ‘transportable’ to different contexts. Trudeau’s nationalist coalition for
reneging in NATO was a single-issue coalition for reneging in NORAD. Trudeau
and other members of Cabinet were far less skeptical of alliance membership in NO-
RAD and recognized the important benefits of maintaining this security relationship.
Their objections were narrowly focused on the nuclear role and its strategic utility.
This coalition was therefore more sensitive to the international costs of reneging and
more reluctant to pursue a coercive strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Further-
more, because this nuclear role was bound up with Canada’s sovereign control of its
airspace, reneging was far less attractive to nationalist officials that were sensitive
to the sovereignty costs of this move. Thus, the anti-nuclear nature of Trudeau’s
coalition provides a plausible explanation for why reneging was not attempted in the
early 1970s.
The archival data concerning the decision making on Canada’s nuclear role in
NORAD after 1970 is sparse. Therefore, the analysis of Canada’s decision-making is
2LAC, CC, 683, 18 June 1970.
3DND, 1971, p.30.
4Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.259-260; NORAD, 2013, pp.7, 38; Schofield, 2014, p.76.
5Ibid; DHH, CP 98/15-18, 22 August 1979.
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more limited than previous chapters. However, the documents do provide some in-
sights into the factors that drove the government’s decision-making in the early 1970s.
Firstly, Trudeau was not able to develop and maintain a robust nationalist coalition
that had a credible threat of withdrawal from NORAD. Stepping back from North
American defence roles conflicted with the “Canada-first” policy that had justified
a reduced role in NATO, which in part was predicated upon a re-prioritization of
continental defence.6 Secondly, it appears that Canada was under pressure from the
United States to retain its nuclear role in NORAD. Nevertheless, without more evi-
dence, it is difficult to assess whether this pressure was more considerable than what
was applied on the Canadian government to keep its nuclear and conventional com-
mitments to NATO. Finally, the success of the defence review and the general opacity
surrounding Canada’s nuclear role allowed Trudeau’s government considerable space
to embrace a straddle strategy. Trudeau was able to retain a nuclear role to placate
the Americans, while still touting Canada’s special anti-nuclear status for domestic
audiences in a way that burnished Canadian nationalism and anti-nuclearism.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the link between strategic factors
and reneging in this case. Shifting strategic factors provide a viable explanation for
why Canada reneged in 1984 and why the Bomarc was withdrawn before the CF-
101s. The next section will explore the role of domestic coalition type. The evidence
suggests that despite Trudeau’s initial skepticism about maintaining Canada’s nuclear
commitments to NORAD, he could not easily form a nationalist coalition that would
support reneging, as this commitment and alliance were more closely tied to Canadian
national security and sovereignty. Therefore, the single-issue nature of the coalition
supporting reneging for NORAD contributed to nuclear retention in the 1970s.
7.2 Realpolitik and Reneging
While there is far less archival data about Canada’s internal deliberations and interac-
tions with the United States about the ending of its nuclear role, the evidence avail-
able supports the Realpolitik model, where leaders optimize alliance commitments
to best serve their state’s security. After Canada’s military contribution to NATO
was decided, the government turned to its commitments to NORAD. By July 1971,
Cabinet agreed that the CF-101s should be retained in order to defend against the
“residual” Soviet bomber threat, while the Bomarcs, considered obsolete, were to be
6Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.24.
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phased out by 1972.7 The remaining CF-101s were withdrawn in 1984, when suitable
conventional aircraft, the F-18, were ready to replace them.8 Thus, the withdrawal
of each nuclear weapons system is primarily related to three strategic factors: The
obsolescence of the particular weapons systems, the eclipse of the bomber by ICBMs,
and the availability of a suitable conventional aircraft for performing Canada’s role
in NORAD.
While the withdrawal of the Bomarcs in 1972 did not amount to Canada reneging
on its nuclear role, it provides an important point of comparison to the decision to
retain the CF-101s. The withdrawal of these nuclear missiles was straightforward and
uncontroversial, especially compared to the high drama of 1963. As demonstrated
in the chapter on the Diefenbaker era, the strategic utility and accuracy of these
interceptor missiles had long been subject to criticism. In addition, by the late 1960s,
the threat of manned bombers had diminished considerably.9 Canada’s phase-out
coincided with the United States’, which was also in the process of dismantling their
Bomarcs, indicating that both states saw this weapons system as unnecessary for
air defence.10 Furthermore, withdrawal by 1972 corresponded to previous Canadian
estimates of the end of the useful life of the Bomarc.11
The CF-101s were also withdrawn in 1984 due to strategic considerations, also
without much public discord. The aircraft was reaching the end of its life by the
late 1970s and by 1977, the government was seeking its replacement.12 After three
years of deliberation, the F-18 was selected. According to Granatstein and Bothwell,
“The air force was satisfied – it had got the best aircraft for the available money.”13
The solely conventional capability of these interceptors was related to the changing
role of NORAD, which was now primarily focused on “surveillance and warning of
ICBM attack” rather than nuclear interception of Soviet bombers.14 By the late
seventies the interceptor force, along with other aging components of its air defence,
7LAC, CC, 1974, 8 July 1971; LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.
8Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, pp.259-260; NORAD, 2013, pp.7, 38.
9Schofield, 2014, p.76.
10Clearwater, 1998, p.87.
11See DHH, RP, 2100, 23 March 1967; DHH, RP, 2100, 21 July 1967 LAC, CC, 3034, 20 May 1969.
The Defence Policy Review report projected longer useful life with phase-out by 1973-1975; however,
it is possible that the longer projection was related to the Canadian military’s worry that withdrawal
of Bomarcs would pave the way for the phase-out of the CF-101s, taking Canada completely out of
its nuclear sharing role (DHH, RP, 2100, February 1969; LAC, CC, 3034, 20 May 1969).
12This paragraph was adapted from my MPhil thesis. While there have been some adjustments
to the original text, some of the original wording is maintained. See Majnemer, 2016, pp.75-76.
13Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.259.
14Ibid 260; NORAD, 2013, pp.6-7.
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“had become obsolescent and uneconomical to operate.”15 A draft speech for the
Minister of Defence in 1979 indicates that improvements in conventional technology
were also a factor: “Aircraft and missile systems developed since the CF101 was
put into service make it unnecessary to have nuclear tipped-weapons to be effective.
We therefore expect the defensive nuclear weapons. . . will be withdrawn once the
CF101s are replaced.”16 Given this evidence, one can conclude that the CF-101s and
their warheads were withdrawn in 1984 because an effective conventional alternative
was found for the Canadian forces that would not diminish intercontinental security.
Much like with the Bomarc, the withdrawal of the CF-101s was closely timed with
the Americans retiring the F-101s in 1982.17
Strategic factors can also explain why the Bomarcs were withdrawn decades be-
fore the CF-101s and why Canada’s nuclear role was retained until 1984. Unlike
the Bomarc, the CF-101s were upgraded in the early 1970s, extending their useful
life. Under the ‘Peace Wings’ exchange, the Canadians would swap their old CF-101
aircraft for upgraded and modernized American versions.18 According to Minister of
National Defence Cadieux’s assessment, accepting these interceptors from the United
States would “improve our air defence capabilities and settle the question of inter-
ceptor aircraft until 1975 or beyond” in a cost-effective manner.19
Initially, Trudeau resisted Cadieux’s attempts to push through this aircraft ex-
change. Cadieux had first recommended approval for this upgrade in July 1969 and
tried to get it approved by Cabinet in November 1969.20 The Prime Minister brushed
him off, worried that accepting these aircraft would tie Canada’s hands into contin-
uing its nuclear role before a proper review had taken place.
The matter came to a head a few months later, when Cadieux confirmed that
the government was considering the exchange to the standing committee on external
affairs. This revelation led to a breathless headline in the Globe and Mail: “Voodoos
[CF-101s] to be traded-in for U.S. models, Defense Minister tells House committee.”21
Trudeau reacted quickly, chastising his Minister for implying that a decision had been
made in a letter to Cadieux:
15NORAD, 2013, p.7.
16DHH, CP, 98/15-18, 22 August 1979.
17NORAD, 2013, p.38.
18Clearwater, 1998, 187.
19LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 20 March 1970. “This exchange will be financed, for the most
part, by credits which will be established in Canada’s favour as the result of a revised cost-sharing
agreement covering the operation of the radar systems.” Any further payments would fall within
the budget for the Department of National Defence. See also LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
20LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 5 November 1969; LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 20 March 1970.
21LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 11 March 1970.
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I must advise you that premature public announcements of detailed pro-
posals such as the CF 101 exchange may well embarrass the government
and the Minister of National Defence if, in light of our considerations of
our future North American defence policy, these detailed proposals are
not approved.22
Despite Trudeau’s reservations, the Cabinet agreed in April 1970 to accept these
upgraded aircraft before the completion of the review on North American defence.23
The Prime Minister was swayed by strategic considerations and his belief that it
would not affect the ultimate outcome for the government’s decision on its nuclear
role in NORAD.24 As Trudeau stated in a letter to Cadieux:
I am aware, however, that the [Peace Wings] proposal becomes very much
more expensive there is further delay. It is also clear that a number of
interceptors are required for the surveillance and protection of Canadian
air space even if we had no responsibility for the joint air defence of North
America. I, therefore, think we can discuss and decide on the “Peace
Wings” proposal at Cabinet in advance of this general review.25
One week later, Cabinet discussed and agreed to the interceptor swap, ultimately
removing one obstacle for nuclear retention.26 In Cabinet, Trudeau aired his reserva-
tions about taking this action before “the government had come to a final decision on
the total North American defence posture,” but did not stand in the way of approving
the upgrade.27
The government justified their decision to retain the nuclear interceptors in the
1971 ‘White Paper on Defence’ with reference to strategic factors.28 While Soviet
reliance on bombers had greatly diminished, they could still be deployed in a nuclear
offensive “to strike targets which did not require immediate attack or. . . the missiles
had not successfully attacked.”29 Furthermore, if Canada dispensed with their inter-
ceptors completely, the USSR could “be tempted to rebuild their long-range bomber
force if they believed there would be absolutely no defences against them.”30 Since
22LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.3, 18, 17 March 1970.
23LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
24LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 16 April 1970.
25Ibid.
26LAC, CC, 532, 23 April 1970.
27Ibid.
28This paragraph was adapted from my MPhil thesis. While there have been some adjustments
to the original text, some of the original wording is maintained. See Majnemer, 2016, pp.73-74.
29DND, 1971, p.29.
30Ibid.
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the CF-101 needed to be armed with a nuclear rocket to attain maximum effective-
ness, there was “no alternative” to housing nuclear weapons on Canadian soil.31 The
government also decided that they would not commit to a specific timeframe for nu-
clear withdrawal. Rather, this decision would be based on the “strategic situation”
rather than a predetermined date.32 In July 1973, the Prime Minister asserted that
he would only contemplate a conventional replacement of the interceptors’ nuclear
capability if “it did not lessen their effectiveness,” indicating that Trudeau viewed
decision-making on its nuclear commitments to be driven by strategic, rather than
domestic, factors.33
This evidence suggests that Canada could only renege on its nuclear commitments
to NORAD once international pressures were sufficiently reduced. By 1984, not
only had the threat of Soviet long-range bombers been eclipsed by ICBMs, but a
conventional alternative aircraft was available for Canada to fulfill its commitments
to NORAD without nuclear arms.34 The last ‘shared’ nuclear weapons finally left
Canadian soil without much fanfare. In their guidance to Canadian officials on how
to return the weapons to the US, Sandia National Laboratories suggested that these
arms be packed with “crumpled newspaper.”35 Without access to nuclear arms or
dual-capable delivery systems, the end of Canada’s nuclear sharing agreement was a
mere formality, officially “terminated by joint agreement” on March 9th 1987.36
7.3 Domestic Coalition Type
Between March 1970, when Canada’s NORAD commitments became the focus of
Cabinet, and July 1971, when Cabinet agreed to retain its nuclear role, there was
a distinct shift in the tone and content of the discussion. Initially, Trudeau was
skeptical of the military necessity of Canada’s nuclear interception role. Trudeau and
his advisors had signalled their support for nuclear withdrawal in the ‘Non-Group’
report that was presented to and then quickly retracted from Cabinet in March 1969.
31Ibid., p.30. “In air combat there is at present no alternative to equipping the CF-101s with
nuclear warheads held in Canada by the U.S. under existing storage and custody arrangements. . . to
play an effective role in the defence of North America against the threat of active nuclear attack, they
require nuclear-tipped air-to-air weapons. Only with such weapons would they have a reasonable
prospect of destroying attacking bombers and their nuclear weapons before the latter were released.”
32DND, 1971, p.30; LAC, CC, 2001, 15 July 1971.
33LAC, CC, 38069, 12 July 1973.
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While this report had focussed mostly on cutting Canada’s contributions to NATO,
it also envisioned the replacement of the CF-101s with conventional aircraft and the
withdrawal of the BOMARC.37 In September 1970, Donald Macdonald replaced Leo
Cadieux as Minister of Defence. During the previous Cabinet debates on NATO,
Macdonald was an important proponent of reneging. Now, he was also skeptical
of the necessity of Canada’s nuclear role in NORAD. By 1971, not only was the
nuclear role retained, but the 1971 White Paper enshrined the enduring military
significance of nuclear anti-bomber interception.38 The upgrade of the CF-101s does
not completely explain this shift, as Trudeau and other officials continued to articulate
their doubts about nuclear retention even after the government had agreed to upgrade
the CF-101s in April 1970. There is not much evidence that Trudeau or other critical
officials were truly won over by the claim that nuclear weapons were necessary for anti-
bomber defence. What, therefore, explains this shift? Why was Trudeau successful
in managing reneging for NATO, but not for NORAD?
While the Realpolitik model presents a plausible causal pathway to reneging,
there is evidence that domestic coalition also played a role in the decision to forgo
reneging in the early 1970s. Many of the officials that were skeptical of Canada’s
contribution to NATO also opposed its nuclear commitments to NORAD. However,
this group supported reneging because of their skepticism of the necessity of nuclear
weapons, rather than the alliance itself. In respect to NORAD’s nuclear commit-
ments, Trudeau’s cabinet therefore represented a single-issue coalition. Discussion on
whether to retain Canada’s interceptors centered on the much narrower issue of the
viability of the bomber threat and the necessity of an active interceptor role, rather
than a broader critique of Canada’s role in NORAD. Statements made by Trudeau
indicate that he was far more sensitive to the international costs of reneging and
alienating the United States in this case. Unlike for NATO, sovereignty costs were a
concern, as reneging on its nuclear role in NORAD would mean that the Americans
would move in to replace it. This allowed status quo supporting Ministers to use the
government’s previous nationalist rhetoric and policy priorities to support nuclear
retention. Moreover, some evidence suggests that Trudeau and other political leaders
simply did not sustain the same level of interest in securing nationalist support for
Canada’s nuclear withdrawal from NORAD as other issues became prioritised.
As with Canada’s commitments to NATO, Trudeau was skeptical of arguments
and reports that unwaveringly supported the status quo and advocated for a change
37DHH, RP, 3240, March 1969.
38DND, 1971, p.29-30.
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in thinking on Canada’s continental defence commitments. On June 18th 1970, after
being presented with the Cadieux’s recommendations for Canada’s future program
for North American Defence, Trudeau accused the status quo supporting Minister of
not actually conducting a review:
The Prime Minister suggested that ministers might conclude that no re-
view of North American defence had taken place and that the status-quo
was to be maintained, or that a review had taken place and the status
quo was to be maintained, but in reality there had been no review of the
subject by Cabinet. The Prime Minister indicated that the effectiveness
of the military contribution that Canada made to Europe had been fully
examined and that a similar examination should take place to establish
principles for the effectiveness of military programs for North America.39
Trudeau complained that the report was “built on a static set of assumptions” that
essentially ceded all decision-making power to the Americans.40 As long as the Amer-
icans thought that the Canadian contribution was sufficient and valuable, then the
Canadians should conclude the same. Macdonald echoed Trudeau’s call for a more
thorough review that went beyond the report that was presented to Cabinet. In par-
ticular, Macdonald wanted the necessity of Canada’s role against the bomber threat
to be further examined.41 At the end of the meeting, Trudeau “recommended that
Cabinet should completely re-examine North American defence policy at a special
Cabinet meeting” in July.42 The Cabinet agreed and specifically called for the provi-
sion of a “specific briefing on the bomber threat.”43
On July 22nd, the Cabinet met again to discuss Canada’s North American defence
policy. During this meeting, Trudeau’s skepticism of the necessity of nuclear retention
because of the bomber threat was on full display:
The Prime Minister question the logic of maintaining an active anti-bomber
defence system. . . detection and warning of the approach of U.S.S.R. bombers
was necessary but that of the scenario envisaged which attempted to jus-
tify the need for an interception and destruction capability against Soviet
bombers was marginal.44





44LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.
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The Prime Minister also emphasized some “Canada first” themes as in the discussion
on NATO.45 He reminded Cabinet that national defence should supersede continental
defence according to their strategic hierarchy: “. . . the first [national] and second
[continental] defence priorities which had been established by Cabinet must not be
reversed.”46 According to Trudeau, Canada’s cooperation with the United State for
“the defence of North American did not of itself imply any particular level of military”
contribution by Canada.47
However, Trudeau’s opposition to NORAD was primarily based on anti-nuclear
rather than nationalist logics. Canada had announced that it would remain aligned
in April 1969. Indeed, it had decided to remain militarily engaged in NATO. There-
fore, a full withdrawal from NORAD was off the table. On a more practical level,
the defence of the North American continent was more tightly bound with national
defence, meaning that the previous emphasis on national priorities would necessar-
ily entail an important role for NORAD. The government had partially justified the
cuts to NATO with reference to Canada’s commitments to NORAD and continental
defence.48 It had made continental defence the second strategic priority, after na-
tional defence.49 Therefore, the previous nationalist rhetoric, which emphasized the
importance of continental defence for national security, undercut Trudeau’s ability to
formulate a similar coalition that would have supported reneging on Canada’s nuclear
commitments to NORAD.
Unlike NATO, Trudeau was more willing to recognize the importance of Canada’s
overall contribution to NORAD, focusing instead on the specific utility of its nu-
clear role. Reflecting this single-issue approach, the Prime Minister also expressed
more hesitance in alienating the United States and advocated for a consensus-based
approach if Canada would try to renege: “It was important, however, if Canada
decided to co-operate with the U.S. for political reasons that the U.S. government
was well satisfied with Canada’s contribution.”50 By July 1970, Trudeau was con-
vinced that Canada should retain its surveillance and detection roles in NORAD,
45Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.24
46LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.
47Ibid.
48DHH, RP, 2530, 3 December 1969.
49DHH, RP, 2106, 30 April 1969; LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970.
50LAC, CC, 855, 22 July 1970. Trudeau also showed more willingness to accept that specific
commitments may be retained for political reasons: “The Prime Minister said that it must be made
clear that, in the allocation of resources to the defence of North America, when the choice was
between the first and second priority, the Canadian government would spend money on the first
priority and only spend money on the second priority, primarily, if it assisted the first, and, secondly,
if it was necessary for political reasons.”
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which were deemed “essential.”51 The nuclear interception role was still criticized
as “marginal.”52 However, Trudeau highlighted that Canada could show its inter-
est in cooperation with the United States and offset reneging through various other
means, such as by “contributing to surveillance and detection systems,” or “by agree-
ing to over-flights” or “providing refueling bases for SAC bombers.”53 In this spirit,
Trudeau warned the Cabinet that the White Paper “should not be tough on the U.S.A.
because Canada fully intended to co-operate” with the Americans in the defence of
North America.54 Similarly, in a later interview Minister of Defence Macdonald noted
that he “recognized the need to co-operate with the United States in defending North
America.”55
Beyond the closer connection between national and continental security, there were
sovereignty costs to nuclear withdrawal. The President of the Treasury Board, Mr.
Drury, suggested that the CF-101s were essential for Canadian sovereignty, because
. . . if the Canadian government did not contribute squadrons of intercep-
tors to co- operative air defence but rather built icebreakers, then it was
possible that the United States would take over that military activity at
the expense of control of Canadian air space by Canada.56
While Trudeau “noted the attractive aspects of this argument,” he also pushed back.57
In response to Drury’s warning, Trudeau mused that he did not necessarily consider
the Americans taking over Canadian airspace a “real threat” to Canadian sovereignty
if the bomber threat had in fact diminished, in which case:
. . . the government might be willing to allow the United States interceptors
to use Canadian bases and air space if the United States continued to
believe the bomber threat was still of significance.58
However, a priority established during the defence review was that the defence of
Canada should be done to the greatest extent possible by Canadian forces.59 With-





55Macdonald in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165, interviewed on 5 April 1988.
56LAC, CC, 683, 18 June 1970.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
59LAC, MG 26 O11, Vol.27, 12, 1 June 1970.
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defence to the United States.60 This line of argument seems to have been persuasive
to Ministers critical of the strategic utility of nuclear interceptors. On July 8th 1971,
the Cabinet agreed to retain the CF-101s with their nuclear role. During this discus-
sion at least one member of Cabinet made the point that while there were “certain
weaknesses” to the “military argument” for retention, the “sovereignty benefits” of
these aircraft, which allowed “the control of Canadian airspace” justified their con-
tinued role.61 This was one of only three points of discussion that were recorded in
the cabinet conclusions before the decision was made.
Unlike the reductions to NATO, there is not much archival evidence of extensive
negotiations between the United States and Canada over its nuclear commitments to
NORAD. It appears that in this case reneging was not attempted and did not reach
Level I negotiations. However, there is evidence that the United States tried to pres-
sure Canada into retaining its nuclear role through less formal channels. The aircraft
swap can be seen as a positive inducement for nuclear retention: it made maintaining
the status quo a cost-effective option for Canada. The Americans may have also ap-
plied coercive pressure. According to Gordon Smith, a Defence Department official
that was instrumental in the creation of the White Paper, the Americans “strongly
pressured” to retain nuclear weapons and even suggested that they could have been
“listening in on phone calls.”62 Because of the single-issue nature of Trudeau’s coali-
tion and increased concerns about the costs of reneging, the Canadian government
may have been more vulnerable to restructuring attempts. This increased suscepti-
bility to American pressure may explain why reneging was not attempted. Because
of the limited archival materials available, it is difficult to say whether the Ameri-
can objections to nuclear withdrawal from NORAD were fundamentally different or
stronger than its objections to Canada’s reneging in NATO. Additionally, it is not
possible to construct a direct causal path between American pressure and the outcome
of retention.63
60Ibid.
61LAC, CC, 1974, 8 July 1971.
62Smith in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.162, interviewed on 8 October 1987.
63Canadian officials later told the Americans that the retention of Canada’s nuclear role was in
part dependent on American actions. During a meeting between the two countries’ representatives
in December 1973, American officials noted that the United States was considering fully withdrawing
its F-101 interceptors. Canadian officials warned that any withdrawal of American interceptors may
be mirrored by a reduction to the Canadian contribution: “[a] phase-out of the F-101s would have
an effect on Canada and Canada’s views of the US program” (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.E-15, Pt.2,
Doc.108, 6 December 1973). This is similar to the American Embassy in Canada’s warning in August
1973 that “any change in level of US support for NORAD is likely to be matched by reduction in
level of Canadian support” (FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.E-15, Pt.2, Doc.108, 6 December 1973).
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It is also possible that even those that were skeptical of Canada’s nuclear commit-
ment did not push harder for nuclear withdrawal because they did not fully appreciate
the implications of the White Paper for the longevity of nuclear sharing. In a later
interview, Macdonald claimed that there was a “downgrading of the interceptor role”
against Soviet bombers, perhaps referring to the withdrawal of the Bomarc.64 Gor-
don Smith suggests that he was left with the impression that Canada would withdraw
from the nuclear soon, even if it was not directly called for in the White Paper:
The decision that Canada would get out of the nuclear roles was clear.
The idea was to get out of all nuclear roles as soon as possible, and the
cabinet (which Smith attended) agreed. He was astonished to learn that
that CF-101s in NORAD in Canada retained their nuclear capability into
the 1980s. He thought this had simply happened – had the language in
the White Paper left a loophole?65
There are several interesting aspects to this statement. Firstly, it is unclear what
Cabinet decision Smith is referring to – while there is a record of Cabinet categorically
deciding to completely withdraw from the nuclear role in NATO, there is no similar
statement rejecting this role in NORAD.66 Secondly, the language of the White Paper
is quite explicit that Canada would retain its nuclear weapons and gave no precise
timeline for their withdrawal.67 As no one was calling for a complete readjustment of
Canada’s relationship and contribution to NORAD, it is possible that this issue may
have slipped through the cracks.
In October 1970, only two weeks into Macdonald’s tenure as Minister of National
Defence, Canada was engulfed in a domestic crisis. The British Trade Commissioner
and Quebec’s Labour Minister were kidnapped by a radical separatist group, Le Front
de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ). This was not only an internal security crisis, but a
direct threat to national unity. The government enacted the War Measures Act, which
led to the deployment of “[u]p to 7500 troops. . . for domestic peacekeeping duties,
and to assist in the intelligence side.”68 Beyond absorbing the attention of Trudeau
and the Department of National Defence, the crisis had an impact on the White
64Macdonald in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165, interviewed on 5 April 1988.
65Smith in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.161, interviewed on 8 October 1987.
66See LAC, CC, 3247, 31 July 1969, where Cabinet agrees that Canada would be out of the nuclear
strike role, referring to its role in NATO, by 1972. Under NORAD, Canada’s nuclear forces had an
air defence/interception role.
67DND, 1971, p.30. It does state that the government will not expend “substantial sums” on new
equipment for anti-bomber defence and will only upgrade “to the extent that this is required for the
general control of Canadian airspace.”
68Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.236.
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Paper on Defence, making “internal security. . . a high priority.”69 In a later interview,
Macdonald also noted that the FLQ crisis improved his view of the importance of the
Canadian armed forces.70 Thus, Macdonald’s attention and priorities shifted in 1970.
It is also likely that Trudeau’s focus shifted as well. In a later interview, Mitchell
Sharp, who remained Secretary of State for External Affairs until 1974, implied that
Trudeau’s interest Canada’s alliance commitments had declined by 1971: “When
Trudeau had an interest in a subject, as on foreign policy between 1968 and 1970, he
had a real interest, but once the issue was settled, he moved away.”71 While there
may have been opportunities to construct a nationalist coalition against Canada’s
commitments to NORAD after 1970, the Prime Minister was not as willing to devote
the considerable resources and attention to the issue as he had for NATO in the late
1960s.
As other issues took over, the opacity surrounding Canada’s nuclear posture and
the vagueness of the withdrawal timeline allowed Trudeau to effectively execute a
straddle strategy. As the nuclear issue had become de-politicised since 1963, Trudeau
did not face much external pressure to withdraw nuclear weapons from Canadian soil.
While the White Paper was quite clear that Canada would retain nuclear weapons
on its soil, this assertion did not garner backlash – nationalist, anti-nuclear, or oth-
erwise.72
Trudeau capitalized on this opportunity to bolster his anti-nuclear credentials as
well as Canada’s international standing. In a speech to the UN on May 26th 1978,
he boasted that Canada would soon be withdrawing nuclear weapons from its soil,
drawing upon anti-nuclear and nationalist rhetoric:
We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada’s armed forces in
Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventional armed
aircraft, the nuclear capable planes still assigned to our forces in North
America...We are. . . the first nuclear armed country that has chosen to
divest itself of nuclear weapons.73
While Trudeau portrayed nuclear withdrawal as imminent, Canada would still have
nuclear weapons on its soil for about six years after this statement. However, his
69Ibid., p.238.
70Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.165.
71Sharp in Bothwell and Granatstein, 2017, p.132, interviewed on 8 December 1987.
72Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990, p.240.
73Trudeau, 1978.
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claims were still technically true: Canada had begun to consider a replacement for
the CF-101 in 1977.74
7.4 Conclusion
Overall, the Realpolitik model provides a parsimonious explanation for the timing of
reneging and the order of withdrawal of the nuclear weapons systems on Canadian
soil. While the bomber threat had been declining for decades, by the late-1970s
conventional interceptors were available to replace the CF-101s. Trudeau’s decision
making, for the most part, was guided by his desire to augment Canadian and North
American security in the most cost-effective manner. These nuclear weapon systems
were therefore decommissioned in line with their American counterparts: first, the
Bomarc; later, the CF-101s. This sequencing suggests that these weapons were indeed
obsolete at this point in time.
Because of the sparseness of declassified archives, it is difficult to say with cer-
tainty why Trudeau’s government position seemed to change so starkly between 1970
and 1971. It is possible that this was merely due to strategic considerations and an
authentic belief in the residual Soviet bomber threat. However, evidence suggests
that domestic coalition type played a role in explaining why reneging was not at-
tempted at this time. The members of Cabinet that supported reneging on Canada’s
NORAD nuclear commitments had a more specific agenda than it had in relation
to NATO. While Trudeau was skeptical of the military necessity of retaining nuclear
interceptors, he saw clear military value in Canada’s membership to NORAD and was
more reluctant to confront the United States. Furthermore, some of the nationalist
rhetoric used to justify reneging on NATO undercut Trudeau’s ability to form a na-
tionalist coalition on NORAD. The fear of sovereignty costs associated with reneging
may have helped persuade reluctant Ministers to accept retaining Canada’s nuclear
commitment.
This chapter presents two important limitations for my theory of reneging. Firstly,
it demonstrates that nationalist domestic coalitions provide only one of multiple path-
ways to reneging. Second, it shows that nationalist domestic coalitions that support
reneging in one are not necessarily ‘portable’ to different alliance commitments. The
conversion of nationalist sentiment into a coherent coalition that can achieve reneging
success requires effort, time, and skill from political leaders.




Why do states renege on their alliance commitments, despite institutional incentives
to cooperate? This question turns some of the assumptions of IR on its head. Usually,
cooperation is presented as a puzzle in an anarchic world, using Realism as the main
foil and thus the standard by which theories can prove themselves. Nevertheless,
many studies have shown that the institutionalization of commitments does indeed
create a structure of incentives to keep cooperating.1 However, this linear and self-
perpetuating vision of international cooperation is only part of the story.
While this thesis has focused on alliance commitments, this puzzle is relevant to
any leader seeking to renegotiate their commitments within institutionalized settings
more generally. Considering the recent rise in skepticism of multilateralism, the elec-
tion of Donald Trump, and the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union,
the question of why defection occurs in institutionalized settings and the relationship
between nationalism and defection are increasingly pressing for scholars to examine
in order to understand international relations. However, while recent developments
have brought these questions to the fore, this research has underscored that there
have always been instances of reneging, even in highly institutionalized relationships,
even among democracies, even by weak or dependent states. Why do some leaders
jeopardize long-term gains for short-term payoffs, while most others do not? Why
are most leaders constrained by the perceived domestic and international costs of
reneging, while others are not? The findings presented here can be applied to other
institutionalized contexts, where similar sets of incentives should also apply to bind




Focusing on alliance commitments provides a useful starting point for examining
how and why states defect within institutionalized relationships. Studies of alliance
reliability and defection have found that despite being in the ‘realist’ domain of se-
curity, allies are surprisingly reliable and keep their commitments more often than
not.2 The incentive structure that encourages reliability and discourages defection
involves three types of costs for defection: material costs, reputational costs, and
domestic audience costs. This constellation of costs for reneging can be applied to
other institutionalised settings that are similarly designed to facilitate cooperation.
‘Reneging’ is defined here as a specific type of defection that involves reversing a
previously fulfilled commitment, while still maintaining membership in the alliance
or the institution more generally. Reneging therefore restructures the distribution of
commitments within an institutionalized relationship in favour of the reneging state.
Unlike wholesale withdrawal, reneging involves the continuation of alliance member-
ship, meaning that leaders that engage in reneging prefer to maintain the benefits
of remaining part of the alliance, albeit at a lower cost. Furthermore, unlike ‘softer’
forms of defection or reduction of commitment, reneging is more difficult to hide or
gloss over. Reneging represents precisely the kind of opportunism that institutional
mechanisms are designed to discourage. Therefore, it should be a particularly costly
form of defection. Studying reneging provides a useful starting point for understand-
ing how and why the institutional incentive structures that keep allies committed and
cooperating can break down.
Withdrawal is a unilateral act, as it terminates a relationship with allies. While
political leaders can decide their own states’ alliance contribution, they do so while
they are still embedded within the alliance. Because reneging leaders want to main-
tain their standing within the alliance, they will attempt to minimize the costs of
reneging and assess allied reaction through bargaining. Because of the interaction of
international and domestic incentives involved in defection, I have adapted Putnam’s
two-level game to represent the dynamics of allied bargaining over reneging.3 Both
allies (Level I) and domestic coalitions (Level II) will need to agree to the renegotiated
‘commitment set’ that the reneging state will adhere to. Under these circumstances, a
no-deal scenario involves a “worsening situation” for the alliance, such as an increase
of intra-alliance tensions or even the ejection of the reneging state from the alliance.4




A leader’s decision to renege, their choice of bargaining strategy, and their like-
lihood of success in negotiations is related to the type of domestic coalition that
supports reneging. Leaders with the support of nationalist domestic coalitions face
fewer audience costs for reneging and have more leverage when bargaining with allies
than those with the support or single-issue coalitions. The main difference between
these two types of groups is their scope of grievance with the alliance as well as their
view of the costs of reneging. Nationalist coalitions, skeptical of a multinational al-
liance’s ability to cater to the national interest, are more likely to see reneging as part
of a broader agenda of refocusing security priorities towards more inwardly oriented
‘national’ concerns. Within the context of nuclear sharing, single-issue coalitions
are anti-nuclear coalitions, which only seek to renegotiate their nuclear commitments
and do not question the fundamentals of alliance membership. Anti-nuclear coali-
tions’ bargaining power should be constrained by their sensitivities to the material
and reputational costs of reneging. Therefore, reneging is likely to be ‘double-edged’
and invite domestic audience costs. By contrast, nationalist coalitions are less sensi-
tive to these international costs and are in fact likely to reward reneging rather than
punish it.
Nationalist coalitions afford reneging leaders with three forms of bargaining power
in international negotiations. First, a credible threat of withdrawal from the
alliance or the negotiations themselves, enabled by the tolerance nationalist coalitions
have for no-deal outcomes and their ability to ‘punish’ allies by supporting more
extreme reductions to commitments. Second, a willingness to act unilaterally and
allow leaders to tie their hands to particular outcomes in the pre-negotiation stage.
Third, a low vulnerability to restructuring, related to these coalitions’ sensitivity
to foreign influence. On the other hand, leaders with single-issue coalitions do not have
a credible threat of withdrawal, are incentivized to seek an alliance-wide consensus,
and are vulnerable to restructuring by status quo allies. Thus, statesmen supported by
nationalist coalitions should be more likely to attempt reneging, more likely to adopt
coercive strategies, and more likely to succeed in their reneging attempts; conversely,
statemen with the support of single-issue coalitions, deterred or constrained by higher
costs, should be less likely to attempt to renege, more likely to employ consensus-
based strategies, and more likely to fail if reneging is attempted.
Canada’s nuclear sharing trajectory in NATO and NORAD was selected as an
in-depth case study because it has several characteristics that make it a deviant case
for reneging. Canada is a democratic country, a junior alliance member, and the
alliances under scrutiny are highly institutionalised: all of these characteristics have
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been hypothesized to discourage reneging.5 Nevertheless, Canada’s reliability record
for nuclear sharing is varied and uneven. Furthermore, the in-depth examination of
Canada’s history of nuclear sharing addresses some of the gaps within the alliance
reliability literature. First, it allows for analysis of the dynamics of defection on
peacetime alliance commitments. This provides further insight into claims that have
been tested mostly in reference to commitments that are activated by war. Second,
most of the alliance reliability literature relies on quantitative methods or recent case
studies without access to declassified material. The large volume of archival material
available for most of the of the relevant time period for the Canada case allows for
careful and nuanced scrutiny of the mechanisms involved in decisions to renege. Thus,
this case is particularly well-suited for theory-generating process tracing.
Each chapter in this thesis has explored a different instance related to reneging.
First, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s failed attempt to renege on the nuclear
commitments that he made in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the Leader of the Op-
position Lester Pearson’s sudden reversal of his support for reneging and his deci-
sion to campaign in support of nuclear acquisition in 1963. Third, Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau’s successful effort to withdraw from Canada’s nuclear role in NATO
by 1972. Finally, the total withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Canadian soil in 1984
and Trudeau’s decisions related to the ending of Canada’s nuclear role in NORAD.
Diefenbaker’s fluctuating stance on nuclear sharing provides a rich case study for
examining reneging. This case reaffirms the proposition that leaders who do not keep
their commitments will be punished at the ballot box for their perceived incompe-
tence and reputational damage they may inflict on their country.6 Diefenbaker bound
himself to nuclear sharing in NORAD and NATO by tying his hands and sinking costs
into this commitment. The perception that he was reneging on these commitments
directly led to his electoral defeat. However, Diefenbaker’s choices were not due to his
indifference to public opinion. This case demonstrates that catering to different types
of domestic coalitions will result in different reneging strategies and affects the out-
come of negotiations. At first, the Prime Minister attempted to form an anti-nuclear
coalition that would appease anti-nuclear constituencies, while also retaining the sup-
port of those that were pro-acquisition. Initially, this straddle strategy involved delay
and obfuscation. When avoiding the issue became impossible, Diefenbaker found a
5For example, Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds, 2015; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Kreps, 2010;
Leeds, 2003.
6Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998;
Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.
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compromise solution: the standby approach, which would allow Canada to techni-
cally keep its nuclear commitments and nuclear weapons off its soil. Despite the
considerable domestic constraints that Diefenbaker faced, his bargaining power was
diminished by his domestic coalition in negotiations with the Americans: he did not
have a credible threat of withdrawal, required American and allied consensus, and
was vulnerable to restructuring attempts. Indeed, it was the United States’ public
criticism of Diefenbaker’s administration and allied accusations of reneging that pre-
cipitated the collapse of the Conservative government. At the same time, a clear-cut
case of foreign interference allowed Diefenbaker to reframe reneging as a nationalist
cause. While Diefenbaker lost the election, records show that this anti-American and
nationalist message resonated with some voters, convincing them that reneging was
an act of nationalist defiance. The Americans were concerned enough with the force
of a potential nationalist coalition that they stayed out of the election and tried to
avoid direct confrontation with Diefenbaker.
While the Diefenbaker case demonstrates how domestic coalition type can af-
fect reneging strategy and outcome, the Pearson chapter shows that leaders with
the support of anti-nuclear coalitions might refrain from attempting to renege in the
first place. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, Pearson and the Liberal
Party staked their position in opposition to nuclear acquisition on narrowly anti-
nuclear grounds. While Pearson and the Liberals supported membership in NATO
and NORAD, they argued that nuclear sharing would amount to the spread of nuclear
weapons and an expansion of the nuclear club. Despite this position and Pearson’s
own personal anti-nuclear beliefs, in January 1963, Pearson reversed Liberal policy to
support nuclear acquisition. This chapter showed that this reversal can be traced to
Pearson’s growing awareness of the international and domestic costs of reneging on
Canada’s nuclear commitments. Ultimately, despite his reservations about nuclear
weapons, Pearson believed that maintaining the strength and stability of Canada’s
alliances and its reputation among allies was more important. Furthermore, he be-
lieved that voters would be sensitive to these costs as well. Pearson’s gamble paid
off: he was able to win the 1963 election, albeit with a minority government. While
anti-nuclear activists abandoned the Liberal Party, the Liberals were able to retain
their base to a greater extent than the Conservatives. They also attracted voters that
were reluctant to support the Conservative Party because of Diefenbaker’s nation-
alist reneging. Crucially, at the elite level, Pearson was able to retain most of the
anti-nuclear members of his coalition, who did not abandon Pearson or the Liberals
despite their disagreement on the nuclear issue.
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The case of Trudeau and the withdrawal from Canada’s nuclear commitment to
NATO gets to the heart of the puzzle of this thesis. Despite warnings from Canadian
officials of the high costs of reneging; despite initial pushback from both American and
NATO officials; despite the generally positive view of NATO within Canadian society,
Trudeau was able to renege on Canada’s nuclear commitments, dramatically reduce
its conventional commitments, and avoid domestic audience costs. Trudeau’s success
was due to the nature of his coalition that supported reneging: It saw conventional
reductions and nuclear withdrawal as part of a broader nationalist agenda that would
refocus defence priorities closer to home. Trudeau’s strategy of coalition-building
elevated nationalist and NATO-skeptic officials while sidelining and co-opting status
quo officials. This resulted in reneging being framed as a compromise outcome.7
At the international level, the support of a nationalist coalition provided Canadian
negotiators with real bargaining power: they had a credible threat of withdrawal; were
able to unilaterally tie their hands to particular outcomes during the pre-negotiation
stage; and deterred restructuring attempts by the United States. Archival records
show that Trudeau’s nationalist coalition, especially the threats of withdrawal, had
a major impact on the Americans’ approach to negotiations, causing them to drop
hard-line opposition to Canadian reductions.
The last chapter examines the final case of reneging: Trudeau’s decision to with-
draw nuclear weapons from Canadian soil. While the findings of this chapter are
constrained by the limited accessed to archival material compared to the other cases,
this chapter demonstrates some important limitations to the argument presented in
this thesis. Firstly, presents a plausible case for the Realpolitik model, showing that
there are multiple potential pathways to reneging. The timing of the withdrawal of
the Bomarc and the CF-101 Voodoo corresponded with the relative decline of their
military utility, the decline in systemic threat, and the availability of conventional
alternatives. Secondly, the inability of Trudeau to easily translate reneging success
from one set of nuclear commitments to another – or rather, convert his nationalist
coalition against NATO into one against NORAD – demonstrates that formulating
and directing a nationalist coalition towards reneging is a difficult and costly task.
8.2 Putnam’s Two-Level Game
This research develops Putnam’s model in three ways, each related to the three sources
of bargaining power that are outlined in the argument: the credible threat of with-
7Halloran, 2006.
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drawal and the size of the win-set; the willingness to act unilaterally and the pre-
negotiation stage; and the vulnerability to restructuring and reverberations. These
findings have implications for how this model should be applied to other contexts.
In Putnam’s model, leverage is directly related to the win-set size. All else being
equal, negotiators with larger win-sets have less bargaining power than those with
narrower win-sets: “The larger the perceived win-set of the negotiator, the more
he can be “pushed around” by the other Level I negotiators.”8 Those with narrow
win-sets are better able to threaten involuntary defection if they do not get their
way. According to Putnam, domestic groups with narrow win-sets provide their
leaders with a credible threat of withdrawal: “the lower the cost of “no-agreement” to
constituents, the smaller the win-set.”9 However, this logic only applies to negotiators
that are attempting to build up commitments as opposed to those that attempt to
wind down commitments. In the case of reneging, the amount of leverage the size
of the win-set will afford its negotiators will depend on its content. A tolerance of
no deal will not always result in a narrower win-set. After all, single-issue coalitions
have a low tolerance for no agreement, but a narrow win-set. Nationalist coalitions
have a high tolerance of no agreement, but a wider win-set, as they are seeking more
reductions to their alliance commitments. Thus, a wider win-set in this case represent
a lower ‘floor’ for reductions to a state’s alliance commitments.
The contrasting examples of Diefenbaker’s reneging attempt in 1962 and Trudeau’s
attempt in 1969 shed light on how the relationship between win-set size, the credible
threat of withdrawal, and leverage operates contrary to Putnam’s predictions when
applied to negotiations on reducing commitments. Both leaders relied on domestic
constraints as leverage when negotiating with allies about the extent and nature of the
reduction to their alliance commitments. Diefenbaker’s anti-nuclear coalition would
not tolerate the stationing of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, nor would it tolerate
a no-deal scenario. Despite the fact that the Americans believed that the standby
proposal or something similar would be the only domestically workable agreement
for Diefenbaker’s coalition, this did not translate into real bargaining power. On the
other hand, Trudeau’s reliance on a nationalist coalition resulted in an arguably larger
win-set. The Cabinet could have ratified a wide range of conventional reductions,
alongside reneging on its nuclear commitment. Nevertheless, the threat of walking




This demonstrates how narrow win-sets do not automatically confer a credible threat
of withdrawal, nor do larger win-sets preclude it.
The content of the win-set and tolerance of no-deal is important for determining
leverage in negotiations related to reneging. In 1969, NATO and the United States
were forced to widen their win-sets and accept Canadian reductions that were previ-
ously deemed intolerable, rather than risk the collapse of negotiations and Canada’s
withdrawal from NATO. Thus, the size of status quo allies’ initial win-set mattered
less in this case than their aversion to a no-deal outcome.
The case studies also demonstrate that the pre-negotiation at the domestic level,
the stage before Level I, can have major implications for the bargaining power of
a reneging state. While Putnam accounts for this stage, it is not a main element
of focus, as he describes it as primarily a stage where negotiators engage in “prior
consultations and bargaining. . . to hammer out an initial position for the Level I
negotiations.”10 My research demonstrates that this initial stage can establish not
only the opening position, but also the strategies that will be pursued in Level I.
Further, this stage is also important for the creation or foreclosure opportunities for
restructuring.
Finally, by paying close attention to domestic coalition type, one can make predic-
tions about when restructuring is likely to be attempted and whether it will result in
positive or negative reverberations. Putnam hypothesizes that restructuring attempts
are more likely to result in positive reverberation in dependent states, internationalist
constituencies, and when attempted by allies as opposed to adversaries; furthermore,
he argues that leaders should be reluctant to attempt restructuring when they fear
that there is a high likelihood of negative reverberation.11 Despite these claims, Put-
nam also concludes that “predicting the precise effect of foreign pressure is difficult”
even though “reverberation seems to occur frequently in two-level games.”12 My work
shows that nationalist constituencies should be more hostile to foreign restructuring,
resulting in negative reverberations. Domestic coalition type can be a more powerful
predictor than dependence on or the relationship with the foreign ‘restructurer.’
The contrasting reactions of Diefenbaker and Pearson to General Norstad’s and
the State Department’s public claims that Canada was reneging on its NATO com-
mitments demonstrates this dynamic neatly. For Diefenbaker, these events created





They provided the impetus for the Prime Minister to turn the nuclear issue into a
nationalist rallying cry. To a nationalist coalition, these were foreign intrusions that
necessitated a leader who would stand up to them and not let Canada be ‘pushed
around.’ For Pearson, these public statements justified the abandoning of his anti-
nuclear position. It demonstrated that Canada was losing standing amongst its al-
lies. Thus, these statements created positive reverberations among non-nationalists,
putting in stark relief the international costs of reneging.
The Kennedy administration’s continuous monitoring of the level of nationalism
within Canada and its concerns about exerting too much pressure on the Canadian
government demonstrates this dynamic. The State Department justified their press
release on the grounds that most of the Canadian population did not have nation-
alist or anti-American views, making them more amenable to restructuring. When
Diefenbaker made a concerted attempt to form a nationalist coalition and appeal to
nationalist constituents in the 1963 elections, the Americans backed off. They did so
despite their considerable interest in the outcome of the election, because they feared
further restructuring attempts would ultimately be counterproductive and reinforce
Diefenbaker’s nationalist appeals. Learning from this episode, the Nixon adminis-
tration also avoided public rebuke of Trudeau, fearing that it would strengthen his
nationalist coalition and push him towards even more extreme reductions to Canada’s
alliance commitments.
8.3 The Costs of Reneging
This thesis has found that the costs that scholars have theorised make commitments
binding – the material, reputational, and domestic audience costs – are not mere aca-
demic constructs, but were articulated by status quo politicians as real constraints on
political behaviour. The looming threat of these costs was present in each case, re-
gardless of the outcome. In the cases of attempted reneging, Diefenbaker and Trudeau
persisted despite warning of these negative consequences. Indeed, in Diefenbaker’s
case, he succumbed to domestic audience costs, as his inability to fulfill Canada’s
nuclear commitments was a key factor in his electoral defeat in 1963. The interviews
of Canadian voters that shunned the Conservative Party confirm past findings on the
micro-foundations of audience costs: Voters believed that reneging would undermine
Canada’s reputation among its allies and Diefenbaker’s handling of the nuclear issue
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demonstrated his incompetence and lack of leadership.13
Pearson thought that reneging would be so domestically unpopular and inter-
nationally damaging that he reversed the Liberals’ long-held opposition to nuclear
acquisition and staked his campaign on maintaining Canada’s nuclear commitment.
In this case, the domestic support for nuclear acquisition had less to do with the
value that Canadians ascribed to nuclear weapons themselves. Rather, it was re-
lated to their beliefs about the importance of maintaining alliance commitments and
the underlying value of the alliances themselves. Likewise, the military necessity of
the nuclear weapons systems was not the focus of Pearson’s campaign. In fact, he
promised to immediately begin the process of negotiating out of these commitments
once acquisition was secured. Instead, the Liberals’ campaign underscored the costs of
reneging and the importance of maintaining Canada’s reputation within its alliances
and on the international stage. Pearson presented himself to voters as someone who
was reliable and would keep Canada’s commitments to its allies. At the same time, he
castigated Diefenbaker as a leader who was recklessly endangering Canada’s standing
and security.
The presence of the costs related to reneging is an important finding, as most
studies on alliance defection have focused on wartime contexts.14 While the issues
at stake may be different for peacetime as opposed to wartime commitments, the
threat of material, reputational, and domestic costs resulting from defection provided
a consistent incentive to maintain even politically controversial commitments. Indeed,
the overall level of threat and the likelihood of the outbreak of war did not have a
consistent effect on whether a leader would support reneging or maintaining commit-
ments. While the Cuban Missile Crisis and heightened state of threat were proximate
causes of Pearson’s reversal, the same international stimuli increased Diefenbaker’s
reluctance to accept nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.
This qualitative examination of material, reputational, and domestic audience
costs allows for more fine-grained conceptual development of them. For example,
within the alliance reliability literature reputational costs are often narrowly oper-
ationalized as a weakened ability to form an alliance in the future.15 The in-depth
examination of the Canadian case allows for a richer understanding of how leaders
13Fearon, 1994, pp.580-581; Levy, McKoy, Poast, and Wallace, 2015, pp.997-999; Smith, 1998;
Tomz, 2007, pp.835-836.
14For exceptions, see Catalinac, 2010; Duffield, 1992.
15Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, and Wood, 2012; Gibler, 2008; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and
Cooper, 2016, p.94.
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perceive these costs even when they anticipate they will remain a member of the al-
liance. In this case, leaders are concerned with the reputational effects of unreliability
among allies as well as on the international stage more generally. Status quo oriented
politicians often made references to the negative effects of reneging on Canada’s sta-
tus and standing within the alliance. For example, during the Defence Review, status
quo officials worried that Canada would not be considered a “serious ally” within
NATO if it reduced its commitment too greatly. This loss of standing and reputation
for unreliability would undercut Canada’s ability to influence its allies both in the
context of the alliance and other multilateral institutions.
The discussions among status quo officials during the defence review in the late
1960s also underscores how alliances are considered facilitators of both strategic and
economic cooperation. Reneging therefore could entail both kinds of material costs.
While those that supported the status quo worried about the more immediate security
deficit that Canadian withdrawals would entail, they were also concerned about how
Canada’s actions would affect NATO’s credibility and stability more generally. The
ubiquity of status quo officials’ fears of a ‘contagion effect’ or ‘reneging cascade’ are
striking and represent a strong incentive towards cooperation. Put in game theory
terms, these officials see alliance cooperation as akin to a stag hunt, where cooperation
is self-reinforcing as well as defection.16 Economic concerns also strongly featured in
status quo officials objects to reneging, revealing the interplay between security and
economic cooperation.17 When considering reneging on NATO commitments, the
writers of the Defence Policy Review worried that a nationalistic defence policy could
have negative reverberations on trade relations with allied nations. Thus, the threat
of spillover was considered by Canadian officials and offered a powerful incentive to
maintain the status quo.
While the Diefenbaker case affirms previous research on the existence and logics
of audience costs, it also provides added nuanced insights. First, it shows that some
leaders renege on commitments, despite the threat of audience costs. Diefenbaker
did not renege because he was unaware of the potential domestic risks of appearing
unreliable. He thought that he could avoid audience costs by convincing enough
of the public that he had a good reason for opposing nuclear acquisition: because
16Nationalists, on the other hand, do not seem to be operating according to this logic. According
to the ‘stage hunt’ metaphor, the nationalist view is essentially that they can hunt rabbits while
the rest of the alliance takes care of the stag. This reasoning runs counter to the game theoretic
logic that equilibria only exist in the state of mutual defection or mutual cooperation, and that one
player’s defection will have an unwinding effect on cooperation for the rest.
17On the interplay between strategic and economic ties between allies, see, for example, Mastan-
duno, 1998, 2020; Powers, 2004.
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he had not made those commitments in the first place; because the international
environment had rendered them obsolete; and because it was not in the national
interest of Canada to accept these weapons. This approach lends credence to recent
findings that leaders can avoid audience costs if they provide justifications for doing
so.18 At the same time, Diefenbaker’s experience shows that not all justifications
are viewed as credible by domestic audiences. In fact, not all types of domestic
audiences may view the same justification as convincing. Second, the role of political
elites in mitigating or amplifying domestic audience costs has been highlighted in
several studies.19 Diefenbaker’s experience affirms these findings, as the collapse of
his government clearly affected the views of voters on the Prime Minister’s confidence
and further politicised the nuclear issue. It also demonstrates that elite dissent can
be its own form of domestic audience costs: elite-level rebellion against Diefenbaker’s
approach to nuclear sharing directly led to the fall of his government. This finding
challenges a clear-cut separation between elite cohesion and the concept of domestic
audience costs.
8.4 The Strength of Nationalist Coalitions
While the costs of reneging were salient to each case, both leaders, elites, and the
wider public weighed them differently. This finding challenges Kreps’s claim that
the systemic incentives should result in elite consensus on the wisdom of avoiding
defection and maintaining commitments.20 Indeed, in each case, there was substantial
elite dissensus on the prospect of reneging on alliance commitments. Depending on
the coalition that supports reneging, leaders will face different sets of constraints
and differing views of the reputational and material costs of reneging. Studies that
examine the effects of domestic coalitions on audience costs and alliance commitment
often focus on the left-right divide or the contrast of hawks and doves.21 For example,
scholars have argued that right-wing coalitions should be more sensitive to sovereignty
costs and more skeptical of multilateral institutions than those on the left.22 This
research has demonstrated another salient dimension to commitment and defection:
level of nationalism. Nationalism can transcend the traditional right/left divide and
can have different implications depending on the context. While Diefenbaker and
18Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012.
19Ibid.; Saunders, 2015, 2018.
20Kreps, 2010.
21Kertzer and Brutger, 2016; Rapport and Rathburn, 2020.
22Rapport and Rathburn, 2020.
8. CONCLUSION 217
Trudeau stood at opposite sides of the Canadian political spectrum, both leaders
drew upon nationalist rhetoric, emphasizing the importance of Canadian sovereignty
in the face of multilateral and bilateral pressures.
These nationalist coalitions are important because they do not behave in the way
that institutionalists predict. Indeed, nationalist constituencies’ evaluations of the
material and reputational costs of defection are configured differently. Fundamen-
tally, nationalists will be skeptical of multilateral institutions that can dilute and
compromise the pursuit of the national interest. As a result, nationalists should be
less likely to punish leaders for reneging on international commitments in pursuit of
nationalist causes.
This research suggests that nationalist groups focus on relative rather than ab-
solute material gains and costs, even within institutionalized contexts. For example,
while Canada benefited from the existence of NATO, Trudeau was preoccupied by
the notion that it did not benefit to the same extent as its European allies. At
the core of his nationalist justification for reneging was a focus on relative gains: if
Canada did not benefit as much as its European allies, it should contribute less. On
the other hand, status quo officials such as Leo Cadieux and Mitchell Sharp focused
on the absolute gains of membership: if Canada lessened its contribution to NATO,
the alliance as a whole would be weaker and less stable, undermining the benefits it
provides to Canada.23 Furthermore, the Diefenbaker case suggests that nationalist
constituencies may be especially sensitive to entrapment concerns.24 Diefenbaker’s
campaign rhetoric about Canada being a “decoy” or a “burnt sacrifice” draws on
fears of entrapment, highlighting the potential security costs of the alliance, rather
than the benefits.25 Under Trudeau, nationalist members of Cabinet also highlighted
the material benefits of reneging rather than the costs, such as the redirection of
resources towards more ‘national’ security priorities or even away from the security
sphere altogether towards domestic projects.
Nationalist constituencies also conceive of international reputation differently.
While both Diefenbaker and Trudeau advocated for reneging, they were not uncon-
23This divide between focusing on absolute versus relative gains could extend to leaders’ evalua-
tions of specific weapons systems. For example, Trudeau wanted each individual weapons system’s
value to be rigorously analysed and specifically justified.
24Simpson (2001) argues that Canadian leaders can be divided into two categories according
to their belief systems regarding NATO: defenders and critics. One of the key categories that
distinguishes these two belief systems is their view on entrapment and abandonment (Simpson,
2001, pp.41-49, 72-74).
25JFK, NSF, Box 18A, Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 5 April 1963; JFK, NSF, Box 18A,
Canada General 4/1/63-4/10/63, 4 April 1963a.
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cerned with Canada’s reputation: specifically, its reputation for not being pushed
around or dictated to by outside powers. While Pearson highlighted the importance
of Canada’s status as a good ally, both Trudeau and, eventually, Diefenbaker em-
phasized the normative and reputational gains of breaking away from its allies and
pursuing a more independent path. Thus, nationalist coalitions tend to focus on and
emphasize the reputational gains of reneging and discount the reputational costs.
While this research has highlighted the interaction between domestic coalition type
and audience costs, the type of coalition can also mitigate costs at the international
level to a degree. In the case of Trudeau’s cuts to NATO, the nationalist nature
of his coalition deterred the United States from trying to directly punish Canada.
Indeed, advisor Helmut Sonnenfeldt’s warning that pushing the Canadians too hard
to retain commitments could effectively “slam the door” on further negotiations by
empowering the NATO-skeptic bloc in Cabinet convinced both the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defence to back down for a hard-line strategy.26 Trudeau’s skillful
formation of a credible nationalist coalition not only affected the level of domestic
audience costs and the outcome of negotiation, but also affected the costs meted out
at the international level, at least in the short-term.
8.5 The Role of Political Leadership
While nationalist coalitions provide leaders with powerful leverage in international
negotiations, the case study presented here also demonstrates that the production and
maintenance of nationalist coalitions is a costly affair. This has several implications.
Not all attempts to direct a nationalist movement against a particular institution will
succeed. Regardless of whether a nationalist movement is organic or contrived, leaders
need to be skillful in order to successfully marshal nationalist coalitions towards a
concrete foreign policy goal. Leaders will also need to skillfully balance the will of
extreme factions against the more moderate members of their coalition, lest they risk
its collapse. Given the amount of effort involved and the potential costs of failure,
leaders are likely to be selective in their reneging attempts.
The variation in outcomes between Diefenbaker in 1963 and Trudeau in 1969
points to the importance of leadership in managing a nationalist coalition towards
successful reneging. While both relied upon nationalist coalitions and rhetoric in
justifying their opposition to Canada’s nuclear commitment, Trudeau’s message was
26FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol.XLI, Doc.94, 28 May 1969.
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more coherent, and he was more organized in managing and coopting dissident Min-
isters within his Cabinet. It is important to highlight that both Diefenbaker and
Trudeau faced divided Cabinets and publics that were largely supportive of the al-
liances in question.27 Thus, the outcomes of reneging success and failure was not
necessarily determined from the outset. The role of leadership skill and agency pro-
vides an important mitigating factor on the ability of a nationalist coalition to allow
for successful reneging. Furthermore, the management of elites is an important aspect
for successful reneging and crucial to mitigating audience costs.28
Trudeau succeeded in his nationalist campaign, while Diefenbaker failed for several
reasons. Firstly, Trudeau was consistent in his messaging. Trudeau presented the
reassessment of Canada’s defence priorities as an impartial and thorough process, with
the outcome not being determined from the outset; however, Trudeau also consistently
indicated that change was on the horizon. Once the review was completed, Trudeau
did not deviate from his message for a “planned and phased reduction” of Canada’s
contribution to NATO.29 Secondly, Trudeau opened the dialogue to allow for more
NATO-skeptic voices to participate. This shifted the balance of power within Cabinet,
allowing for status quo officials to be co-opted into his nationalist coalition. Thirdly,
Trudeau decisively called the consensus within Cabinet, enforcing a policy that all
Ministers were bound to abide by. The Prime Minister also prioritized withdrawing
from Canada’s nuclear role in these discussions and ensured that Canada leave this
role by 1972.
On the other hand, Diefenbaker’s attempts to maintain an anti-nuclear coalition
ultimately undermined his ability to form a nationalist coalition at the elite or mass
level. The Conservative’s surge later in the election suggested that Diefenbaker’s na-
tionalist appeals did resonate with a significant portion of the Canadian electorate.
However, while Diefenbaker’s electoral fortunes seem to improve as time went on, he
ultimately could not shake off his previous mishandling of the nuclear issue. Most
crucial in preventing Diefenbaker from forming a nationalist coalition was his inconsis-
tency in both policy and rhetoric. The most obvious example is that in the late 1950s,
Diefenbaker made statements that asserted his support for nuclear acquisition and
promised that these commitments would be fulfilled within the near future; however,
27Arguably, Trudeau faced a more unfavourable balance-of-power within his Cabinet, as both the
Secretary of State of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence were firmly supportive
of the status quo. Diefenbaker, on the other hand, had a powerful anti-nuclear ally in his Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, who was highly skeptical of Canada’s nuclear
commitments.
28Saunders, 2015, 2018.
29DHH, RP, 2109, 3 April 1969.
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by the early 1960s, Diefenbaker’s seemed caught in between the pro- and anti-nuclear
factions, adopting a straddle strategy that left his position murky. Indeed, Diefen-
baker only formed a coherent nationalist anti-acquisition message during the 1963
campaign. His indecisiveness allowed for these two opposing camps to strengthen
within Cabinet. The infighting between these Ministers ultimately spilled out into
the public sphere, ending in the resignation of several key Ministers and the collapse
of government in 1963. Diefenbaker’s refusal to call the consensus within Cabinet fur-
ther fuelled these divides. This prolonged the crisis by preventing dissident Ministers
from being bound by Cabinet solidarity in support of any one position.
Crucially, Trudeau managed to keep most of the dissent within the confines of
Cabinet. While Trudeau faced threats of resignation, they never materialised and
were issued privately. Status quo Ministers were also bound by Cabinet solidarity to
adhere to the decisions made by the government. The strategic maneuvering by the
Prime Minister, which elevated the most extreme anti-NATO positions in Cabinet,
allowed for substantial withdrawals to be framed as a compromise domestically as well
as internationally.30 Diefenbaker, on the other hand, was unable to manage the dissent
amongst his Ministers. The turmoil in Cabinet over the nuclear issue reverberated
into the public sphere: not only did it make a relatively esoteric defence issue one of
the primary subjects of the 1963 campaign, but the discord among Conservative elites
undermined popular confidence in Diefenbaker’s leadership. It also undermined his
bargaining power with the Americans. While the potential for controversy on nuclear
sharing was always present, the issue never reached the same kind of public scrutiny
as it did in the early 1960s. Diefenbaker, due to his unwillingness to put out a clear
stance, was not able to control the message around nuclear weapons, which led to the
issue taking on a life of its own.
These cases demonstrate that reneging is difficult to successfully execute; that the
political costs to a botched attempt at withdrawal from an alliance commitment can
be extremely high. Trudeau’s aborted attempt to renege on Canada’s nuclear role
in NORAD also reflects the difficulty of reneging. Political leaders need to devote a
good deal of energy and political capital towards formulating a nationalist coalition
in favour of reneging. In this case, it appears that other issues took precedence
for the administration, allowing Canada to retain nuclear weapons on its soil until
1984. It is also possible that the nature of the nationalist coalition and messaging,
which prioritised Canadian national security rather than an anti-American brand of
nationalism, was a less effective vehicle to leverage withdrawal from a North American
30Halloran, 2006.
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nuclear defence role. Unlike NATO, NORAD had important implications for Canada’s
national security. A pullback on Canada’s contribution to North American defence
would only increase the United States’ dominance in this sphere.
8.6 Implications and Future Research
This thesis suggests that an upsurge of nationalism may lead to more political lead-
ers attempting to restructure institutions towards a more favourable distribution of
costs and benefits for their state. Thus, a rise in nationalist may not lead to outright
exit from various institutions. However, reneging is a risky strategy: if negotia-
tions collapse or allies ‘call the bluff’ of reneging leaders, it may lead to withdrawal
or an increase in tensions between allies. Regardless of the particular outcome, a
widespread upsurge in nationalism across the globe will likely have negative implica-
tions on the health of international institutions. The case of Canada demonstrates
that nationalism can rise and affect the institutional commitments even within states
that have entrenched political economies favouring ‘outward-looking’ or “internation-
alizing” diplomatic, economic, and security policy.31
Two other recent examples demonstrate this dynamic between nationalism, reneg-
ing, and the threat of withdrawal: The United Kingdom’s exit from the EU and the
United States’ renegotiation of NAFTA. While both cases technically involved ‘exit’
from a particular institution, they actually amounted to attempts to restructure in-
stitutionalized commitments in the favour of the initiating state. Ultimately, the UK
and the EU were able to negotiate a deal that dramatically restructured, but did not
completely sever their relationship. In pre-Brexit negotiations, nationalist appeals
were used in the hope that the UK could retain the benefits that it enjoyed as a
member of the EU, while shedding the commitments that entailed high material or
sovereignty costs. Indeed, the threat of ‘no-deal’ or the complete demise of the insti-
tutional relationship and reciprocal commitments between actors was used by both
the US and the UK in attempts to extract a better deal from their status quo coun-
terparts at the international level. Thus, in both of these cases, rising nationalism
was directed at a particular institution and commitment set, but resulted in reneging
rather than complete withdrawal.
Conceptually, more work needs to be done on defining the various facets of de-
fection. This study highlighted the importance of reneging, due to its costliness for
actors in institutionalised alliances. Building on the definition presented here, and
31Solingen, 2007, p.41.
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others such as McInnis’s definition of defection, future studies could lay out the var-
ious options a state can take when it does not want to retain a commitment. For
example, within the realm of alliance commitments: States can renege on a commit-
ment that they are currently fulfilling; they can refuse to renew their commitment or
set time limits on commitments; they can stall in bringing a commitment to fulfill-
ment after ratification; they can diminish their commitment without reneging on it.
Characterisation of various types of defection leads to theoretical questions: When
and why do states engage in particular forms of defection, and when are they most
likely to take some kind of compensatory action? Future studies can also explore
the relative frequency of different types of defection. This study hypothesizes that
reneging should be more rare than other types of defection, as it is more costly.
Future researchers can also test the generalisability of the domestic coalition type
argument by applying it to other case studies that encompass other states, institu-
tions, and/or time periods. A comparative approach may also illuminate the under-
lying causes for domestic coalition type and why certain leaders pursue certain kinds
of coalitions. The application of this argument to other cases will also allow for the
uncovering of further mechanisms for defection and reneging. While the presence of
a nationalist coalition explains Trudeau’s withdrawal from Canada’s nuclear role in
NATO, this finding does not preclude other pathways for reneging and defection.
More research is needed on the interaction between junior alliance membership,
nationalism, and reneging. As Catalinac notes, “there has been little research to
date that has addressed the questions of when states will become unhappy with
their surrender of autonomy, and what they might do about it.”32 While Morrow
and Catalinac highlight that changes in power or threat perception can result in
increases in demands for autonomy among junior alliance members, my research sug-
gests that there are also purely domestic level causes of demands for autonomy.33
While junior status has been found to make defection less likely in wartime contexts,
domestically-driven reneging may be more likely in junior alliance members, since
questions of dependency and sovereignty are more likely to be relevant within their
domestic spheres. On the other hand, senior alliance members are unlikely to have
such concerns and may therefore choose less controversial reductions over reneging.
Senior alliance members may also worry that reneging on their alliance commitments
would inflame or be an impetus for these tensions for their junior allies. For example,
the American reluctance to withdraw all nuclear weapons from Greece in the 1960s
32Catalinac, 2010, p.334.
33Ibid., pp.324-325, 332; Morrow, 1990.
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and 1970s, despite concerns about the physical security of the weapons, was related
to their desire not to “further alienate the Greek government from NATO.”34 More
research is needed to determine the extent to which nationalist domestic movements
are more likely to be a ‘weapon of the weak’ for reneging on alliance commitments.
My thesis also suggests further avenues of research for studies on domestic au-
dience costs. Most recent studies on audience costs take the form of experiments,
focusing on the audience side. Essentially, they examine under what circumstances
do domestic audiences punish international unreliability in their leadership. However,
demonstrating the existence of audience costs cannot fully explain how they might
affect foreign policy. There is another side of the token to explain how audience costs
affect outcomes that deserves equal attention: the role of political leaders. Do po-
litical leaders recognize domestic audience costs and act to avoid them? If so, under
what circumstances does the threat of audience costs affect foreign policy decision-
making? This thesis challenges the often-repeated assertion that audience costs are
too difficult to study qualitatively or directly due to selection effects.35 This argu-
ment asserts that if audience costs exist, leaders should be deterred from reneging in
the first place, leading to a paucity of case study material to engage with.36 While
well-reasoned, this deductive argument pre-supposes what kind of empirical material
is actually available.37 The frequency of policy reversals in this case suggests that
researchers are likely to find cases similar to Diefenbaker’s, where leaders make inter-
national commitments only to renege. Finally, this thesis shows that political leaders
do recognize the impact of audience costs and act accordingly to avoid them. Yet,
these strategies can be self-defeating. Thus, merely providing a justification “on the
basis of new information” may not be enough to avoid audience costs: domestic au-
diences need to find them credible.38 More research is needed to assess how different
justifications can interact with different domestic audiences.
34Kristensen, 2005, p.25.
35Kertzer and Brutger, 2016, p.234; Schultz, 2001; Trager and Vavreck, 2011, p.532.
36Ibid.
37When audience costs have been studied qualitatively, it has been in relation to threats during
international crises, see Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012.
38Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012, p.323.
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library (RN)
Yorba Linda, California, USA
244
National Security Council Files (NSC)
Country Files – Europe
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 7 February 1969. ‘Telegram from Linder to
Secretary of State,’ Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 13 February 1969. ‘Telegram from Secretary
of State Rogers to American Embassy Ottawa,’ Confidential.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 18 February 1969. Telegram from Secretary
of State Rogers to American Embassy Ottawa,’ Confidential.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 17 March 1969. ‘US Department of State
Research Memorandum, Subject: Canada: Foreign and Defense Policy Review,’
prepared by INR – Thomas L. Hughes, Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969a. ‘Memorandum of Conver-
sation, Subject: Consultation; European Problems,’ Confidential.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 24 March 1969b. ‘Memorandum of Conver-
sation, Subject: Canadian Foreign Policy Review,’ Confidential.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 26 May 1969. ‘Department of State Telegram,
to American Embassy in Ottawa, Joint State/Defense Message’ Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 1 of 2, 10 July 1969. ‘Telegram from Secretary of
State Rogers to US Mission NATO,’ Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 26 May 1969. ‘Telegram from US Mission
NATO (Cleveland), to Secretary of State,’ Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 27 May 1969. ‘Memorandum for Mr.
Kissinger, Subject: Secretary Laird’s Comments on Canadian Defense Plans,’
prepared by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Secret.
RN, NSC, Box 670, Canada Vol.1 2 of 2, 28 May 1969. ‘Memorandum for Mr.
Kissinger, Subject: State Department Demarch on Canadian Defense Plan,’ pre-
pared by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Secret.
245
Polling Data
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1961. Gallup Poll, September 1961,
#291 [Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.
[distributor]. Accessed online: http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/
index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-291-
E-1961-09&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1962. Gallup Poll, June 1962a, #296
[Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.
[distributor]. Accessed online: http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/
index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-296-
E-1962-06-a&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1962. Gallup Poll, November 1962,
#299 [Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.
[distributor]. Accessed online: http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/
index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-299-
E-1962-11&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1963. Gallup Poll, March 1963, #301
[Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.
[distributor]. Accessed online: http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/
index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-301-
E-1963-03&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1968. Gallup Poll, October 1968,
#332 [Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.
[distributor]. Accessed online: http://odesi2.scholarsportal.info/webview/
index.jsp?object=http://142.150.190.128:80%2Fobj%2FfStudy%2Fcipo-332-
E-1968-08&mode=documentation&v=2&top=yes
Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO). 1969. Gallup Poll, July 1969, #336
[Canada]. [public-use microdata file]. Toronto, Ontario. Gallup Canada Inc.





Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (2000) ‘Hard and soft law in international governance’,
International organization, 54(3), pp. 421–456.
Beach, D. (2017) ‘Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science’, Oxford Research En-
cyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2013) ‘The Three Different Variants of Process-
Tracing and Their Uses’, in Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guide-
lines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 9–22.
Bennett, D. S. (1997) ‘Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984’,
American journal of political science, 41(3), pp. 846–878.
Berger, A. (2012) ‘A Tornado in a Teacup? Examining Germany’s Alleged Nu-
clear Strike Aircraft Modernisation’. RUSI. Available at: https://rusi.org/
commentary/tornado-teacup-examining-germanys-alleged-nuclear-strike-
aircraft-modernisation.
Berkemeier, M. and Fuhrmann, M. (2018) ‘Reassessing the fulfillment of alliance
commitments in war’, Research & Politics, 5(2), pp. 1–5.
Bothwell, R. (2007) Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984. Van-
couver: UBC Press.
Bothwell, R. and Granatstein, J. L. (2017) Trudeau’s World: Insiders Reflect on
Foreign Policy, Trade, and Defence, 1968-84. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Boyer, M. A. (2000) ‘Issue definition and two-level negotiations: An application to
the American foreign policy process’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 11(2), pp. 185–212.
Brown, J. N. and Marcum, A. S. (2011) ‘Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political
Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy’, Security Studies, 20(2), pp.
141–170.
Buckley, B. (2000) Canada’s early nuclear policy: fate, chance, and character. Mon-
treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Carlsnaes, W. (2002) ‘Foreign Policy’, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B.
A. (eds) Handbook of international relations. London: Sage, pp. 298–325.
247
Catalinac, A. L. (2010) ‘Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing
“Opposition for Autonomy” in Asymmetric Alliances’, Foreign Policy Analysis,
6(4), pp. 317–338.
Chaudoin, S. (2014a) ‘Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes’,
International organization, 68(4), pp. 877–911.
Chaudoin, S. (2014b) ‘Promises or policies? an experimental analysis of international
agreements and audience reactions’, International organization, 68(1), pp. 235–
256.
Chiba, D., Johnson, J. C. and Leeds, B. A. (2015) ‘Careful Commitments: Democratic
States and Alliance Design’, The journal of politics, 77(4), pp. 968–982.
Choi, A. (2012) ‘Fighting to the Finish : Democracy and Commitment in Coalition
War’, Security Studies, 21(4), pp. 624–653.
Clare, J. (2007) ‘Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests’, The journal of politics,
69(3), pp. 732–745.
Clearwater, J. (1998) Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada’s
Cold War Arsenal. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
Clearwater, J. (1999) U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada. Toronto: Dundurn.
da Conceição-Heldt, E. and Mello, P. A. (2017) ‘Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy
Analysis’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496.
Crescenzi, M. J. C. et al. (2012) ‘Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation’, In-
ternational Studies Quarterly, pp. 259–274. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00711.x.
Davidson, J. (2014) ‘Heading for the Exits : Democratic Allies and Withdrawal from
Iraq and Afghanistan’, Democracy and Security, 10(3), pp. 251–286.
Davis, J. W. and Jasper, U. (2014) ‘Non-strategic nuclear weapons as a “Trojan
horse”: explaining Germany’s ambivalent attitude’, European Security, 23(1), pp.
15–30.
248
Department of National Defence (DND). (1971) Defence in the 70s: White Paper
on Defence. Government of Canada, Donald Macdonald, Ministry of National
Defence.
Duffield, J. S. (1992) ‘International regimes and alliance behavior: explaining NATO
conventional force levels’, International organization, 46(4), pp. 819–855.
Eichenberg, R. C. (1993) ‘Dual Track and Double Trouble: The Two-Level Politics
of INF’, in Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., and Putnam, R. D. (eds) Double-Edged
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University
of California Press, pp. 45–75.
Elman, C. (1996) ‘Horses for courses: Why no neorealist theories of foreign policy?’,
Security Studies, 6(1), pp. 7–53.
Fearon, J. D. (1994) ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes’, The American political science review, 88(3), pp. 577–592.
Fearon, J. D. (1997) ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking
Costs’, The Journal of conflict resolution, 41(1), pp. 68–90.
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change’, International organization, 52(4), pp. 887–917.
Fjelstul, J. C. and Reiter, D. (2019) ‘Explaining incompleteness and conditionality in
alliance agreements’, International Interactions, 45(6), pp. 976–1002.
Foradori, P. (2012) ‘European Perspectives’, in Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and
Jeffrey D. McCausland (ed.) Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO. Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, pp. 279–299.
Foradori, P. (2013) ‘Introduction: debating the last remaining case of the forward
deployment of nuclear weapons’, in Foradori, P. (ed.) Tactical nuclear weapons
and Euro-Atlantic Security. London: Routledge.
Fortmann, M. and Larose, M. (2004) ‘An Emerging Strategic Counterculture?: Pierre
Elliott Trudeau, Canadian Intellectuals and the Revision of Liberal Defence Pol-
icy concerning NATO (1968–1969)’, International Journal. Translated by S. M.
Murphy, 59(3), pp. 537–556.
249
Fuhrmann, M. and Sechser, T. S. (2014) ‘Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the
Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments’, The Journal of conflict resolution, 58(3),
pp. 455–480.
Futter, A. (2011) ‘NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe’, European Security, 20(4), pp. 547–562.
Gartzke, E. and Gleditsch, K. S. (2004) ‘Why Democracies May Actually Be Less
Reliable Allies’, American journal of political science, 48(4), pp. 775–795.
Gaubatz, K. T. (1996) ‘Democratic states and commitment in international relations’,
International organization, 50(1), pp. 109–139.
Gerring, J. (2008) ‘Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quan-
titative Techniques’, in Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Brady, H. E., and Collier, D.
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford University Press.
Gibler, D. M. (2008) ‘The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation’,
The Journal of conflict resolution, 52(3), pp. 426–454.
Granatstein, J. L. and Bothwell, R. (1990) Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian
Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Grieco, J. M. (1988) ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International organization, 42(3), pp. 485–
507.
Halloran, M. (2006) ‘ “A Planned and Phased Reduction”: The Trudeau Government
and the NATO Compromise, 1968-1969’, in Nuenlist, C. and Locher, A. (eds)
Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO 1956-1972. Zurich: Center
for Security Studies, pp. 125–43.
Harald, F. G. M. (2013) ‘Germany’, in Foradori, P. (ed.) Tactical nuclear weapons
and Euro-Atlantic Security. London: Routledge.
250
Head, I. and Trudeau, P. E. (1995) ‘Nuclear Weapons: The Canadian Dilemma’, in
The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968-84. Toronto: Mc-
Clelland & Stewart, pp. 65–95.
Heidt, D. (2012) ‘ “I think that would be the end of Canada”: Howard Green, the
Nuclear Test Ban, and Interest-Based Foreign Policy, 1946–1963’, The American
review of Canadian studies, 42(3), pp. 343–369.
Hellyer, P. (1990) ‘Early Days and Politics’, in Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to
Unify Canada’s Armed Forces. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, pp. 1–31.
von Hlatky, S. (2014) ‘Transatlantic cooperation, alliance politics and extended deter-
rence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons’, European Security, 23(1), pp.
1–14.
Horovitz, L. (2014) ‘Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons’, European Security,
23(1), pp. 73–89.
John Ikenberry, G. (2002) America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kamp, K.-H. and Remkes, M. G. R. C. N. (2011) Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing
Arrangements. Nuclear Threat Initiative, pp. 76–95.
Kent, T. (1988) ‘The Nuclear Error’, in A Public Purpose : An Experience of Lib-
eral Opposition and Canadian Government. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, pp. 187–199.
Keohane, R. O. and Martin, L. L. (1995) ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’,
International security, 20(1), pp. 39–51.
Kertzer, J. D. and Brutger, R. (2016) ‘Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the
audience back into audience cost theory’, American journal of political science,
60(1), pp. 234–249.
251
Koster, K. (2013) ‘The Netherlands’, in Foradori, P. (ed.) Tactical nuclear weapons
and Euro-Atlantic Security. London: Routledge.
Kreps, S. (2010) ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public
Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy
Analysis, 6(3), pp. 191–215.
Kristensen, H. M. (2005) U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold
War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning. Natural Resources Defense Council.
Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M. (2021) ‘United States nuclear weapons, 2021’, The
Bulletin of the atomic scientists, 77(1), pp. 43–63.
Kroenig, M. (2016) The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deter-
rence. Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.
LaMarsh, J. (1969) ‘N.A.T.O’, in Judy LaMarsh: Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded
Cage. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, pp. 13–35.
Lamothe, D. (2016) ‘The U.S. stores nuclear weapons in Turkey. Is that such a good
idea?’, The Washington Post, 19 July. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/19/an-old-nuclear-weapons-deal-raises-
new-questions-about-u-s-bombs-in-turkey/ (Accessed: 4 June 2021).
Langlois, C. C. (2012) ‘Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships: The Ally’s
Decision to Renege’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29(2), pp. 148–169.
Leeds, A. B., Long, A. G. and Mitchell, S. M. (2000) ‘Reevaluating alliance reliability
: Specific threats, specific promises’, The Journal of conflict resolution, 44(5), pp.
686–699.
Leeds, B. A. (1999) ‘Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and
International Cooperation’, American journal of political science, 43(4), pp. 979–
1002.
252
Leeds, B. A. (2003) ‘Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions
to Violate Treaties’, International organization, 57(Fall), pp. 801–827.
Leeds, B. A. and Anac, S. (2005) ‘Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Perfor-
mance’, International Interactions, 31(3), pp. 183–202.
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M. and Vogel, J. S. (2009) ‘Interests, institutions, and the
reliability of international commitments’, American journal of political science,
53(2), pp. 461–476.
Leeds, B. A. and Savun, B. (2007) ‘Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate
Agreements?’, The journal of politics, 69(4), pp. 1118–1132.
Lennox, P. (2010) ‘Nuclear Weapons, 1945-2009’, in At Home and Abroad: The
Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World. Vancouver: UBC
Press, pp. 56–70.
LeVeck, B. L. and Narang, N. (2016) ‘How International Reputation Matters: Revis-
iting Alliance Violations in Context’, International Interactions, 43(5), pp. 797–
821.
Levendusky, M. S. and Horowitz, M. C. (2012) ‘When Backing Down Is the Right
Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience’, The journal of politics,
74(2), pp. 323–338.
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